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Alexander Campbell
Candidus Essays (1820-1822)

 

THE REPORTER.
"'TIS PLEASANT, THROUGH THE LOOP-HOLES OF RETREAT, TO PEEP AT SUCH A WORLD--
TO SEE THE STIR OF THE GREAT BABEL, AND NOT FEEL THE CROWD.
"

VOL. II. NO. 48. WASHINGTON, (PA.) MONDAY, APRIL 23d, 1821. WHOLE NO. 100.

FOR THE REPORTER.
No. 12.

      MR. EDITOR,

            SIR--Mr. Timothy tells us in his first No. that "his object is the preservation of the public morals."1 From this sentence and others of similar import, it is insinuated, That my efforts are levelled against the public morals. Now I would think that a man of Mr. T's sense of honor, should not deal so much in dark innuendos. Let him plainly assert that I am an enemy to pubic morals, that I delight in immorality and wickedness, as my native element, and that I aim at the exterpation of all moral order and not like the crafty Ulysses attempt,

-------------"Spargere voces
In vulgum ambiguas"------

But is it so, that T. and all those who have opposed me, have really, and in fact, identified the existing custom of fining men for sabbath breaking, with morality, so that he who opposeth this practice is thereby to be branded immoral and profane? Do they think so? Then they must think, that all those who do not fine men for all such vices as drunkenness, profanity, and sabbath breaking, are immoral and profane; and those who speak or write against fines and imprisonment, as means of moralizing, are accounted as apostles of immorality and profanity and to be treated as demoralizers of society. Such views suit the latitude of Madrid or Goa, they are not suitable to the climate of Pennsylvania. But, perhaps, they do not think so, they merely intend to hold up to odium him whom they are conscious they cannot refute. Upon this hypothesis--perverse are their hearts, and immoral their efforts. Let us hope better things of Mr. T. and suppose that it is with him, We cant of his colleagues; rather let us impute it to a defect in his understanding, than to any perversity of heart--And is it not a defect, a great defect in the understanding of any man, to hold any thing human, so sacred, as to suppose it immoral or profane to call it in question? Is it not a defect in the understanding of any man, to think, that the law of '94 and morality stand or fall together? Is it not a defect in the understanding of any man, to think, that before the law of '94, and the existence of moral societies, there was little or no morality, in the state of Pennsylvania. Is it not a defect in the understanding of any man, to suppose, that either moral societies, or inquisitions have ever ameliorated society, or reduced the quantum of actual wickedness? From such views, and from such only, can all those dark innuendos proceed. I choose rather to attribute them to the head, than to the heart of so good a man as Timothy. It is then the opinion of Timothy, and his colleagues, that he that opposeth the moral association of West Middletown, or the law of 1794, is in that very act, immoral and profane.

      But seeing I consider moral societies, a moral evil, and the laws under which they act, as immoral in their tendency, however well intended) the query is; whether I may not with as much propriety, and with as high a claim, on the faith of the community, as T. say, that "my object is the preservation of public morals." Have I not said and demonstrated that he who pockets the 4 dollars, taken from the sabbath breaker, is as great a sinner as he who violates the sabbath?" It would then seem that I am moved to oppose the "moral associations" from a conviction that they are immoral in their tendency. My object, then, is ostensibly the same, as that of Timothy. Consequently I have as good a right to insinuate against the immoral tendency of T's remarks as T. has to insinuate against mine. But as it would argue a great defect in the understanding of any man, to think, or to say, that two or three persons cannot have the same object in view, and yet differ in the means of accomplishing it; or, in the best way of carrying it into effect, I have insinuated nothing as to the intentions of my opponents. And as defects of the understanding, are amongst the objects of human commisseration, and not of resentment and disgust; it would be incompatible with my feelings to triumph over, or retaliate upon Timothy, believing, that he has so completely identified morality and the law of '94, that he cannot conceive of the one, as distinct from the other.

      I now proceed to examine his remarks on my 4th objection No. 9.2--I objected to the Judge's views of the law of 94, in the following words." "That the law itself is unjust, inasmuch as it is partial, it consults the taste and voluptuousness of the genteel folks in large cities, by allowing them to go to market morning and evening, (on the sabbath) to buy such things as may satisfy their craving appetite, while it would fine the poor farmer, for saving his harvest, or gathering the labors of the year, a work of much greater importance, than buying and selling fresh oysters, melons, leeks, and onions, or even a fresh beef-stake before sermons, or after worship." Now says T. the provisions of the law are exactly the reverse of what is here stated." The provision, says he allows--"The delivery of milk or the necessaries of life"--Not a word, adds he, "about fresh oysters, melons, but milk, and the necessaries of life, which shews the law to be in favor of the poor, not of the gentry" and finally winds up his remarks by saying, that what Mr. C. has stated concerning the laws in his 4th objection is exactly contrary to truth."--Such are the words of Timothy--Now sir, we have in the words cited, a remarkable proof, how eager T. is to impeach the veracity of C. And from the good will he has shewn, and the efforts he has made to accomplish this, he has almost excited us to sympathize with him, for his lamentable want of documents. There is no doubt, but it would be a great gratification to him, and some of his coadjutors, if he could only plausibly substantiate some foul charge against me. They have said so much on the supposed immoral tendency of my remarks, that it would add greatly to their felicity, if they could establish their insinuations, by some immoral act of him, whom they cannot conquer, so long as he is faithful to himself.

      Judge Rush says, in his charge, published in your paper, of the 6th Nov. last, that the law of '94--"authorizes the sale of the necessaries of life, before nine in the morning and after 5 in the afternoon, in our public markets." Mr. T. says--"the delivery of milk, or the necessaries of life." Now the Judge and Timothy must adjust this difference of statement between themselves. I quoted the Judge, and considered his authority good, in any thing pertaining to a fair representation of the law of the state.3

      The question which is necessary to be proposed, to send, Mr. T's accusations to those regions of darkness, whence it came, is--"what are considered the necessaries of life?" Doubtless they are more than milk"--I presume Mr. T. considers an onion, a beefstake, and even a melon in its own season, amongst the necessaries of life: or, may be, he wishes for no more than bread and milk. But there is a question which, perhaps, explains what, the inhabitants of cities themselves consider the necessaries of life; for whatsoever is bought or sold in the public market, protected by public law, on the sabbath day, must be considered a necessary of life--This question is--Are not those articles and many others, such as fresh fish, sweetmeats &c. bought and sold in our large cities on the sabbath day? And has it ever been determined in any court of justice, that such are not necessaries of life? Or is there any phraze in every body's mouth, of greater latitude, than the phraze, the necessaries of life. I maintain, then, that while the law "authorizes the sale of the necessaries of life," according to the common acceptation, it allows those things, and others of a similar nature to be sold, Timothy to the contrary notwithstanding--It is somewhat laughable to hear T. conclude that the "intention of the law is in favor of the poor--not of the gentry."--Pray Mr. T. do the rich stand in no need of the necessaries of life? Do riches elevate a man above the common wants of mankind? And must the "spirit" and "the intention" of the law, be always plead by you, to get rid of the consequences attached to the existence of it? Or are we to suppose, that the gentry would be fined for buying the necessaries of life, while the poor might purchase them with impunity?

      I presume it is unnecessary to expose further the futility of Mr. T's comment upon the 4th objection--when we detract from it, its virulence, what remains is, "vox et preterea nihil." The only word in my objection which might be cavilled at, is the word "genteel folks" as if the law only favored the rich, but who does not know, that this term is ironically applied to both rich and poor, that inhabit large cities, when contrasted with clodhoppers, and such uncouth folks?--But some way or other Mr. T. had fastened upon the word "genteel" the idea of rich, and then talks away upon rich and poor, at great length--as if none were genteel but the rich. Perhaps, this is, indeed, the sentiment of Mr. T. and therefore in order to be genteel, he makes violent efforts to be rich.

      Mr. T. has a remarkable sentence in his comment upon this 4th objection --I have not yet noticed it--it reads thus--"Nor does the law say any thing about fining the poor farmer for saving his harvest, but on the contrary, it expressly permits "works of necessity and charity" --Indeed! while the law prohibits all servile labor on the sabbath, except such as is specified in its provisos, I was foolish enough to suppose, that "saving a harvest," not being amongst the servile labor excluded from the penalty of the law, by any proviso in it, was necessarily subjected to the penalty. But in the judgment of this sagacious logician Mr. T the law permits the farmer to save his harvest because forsooth, it says nothing against it! Then according to this new logic, a farmer may clear land, a carpenter build houses, or a cabinet maker make desks, on the sabbath with impunity as to the law, because, according to this learned reasoner, the law says nothing about these things! Yes, Mr. Editor, you may set types all the sabbath day, or write on any political subject with impunity, for the law says nothing about such things! What a blessing it is to possess an understanding so acute, so comprehensive, so well cultivated, as that of this learned gentleman!--

      But with regard to these "works of necessity and charity," which T. mentions I have a few observations to make which if correct, levels the whole edifice Mr. T. has been constructing and the law protecting in the dust, and irrecoverably ruins the whole project. I presume Mr. T. from the remarks he has published, argues that the Sabbath is merely changed from the seventh to the first day of the week, as he has learned in the Catechism, and that the moral obligation, to its observance, is derived from the 4th commandment, as he has referred to it in his 1st No. In this respect he agrees with the leaders of the West-Middletown association, and with thousands of professed christians. On this hypothesis, I predicate what follows. Now, Mr. Editor, I should be glad to know from Mr. T. how he can approve the law of '94, which really sets up a system of Sabbath profanation, and establishes it in a systematic way. The divine law says, "on the Sabbath thou shalt not do any work." The law of '94 makes provision for buying and selling the necessaries of life on the Sabbath; as a "work of necessity," I presume. The divine law positively says, "six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work." The law of '94 says thou mayest violate this commandment, inasmuch, as thou mayest do a part of thy work on the Sabbath, such as to obtain the necessaries of life. The divine law says, "ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitation upon the Sabbath day." (Ex. 35, 3,) The law of '94 says, you may cook your own victuals; and tavern keepers may prepare victuals for travellers. The divine law says, "thou shalt bear no burden on the Sabbath day." But the law of '94 makes provision for those bearing burthens, nay, allows a man to bear burthens and to carry whole families over rivers at all public ferries on the Sabbath day. The divine law positively says that, "whosoever doeth any work, thereon shall surely be put to death." (Ex. 35, 2,) The law of '94 says, in fact, by no means, he shall only pay four dollars and pass on." The man who only gathered a burden of sticks on the Sabbath day, under the divine law, was stoned to death, but the man who commits a similar offence under the law of '94 either passes on with impunity, or forfeits some very trifling consideration. I say then, and who can disprove it, that if the 4th precept of the Decalogue is obligatory on Pennsylvania, that the law of '94 is immoral and profane. And that T. who advocates it is so far advocating the cause of immorality and profanity. Think not Mr. Editor that I am beside myself--I speak the words of truth and soberness. Think not that the trite salvo, concerning "works of necessity" will bear out Mr. T. or the law of '94.--The doctrine of works of necessity is a pliable doctrine, it is not taught in all the laws concerning the Sabbath in the Bible; it is the doctrine of the "children's Catechism."--I ask, for a hint in all the laws respecting the Sabbath in the sacred canon, authorising the works of necessity--I ask any man of sense, who dare think for himself--was it not as necessary for the Jews to eat, and drink, and be warm, as it is for us? --Was it not as necessary for them, to carry into their houses, burdens of water, and fuel, and food, on the Sabbath, as it is for us? I ask why then was it death for them to do any work upon the Sabbath. While we, under the same law, do all those things with impunity?--I say tell me nothing of your fancied works of necessity, one fact recorded in the 16th of Ex. overthrows the whole scheme. When the Jews were in the wilderness, travelling on towards Canaan, three miracles were wrought to prevent them from doing one of those works of necessity. On the 6th day, there fell a double portion of Manna, which was a miracle of no little consequence--If the Jews kept the Manna over night, on any night of the week, except the night preceding the Sabbath, it stank-- this was a second miracle. And for a third miracle, there did not fall a particle of Manna on the Seventh day. So that if three miracles were wrought to prevent the necessity of one work of necessity, when the Jews were in a sojourning state; can we think, that after they got possession of the good land, they ever could be in such circumstances, while they kept God's law, as would lay them under the necessity of doing one work of necessity. It would be absurd to suppose it. No, I repeat it again, that if the moral obligation of the 4th commandment remains--the law of Pennsylvania, upon this subject, is worse than solemn mockery; and, if this is not yet obligatory, the state has no business with it. Between the horns of this dilemma I leave Mr. T. and the law to work their own way for the present.

  CANDIDUS.      
      April 13, 1821.  


      1 "Timothy" [Andrew Wylie], "For the Reporter. No. 1," The Reporter 2, 38 (12 February 1821):2-3.
      2 "Timothy" [Andrew Wylie], "For the Reporter. No. 2," The Reporter 2, 39 (19 February 1821):1.
      3 The law of 1794 says, "Provided always, That nothing herein contained shall be constructed to prohibit . . . the delivery of milk, or the necessaries of life, before nine of the clock in the forenoon, nor after five of the clock in the afternoon of the same day." "An Act for the Prevention of Vice and Immorality, and of Unlawful Gaming, and to Restrain Disorderly Sports and Dissipation," in The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, vol. 15 (Harrisburg: C. F. Aughinbaugh, 1911):111.

[The Reporter, 23 April 1821, p. 1.]


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Alexander Campbell
Candidus Essays (1820-1822)