Mr. Chairman: It seems a very hard matter, indeed, to reason logically when we have nothing to reason against. We require not only to have premises established from which to reason, but we must [72] have a definite object for which to reason. There is scarcely anything tangible or pertinent in Mr. Owen's last address, any more than in his preceding ones. He has not put himself to the trouble to investigate or to discriminate with regard to the difficulties involved in our argumentation, if such it may be called. My friend might naturally have anticipated to have been met, in the course of this discussion, with "How did man come into existence?" Are we going to extinguish all the lights we have upon this momentous question without presenting a single spark in lieu thereof? If man did not make himself, then, I ask, how came he into existence? Again, we have presented some (as we conceive) insuperable difficulties in the way of Mr. Owen's views of irresponsibility. We have urged upon him this difficulty. We have proved that his theory reduces the idiot and the sage to the same level of irresponsibility. And we did expect (reasonably we think) that he would have adverted to, and at least attempted to remove this stumbling block. But Mr. Owen, it seems, has found it convenient to pretermit all notice of this part of our remarks. He has favored us, gratuitously too, with some very good remarks upon temperance. Assuredly Mr. Owen knows that there is no controversy about temperance between us; that I have no objection to men's enjoying the blessings of temperance, and of a sound and healthy action of mind and body. But what has this to do with the argument before us?

      I presented another difficulty in the way of my unreserved admission of the proposition that "our will has, in no sense, any power over our belief." I have contended that our will has power over our assent to the verity of a matter submitted to our understandings as a matter of belief. To this he has paid no regard, in his last speech. Volition cannot create the evidence on which belief must be founded, but it can give stimulus and impulse sufficient to put us upon the investigation of the character of that evidence. Suppose, as Mr. Owen states, that it was my interest that did excite me to investigate the testimony offered, am I not at liberty to act according to what I conceive to be my true interest? And if I so act, do I not act rationally and voluntarily? Seeing my interest, have I not liberty to make a start in pursuit of it? Consequently our volitions have power in influencing and inducing our belief. In some instances we are compelled to believe.

      I might not wish a fact to be true, and yet might be unable to resist the force of the evidence; and, on the other hand, I might wish it to be true, and yet be unable to believe it for want of satisfactory evidence. Thus contradictory to our volitions, such is the sovereignty of evidence to compel belief. This we admit most cheerfully; but from such particular instances to infer a general and universal conclusion, is a [73] sophism of the most palpable detection. I would not sacrifice a single truth that might appear to combat a favorite point for any momentary triumph.

      Philosophers run as much into extremes as any other persons. Because Mr. Owen finds instances where belief is involuntary, or, at least, not dependent upon any previous determination, he asserts universally, that, in no case whatever, does our belief depend upon our will. But this we shall, in its own place, still farther develop.

      Instead of adverting to the difficulties proposed in my last speech, Mr. Owen told us he could never believe that a good and wise being could create a Devil: yet he could believe that the Devil created himself, or that a wise and kind Nature created evil. Natural evils and moral evils do exist from some cause; there are poisons, pains, and death. Yet, with Mr. Owen, there is neither a God nor a Devil! Everything made itself, or all things together made each separate agent!!

      Nor can he endure the idea of misery existing anywhere. The thought of any sentient being suffering hereafter, would convert his heaven into a place of torment. He has high conceptions of his future sensibilities! They must be much more perfect than at present: for he can sleep sound and enjoy all animal and social comforts, day and night, without ever thinking or feeling unhappy at the thought--

      He seems now to enjoy himself, unconscious that there are myriads suffering all the fiercer tortures of mind and body, but yet fancies that the thought of any human being suffering hereafter, would make him most wretchedly unhappy! His sensibilities are very fantastic.

      I will now, for the sake of eliciting investigation, submit an outline of what I conceive to be the constituents of the human being. Taking myself for one of the species, and as a sample of the race, I proceed to examine myself with a view to discriminate accurately what manner of being I am; I look at my exterior, my corporeal powers, and senses. Of the latter I perceive that I have five. Through these communications are made to some internal power or principle called the mind. [74] The mind through the senses, by what is called sensation, has the power of perception, by which I become acquainted with all things external. By memory I become acquainted with all things past; by consciousness I become acquainted with all things internal. All philosophers agree that we have the powers of perception, memory, and consciousness. Now sensation, perception, memory, and consciousness are just as distinct from each other as the ear, eye, or hand. But these constitute the mind as our different members constitute the body. These faculties are as distinct in their operations as are the different members and organs in the animal part of man. I repeat for the sake of perspicuity and emphasis, that by perception we become acquainted with all things external. By memory we take cognizance of all things past. By consciousness we become acquainted with things internal. Such of these as are active powers act independently of volition. But I ask--Have we any other powers or faculties capable of acting independently of volition? I say No. We have, however, the powers of recollecting, reflecting, imagining, reasoning, and judging. These operations of the human mind are dependent upon volition; or, in other words, it depends upon volition, whether I shall or shall not exercise my powers of recollecting, reflecting, imagining, reasoning, or judging. Mr. Owen, it appears to me, confounds our appetites with our highest powers. These I would designate by the term instincts. But our appetites, affections, passions, and judgment affect the will, and determine to action. I hope Mr. Owen will either affirm or deny, that we may examine our mental powers, for he seems to overlook them in his system. I beg leave to submit this analysis of our mental powers, in order to ascertain what is the primitive character of the mind. At present we are utterly unable to discover whether Mr. Owen recognizes any distinction between our perception, memory, and consciousness, and our appetites, affections, and passions.

      But Mr. Owen has gone so far as to inform us that our ideas of a Deity, Devil, etc., are fanciful. I am glad to hear the assertion, because it may present something tangible. Are we to admit the assertion that the idea of a God is fanciful, or shall we join issue upon this assertion? I have no objection to rest the whole merits of the discussion upon this assertion. This is a tangible position taken by my opponent.

      I repeat, that if my opponent can make that assertion good, I will give up the cause I advocate. If he will join issue with me upon this assertion, the scope and compass of this discussion will be much contracted. I conceive that the whole of my opponent's declamation has been entirely irrelevant to the premises before us, and that it has no [75] connection with the real merits of the questions we are to debate. The question whether all religions are founded in ignorance, is a question of fact--of plain, simple, tangible, veritable, demonstrable fact. A man need not to be a sage before he can become a Christian. The truth of religion depends altogether upon facts--facts which can be apprehended as easily by the unlearned as by the wise. I well know, my friends, that the real merits of this question do not rest where, for the sake of an issue, I have proposed to rest them; but I repeat, that I will rest the whole merits of this controversy upon my opponent's being able to establish the assertion, that the idea of God is a fancy. I know very well that it is very difficult to render a clear and perspicuous demonstration of an abstract and metaphysical hypothesis. Were we as well acquainted with the extent and measure of our intellectual as we are with those of our physical powers, we could soon settle this controversy. Were I to tell you that I had seen a man take up the Andes in his hand and cast them into the ocean, you would unhesitatingly say that it was false; because you know by experience, and the most extensive observation, that this is far beyond the measure of any human strength. But when I say that a man could as easily, by the exercise of his own native, inherent, unaided human strength, take up the mountains and cast them into the sea, as he could originate the idea of a God, you would feel a great deal more hesitancy in giving a plump negative to the assertion--you would immediately say this is a question of much more difficult solution than the former--it is abstract and metaphysical: it is de rebus spiritualibus, and not de rebus naturalibus.

      I did not propose those questions yesterday with a view to puzzle my opponent. As far as I have been able to penetrate these subjects I am conscious that no man can solve these questions, but by an admission of the principle for which I contend. These questions were therefore, tendered to my friend in order to bring his own mind to reason upon them, and thereby enable it to arrive at logical conclusions. But I cannot consent to go on with the discussion in this way. I am willing to receive and examine Mr. Owen's ablest arguments in support of his cause. And I do wish for his own sake, and for the sake of truth, that he would come out in his whole argumentative strength in advocacy of his proposition. More good than Mr. Owen has ever dreamed of may result from a correct and fair investigation of this subject. I should like to be told why we should not, on Mr. Owen's principles, love stones and trees as well as men.

      Mr. Owen has told us, moreover, that the Millennium is coming, when we shall all be independent; that is, in his acceptation, we shall have like sympathy for trees and stones as for each other. Am I not [76] warranted in calling all this impertinent declamation? But, I must resume my disquisition upon the old skeptics, as I have nothing before me in Mr. Owen's last speech, pertinent to our discussion. When my last half hour expired I was going on to show how the skeptics involve everything in mysticism. No skeptics ever could agree upon any system of human nature.

      "Man is the work of nature," says the philosopher. But who, or what is nature? Of her he appears as ignorant as the deist of his "God of nature." He attempts to define nature: "Nature, in its most extended signification, is the great whole that results from the assemblage of different matter, of its different combinations, and of their different motion which the Universe presents to view." But Nature, the mother of us all, is here said to be a child of matter and motion. The sage defines her again: "Nature, in a less extended sense, or considered in each being, is the whole that results from its essence; i. e., of the properties, combinations, motions, or different modifications by which it is distinguished from other beings." This makes the nature of each being the result of its own essense!! But we shall hear his definition of one being, viz: man: "Man is, in the whole, the result of the combination of certain matter, endowed with peculiar properties, of which the arrangement is called organization, and of which the essense is to feel, to think, to act, and, in short, to move after a manner distinguished from other beings with which he can be compared." Now if nature be something different from matter, motion, or the essense of particular bodies, can these be called nature, or can she be called the author of them!! But the sage, feeling the darkness and confusion of his former definitions, gives an extra definition in the way of an admonition: "Whenever I make use of the expression 'nature produces an effect,' I have no intention of personifying that nature which is purely an abstract being."

      But he talks of the LAWS OF NATURE. Is she a lawgiver? The laws of a stone are just as puissant as the laws of Nature. Is Nature the governor, and the governed--the agent and the patient--or is the term law equivalent to the term nature?!

      There are some who glory in being rational, and condemn others as irrational. The rationals censure the irrationals for their ignorance of the system of religion which they embrace, or rather, for having any system which they do not fully comprehend. After this, who would expect to hear a person professing to teach and to admire what he calls the SYSTEM OF NATURE, confessing in piecemeal his ignorance of the whole of it? Yet such is the author of the System of Nature. [77]

      We shall now state the dogmas and mysteries of atheism:--

      First. Of the dogmas.

      1. "The Universe presents but matter and motion."

      2. "From the action and reaction of the beings which the Universe contains, result a series of causes and effects."

      3. "Man is the work of Nature."

      4. "Motion is guided by constant and invariable laws."

      Now for a confession of ignorance on those dogmas and topics connected with them--

      1. "The different principles of each of these motions are unknown to us, because we are ignorant of what originally constitutes the essence of these things. We know bodies only in the mass; we are ignorant of their intimate combinations, and the proportions of those combinations."

      2. "If we have a mind to find the principle of action in matter and the origin of things; it is forever to fall back into difficulties, and to absolutely abridge the examination of our senses, which only can make us know and judge of the causes capable of acting upon them, or impressing on them motion."

      3. "We know nothing of the elements of bodies."

      4. "The mind most practiced in philosophical observations, has frequently the chagrin to find that the most simple and most common effects escape all his researches and remain inexplicable to him."

      5. "We are ignorant of the ways of nature, or of the essence of beings"--"Let us therefore content ourselves with avowing that nature has resources which WE KNOW NOT OF."

      6. "If they ask FROM WHENCE MAN HAS COME, we reply, that experience does not enable us to resolve this question, and that IT CANNOT REALLY INTEREST US. It suffices for us to know, that man exists, and that he is constituted in a manner to produce the effects of which we see him capable."

      7. "PERHAPS this earth is a mass, detached in the course of time, from some other celestial body--PERHAPS it is the result of those spots, or those incrustations which astronomers perceive on the sun's disc; which from thence have been able to diffuse themselves into our planetary system--PERHAPS this globe is an extinguished, or displaced comet, which heretofore occupied some other place in the regions of space; and which, consequently, was then in a state to produce beings very different from those which we find in it now."

      8. "We CONJECTURE that the human species is a production peculiar to our globe, in the position in which it is found, and when this [78] position shall happen to be changed, the human species will change, or will be obliged to disappear."

      9. "IT IS PROBABLE that man was a necessary consequence of the disentangling of our globe, or one of the results of the qualities or properties of the energies of which it was susceptible--that he was born male and female--that his existence is co-ordinate with that of the globe."

      10. "THE PRIMITIVE MAN did perhaps differ more from the actual man, than the quadrupeds differ from the insects."

      11. "It is impossible for us to know what they will become, as to know what they have been."

      12. "It is not given to man to know his origin; to know the essence of things, nor to know their first principles; but we may conclude that he has no just reason to believe himself a privileged being in nature."

      13. "We know not the nature of magnetism, of electricity, of elasticity, of attraction, or cohesion."

      14. "The most simple motions, the most ordinary phenomena, the most common modes of action, are inexplicable mysteries, of which we shall never know the first principles."

      This, which is but a sample, we must give as a specimen of the ignorance confessed by those who pretend to believe that Christianity is based upon the ignorance of mankind. I have extracted these fourteen assertions in their own words.

      1. The origin of Matter.

      2. The principle of motion in Matter.

      3. The specific origin of the Earth.

      4. The origin of Man.

      5. The elements of Bodies.

      6. The nature of Magnetism.

      7. The nature of Attraction.

      8. The nature of Repulsion.

      9. The nature of Cohesion.

      10. The nature of Elasticity.

      11. The nature of Electricity.

      12. The destiny of the whole or any part of the Universe.

      13. Our belief, in no case, depends upon our will, therefore, faith or belief, is necessary; consequently, original and divine.

      14. Knowledge, belief, and opinion, are all involuntary. The desire to know, a natural principle, has no effect upon our will; our consequent volition has no influence upon our knowledge. [79]

      The materialist has to confess as much ignorance and to believe more mysteries than the Christian. And this is neither the half nor the worst of it; he has to teach, admit, and contend for a number of absurd mysteries, besides those which he acknowledges, which, in fact, are much greater than any taught in the most corrupt schools of Christian priests. But they are of another kind, and therefore are not to be compared.

      1. The Materialist asserts, "That it cannot really interest man to know his origin." This is contrary to universal experience, and to the ardent desires of rational nature.

      2. The materialist asserts that "man has no just reason to believe himself a privileged being in nature." This is also contrary to experience, and the most common observation.

      3. He has, in any attempt to account for the origin of man, to suppose an absurdity; namely, that there were an infant male and female born or produced co-ordinate with the existence of the earth, and that these had no parent; consequently, could not possibly arrive at maturity. Experience has taught us that the first pair must have been adults when first ushered into being.

      4. He has to suppose, contrary to all experience, and to all history, that man was not originally like the species now.

      5. That there was first an acorn or a seed before there was a tree to produce it. Doubtless all the vegetable, as well as the animal kingdom was first in its prime before there was a seed fell into the earth.

      6. He is also compelled to suppose matter and motion originally possessed of powers of which they are now totally divested, and, therefore, has to reason against all experience. Nature cannot now produce a new genus or species in the animal or vegetable kingdom. By what rational evidence can it then be shown that ever she possessed such a power?

      7. He cannot give any rational account of how the idea of God or a Creator so universally obtained among mankind.

      8. He cannot show one single instance of either contingency or the blind laws of nature operating to produce a poem like Homer's Iliad, or Milton's Paradise Lost; to produce a house like this one; a steamboat; a ship; a watch; human eye; a hand; or a picture. Why then assert, contrary to all experience and observation, that nature produces the power of creating anything?

      The capital sins of ignorance, confessed by the materialist, amount to twice seven. The natural mysteries of their creed are also at least twice seven. And the artificial mysteries which they have recently superadded amount to seven. In this enumeration, we have followed [80] their method: we have not gone into the detail. The prominent items I have given in their own words. But there is one mystery that ought to be added, which is more than equal to that of transubstantiation in its worst aspect. It is this: Motion, say they, is a property of matter. But what gives regularity to motion? Why does it choose to move in order, or in any uniform course?

      Motion was so irregular, at one time, as to form out of two vegetables a man and a woman. They sprang up on the bank of a river in Asia. They grew with their faces toward each other, and when they were fully ripe, a gentle breeze broke them off the stem, and so put them in motion; and thus they formed an early attachment for each other, and have kept in motion ever since. But why motion should have acted so irregularly at that time, and kept so regular ever since, is the great mystery of mysteries of atheism.

      Before I sit down, I will give you the testimony of Lord Chesterfield, on this creed of the materialists. No man can suppose him either a bigot or an enthusiast, in religion. He says--

      "I have read some of Leed's sermons, and like them very well. But I have neither read nor intend to read those which are meant to prove the existence of God; because it seems to me too great a disparagement of that reason which he has given us, to require any other proof of his existence than those which the whole, and every part, of the creation afford us. If I believe my own existence, I must believe his. It cannot be proved a priori, as some have idly attempted to do, and cannot be doubted of a posteriori--Cato very justly says: 'And that he is, all nature cries aloud.'"--Elegant Epistle.

[COD 72-81]