YOUNG GENTLEMEN:--

      Were I asked what element or attribute of mind confers the greatest lustre on human character, I would not select it from those most conspicuous in the poet, the orator, the philosopher, or the elegant artist; I would not name any of those endowments which are usually regarded as superlative in adorning the reputation of the man of genius or of distinguished talent; I would not call it memory, reason, taste, imagination; but I would call it energy. I am sorry that it has not a more expressive and a more captivating name; but, gentlemen, that something which we call energy, is the true primum mobile--the real mainspring of all greatness and eminence among men. Without it, all the rarer and higher powers of our nature are useless, or worse than useless. The genius of a Milton, a Newton, a Locke or a Franklin, would have languished and expired, without achieving any thing for them, their country, or the human race, but for this peculiar vis a tergo--thin, active, operative and impulsive ingredient in the human constitution. Sustained and impelled by this impetus or power, endowments very moderate may accomplish--nay, have accomplished--more for human kind, than the brightest parts have ever done without it. That power, or element of our constitution, which makes humble talents respectable; respectable talents, commanding; commanding talents, transcendent; and without which the most splendid powers can effect nothing--may, we presume, be regarded as chief of the elements of human nature.

      Were I again asked what power, or art, or habit, most of all accelerates and facilitates the acquisition of knowledge, which most of all widens, deepens and enlarges the capacity of the human mind; feeling myself sustained by the oracles of reason and the decisions of experience, with equal promptitude I would allege that it is that undefined [125] defined and undefinable something, which no one comprehends, but which every one understands, usually called the faculty or art of attention--a power, indeed, not often appreciated, not easily cultivated, and never enough commended, even by the most devoted sons of literature and science. But a small remnant, an elect few of our race, have ever known how to use their eyes, their ears or their hands in the pursuit and acquisition of useful knowledge, much less how to direct and govern the operations of their own minds in the application of it.

      Of a great majority it may truly be said, though not in the identical sense of the Great Teacher, " Eyes they have, but they see not; ears they have, but they hear not; and powers of understanding, but they perceive not." They know not, indeed, how to use their senses, or their reason, on material nature, and therefore perform the whole journey of life with a few vague, indistinct, incomplete and misshapen conceptions; and finally embark for eternity without a clear, definite or correct idea of their relations to the universe, or of their responsibilities to Creator or creature.

      Some might consider this use of our perceptive powers as what is usually called observation. But what is observation? Another name for the attentive application of our minds, through the senses, to whatever passes before us in the operations of nature and society. And this again depends upon what the new school of mentalists have agreed to denominate concentrativeness. They have discovered, or think they have discovered, that there is a native, original and distinct power of the mind by which the other powers are concentrated, commanded or continued on the objects around us. This they have very aptly denominated our concentrativeness. Be this true or false in theory, one thing is evident--that without attention nothing is perceived, and consequently nothing learned; while by it, all nature and society, as they pass before us, find a way into the chambers of the human mind and are safely lodged in the spacious apartments of our intellectual nature, whence they diffuse themselves through all the avenues of human life and human action.

      And were I still further interrogated what other habit, art or power completes the measure of the comparative superiority of individual greatness, I would as decidedly and, I think, as rationally answer that it is the faculty or habit of classifying our acquisitions and conceptions under proper heads. It is the power of properly labelling every new thought, and of marshalling all our ideas under their proper captains on every emergency. It is the power of generalizing and of abstracting whatever is foreign to some grand idea, or some particular system. [126] or law or principle of nature. Every man will be eminent amongst his compeers in the ratio of his readiness and power to classify the objects of nature, society, art and religion; or, what is the same thin;, his views of them according to any given attribute or property which they may possess, or according to any end or object he may have in view.

      To a person well disciplined and practised in classification, all nature, society, literature, science, art, ever stand in rank and file before him, according to his intimacies with them. In the philosophy and skill of the greatest military chieftain that ever lived, he can assemble the greatest force to a given point in the shortest time. He, too, superlatively enjoys his own knowledge, just as the prudent mistress of a household, who has a place for every thing and every thing in its place, enjoys all her resources. He also sees order, harmony, variety, fitness, beauty, from a thousand points inaccessible to one destitute of this sovereign art.

      He that looks at the universe with a generalizing eye, looks at it with a discriminating perspicacity more individuating than his who rarely ascends from an individual to a species, or from a species to a genus; for, however paradoxical it may appear, the habit of generalizing is the habit of individuating; and he who classifies most expertly individuates most readily; and, therefore, he who best understands the species most clearly discerns the individual; and he most clearly perceives the species who best comprehends the genus under which it stands; just as he whose vision commands the largest horizon most distinctly discriminates the objects which it contains.

      To illustrate and enforce this important point is, gentlemen, a primary object of this address; and, to make it as useful as possible, I shall select three generic words as a proper theme for such a development. These are, LITERATURE, SCIENCE, ART. A definition of these terms--their comprehension, mutual dependence, and the connection of all true science with religion--shall constitute the outlines of my practical remarks at present.

      And how shall we define the generic term literature? You anticipate me, and, with one accord, reply, "The knowledge of letters." It is, gentlemen, neither more nor less than the knowledge of letters; but it is generic, and comprehends all sorts of letters--words, signs; languages. Contradistinguished from science and art, it simply means language and its laws. These principles or laws may, however, be classified and arranged into the form of a science--such as grammar, logic, rhetoric; and, according to our mode of considering or using [127] them, they become to us either sciences or arts. As subjects of study or contemplation, they are sciences; but, as precepts and rules of thought or of speech, they are arts. Hence they are called sciences or arts just as we approach them and use them. We must, however, keep to our definitions; and, having agreed that literature is the knowledge of letters and that a literary man is only a man of letters, we must hasten to our second definition.

      What is science? You answer, "The knowledge of things." You mean the constitution, attributes, operations and states of all the individual subjects on which we think, reason or discourse. True, very true, gentlemen; hence we may have sciences based on things themselves, or on their attributes--their operations and relations. Of these we presume not to fix the limits. You can convert any part of speech into a noun by making it the subject of a verb: so you can convert literature, art, or any thing on which you think, contemplate, reason, discourse, into a science. Still, however, science, properly so called, denotes that knowledge of things--their properties, operations, laws, relations--founded upon demonstration or certain and indubitable evidence.

      In former and less enlightened ages, we had but "seven sciences," "four elements" and "ten categories." Those ages have, however, been added to the years beyond the flood; and elements and categories and sciences have multiplied exceedingly, and replenished the earth with many valuable and splendid improvements.

      In this age of simplification and true science, a science means the accurate and certain knowledge of some particular subject. Thus, astronomy is the knowledge of the heavenly bodies and their laws. But, as we cannot be said to have the knowledge of any thing without knowing its laws or the changes to which it is subject, we may simplify still further, and say that astronomy is the knowledge of stars; geology, the knowledge of the earth; mineralogy, the knowledge of minerals; botany, the knowledge of trees and plants; zoology, the knowledge of animated beings, &c.

      And what is art? Art is the application of science, or it is the rules of some particular practice or calling, or it is the practice itself. Every science has its own peculiar and corresponding art; and, indeed, the use and end of all the sciences are the useful and liberal arts to which they give rise and for the sake of which they are acquired and cultivated. Thus, we naturally associate science and art, theory and practice, faith and obedience, as correlate terms--as mutually implying each other--especially the latter as presupposing the former; for [128] art without science, practice without theory, and obedience without faith, would be as anomalous and unnatural as an effect without a cause, fruit without blossoms, or a child without a parent.

      Our terms are now defined. Literature is the knowledge of the signs of thought; science, the knowledge of the things of thought; and art, the application of these signs and things to the numerous and varied ends of individual and social life. Each of these terms, as already observed, is generic, and represents a class--one grand abstract idea--from which all that is common to other ideas, and not individual, is separated. Literature, therefore, includes all that pertains to language or signs of ideas, ancient or modern, natural or artificial, from the alphabet of Cadmus down to the belles-lettres productions of the present day. The arts of reading, writing, speaking, grammar, logic, rhetoric, are but the practice of the theory of literature; for, like every thing else, literature has both its theory and practice. A mere literary person, however, is conversant only with letters or signs of thought, without regard to science or the useful and liberal arts. Could you accurately and elegantly speak and write all the languages of the world, living and dead, ancient and modern, from the hieroglyphics of Egypt to the apocalyptic symbols of unaccomplished prophecy, you would be only literary men--skilled in the names of things, the symbols of thought, the signs of ideas. It is freely admitted that in so much intercourse with books, so much attention to the signs of thought, much useful knowledge of men and things may be acquired, and that a literary man of high attainments will necessarily possess much valuable information in the study of ancient and modern dialects of thought; still, we must plead that such a person is greatly inferior to the man of science in point of really useful and practical knowledge, as he who can only name a horse in ten languages is greatly inferior in the knowledge of that useful and noble animal to the keeper of a livery-stable, who can only name the animal in his vernacular. Believe me, young gentlemen, a man with one language and many sciences, or even useful arts, is much more likely (for he is better prepared) to be a valuable and useful member of society, than he who has many languages and only one or two sciences. Except it may be in the departments of a translator or an interpreter, or in preparing others for those services, such persons are greatly overrated in society.

      But, as science, rather than literature or art, is the burden of our address, and as we have more in view than simple definition--combining, as far as we can, the definitions of important terms with the [129] laws of classification, and thus illustrating and commending its value we shall hasten to the classification of science, properly so called.

      The great end to be gained in classification is the proper distribution of all knowledge under proper heads, with a single reference to the easy acquisition and communication of it. A good and rational classification, then, is that which collects all that appertains to any one subject under a suitable designation, and clearly separates it from all that belongs to another category or subject. There are two great difficulties in perfecting such a classification of science: one, radical and as yet insuperable, is that no one science is so insular in its position, so separate and distinct from all others, as to be perfectly independent of them--so as never to borrow or lend a single idea. Such a science would be as singular as Robinson Crusoe, or Alexander Selkirk, in the island of Juan Fernandez: yet even he had his man Friday. A science perfectly isolated is not yet known; therefore our classifications are not bounded by insuperable barriers or mountain landmarks: they rather resemble the charters given by the kings and queens of England to the principal American colonists, setting forth the eastern, the northern and southern boundaries, but ending in the vague terms, "thence west to the Pacific Ocean," "the Lake of the Woods," or some unknown terminus in the midst of Indian tribes. Hence, as our western limits are yet undetermined, so one side of all our sciences is yet unsurveyed. The best classifications hitherto made are therefore imperfect. The other difficulty is found in the unfortunate fact that we have not yet acquired a perfect scientific language. All our vocabularies and nomenclatures are defective, and unfit for close and accurate definition or reasoning. Still, the best classification of science, in the absence of a perfect one, is that which collects all our knowledge of one subject under the best title and distinguishes it from every other.

      Mr. Locke, the great mental philosopher, was duly sensible of this, and sought to divide the whole world of ideas into provinces separate and distinct from each other. He so generalized ideas as to place them all under three distinct heads. These three genera generalissima, or grand generic ideas, are,--things, actions, signs; that is, things, as they are in themselves knowable; actions, as depending on us, in reference to our happiness; and signs, as they may be used in reference to our knowledge as regards both clearness and accuracy. According to this eminent Christian philosopher, all science pertains to these three, or these three engross all the science in the world:--"For," says he, "a man can employ his thoughts about nothing but either the contemplation [130] of things themselves for the discovery of truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his own actions, for the attainment of his own ends; or the signs he would make use of both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for his clearer information."

      The modern schools of Britain have sought to improve upon this view of the matter by reducing all science to two chapters. The head of the one is, "WHAT IS;" the of the other is, "WHAT OUGHT TO BE." The what is and the what ought to be, say they, are the sum total of all our knowledge. This is within one step of the ontological abstraction, which makes the word BEING the genus generalissimum, the highest and most comprehensive term in universal language. This is, however, too sublimated for practical purposes. The ontology and the deontology, or the what is and the what ought to be, of the most approved schools, would, I think, make five chief heads of science, or five chapters of sciences of sciences; for we are now seeking not for a particular science, but for a science of sciences. Following both Locke and the moderns, so far as they both can be followed by one person, or rather putting them together and forming a tertium quid, a new compound, we would have five sciences of sciences, or five general sciences, which would include the whole area of human knowledge; and if we must continue the old nomenclature, we should call them physics, metaphysics, mechanics, ethics and symbolics. By physics I mean natural truth, or truth in the concrete, as it is found in material nature; by metaphysics I mean artificial or abstract truth, or truths not found in nature, but inferred or generalized from nature; by mechanics we would denote truths that are simply useful; by ethics we intend truths moral and good in their operation; and by symbolics we mean the signs which are employed in acquiring and communicating these truths. We would thus represent truth as the matter of all science, and name the science from the nature or character of the truth of which it treats. Thus we would have truth in the concrete, truth in the abstract, truth as connected with simple utility, truth as connected with human happiness, and lastly, the signs of truth; or particular truths, general truths, useful truths, happifying truths, and the signs of truth.

      But, gentlemen, I will be told that this is too multiform an abstract of science reduced to five chapters, and that the inductive sciences are already well divided into natural, mental, moral; or, to speak more learnedly, into physical, psychological and ethical. With all due deference to the men of enlarged and liberal science, I object to this division [131] as quite indistinct, confused and defective. We have had physical and metaphysical sciences, natural and moral, speculative and practical, material and mental, and I know not how many other classifications, all, in my judgment, either too indefinite, too defective or too confused. The best of these, perhaps, is the natural, mental and moral; but do not these most wantonly run into each other's territories? The specific idea which is as essential to a science of sciences as to a particular science, is lost,--as, for instance, do we not find the specific idea of the mental in the natural, and the specific idea of the natural both in the mental and the moral? and does not this division leave out the science of signs altogether? If not, wherein does it excel the ontological and the deontological division already defined?

      In the classification of science, as in the arts and business of life, we seek some generic idea; and having found it, we arrange all things that have that idea in them, under the term or name which represents that idea. For example, if we contemplate sciences with regard to the subjects on which they treat, we prefix to them the name of that idea. That science which treats of simple being for the sake of discovering general or abstract truth, is properly called ontology, because that Greek compound represents the law, or reason, or nature of being in general. We call this science sometimes a speculative science, because it is a mere exercise of our intellectual powers--itself, too, the result of speculative reasoning and discussion upon simple existence, rather as a matter of intellectual or moral gratification, than of practical utility. It is, therefore, purely metaphysical. But those sciences which treat of the masses of matter that compose the universe, the structures and relations of all those parts that compose the immense whole, we properly call the physical sciences, contrasted with the former, which is properly metaphysical. Again, those sciences which treat of actions with a reference to utility--as the construction of all the necessaries and conveniences of life--are properly called mechanical by the mechanicians of the world. Those, however, that contemplate actions in reference to right, or to human happiness, are called moral, or ethical, from the earliest ages of philosophy. Thus, according to the division now contemplated, we would have two chapters of science on things, two chapters on actions, and one on signs; and this, after all, is but the perfection of Locke's views.

      These five chapters of science, namely, physics, metaphysics, mechanics, ethics and symbolics, cover the whole ground of English and American sciences, and are the completion of all the improvements from Locke to the present day. The two first concern being and truth, [132] or things particular and general; the next two contemplate actions as useful and good; and the last one treats of the signs of all our ideas in every department of our knowledge. They are, indeed, dependent on one another as much as the intellectual powers of man are dependent on his active or effective powers, and his active powers upon his intellectual.

      We shall now briefly notice the principal sciences that are found under these general heads or classes:--

      1. In the science of sciences called Physics, or physical sciences, we make seven primary sciences, viz. astronomy, geology, geometry, mineralogy, botany, zoology, chemistry. Gentlemen, neither approve nor disapprove this division till we have examined it. Our process of thinking and reasoning in making out this distribution is, we think, very natural. It is as follows:--In physics the generic idea is material nature. We then proceed to the specific sciences, which are the integral parts of it. This we do in the following manner:--1st. We look at the whole universe as composed of innumerable masses of matter spread out over infinite space, moved and moving by certain powers or laws, and tending to some grand result. The science that treats of all these masses and their laws we call astronomy. Of these systematic masses we select one, called the solar system; and of that system we again select one planet, our earth. Then comes, in the second place, the science of the composition and organization of our earth, called geology. But we cannot proceed any further in the study of the universe without some scaffolding; for the ideas of quantity, extension, magnitude, number, rush upon us, and so completely overwhelm us, that we set about measuring our earth that we may measure the universe; and hence arises, just at this point, the science of geometry, a word indicating the measurement of the earth; for we soon discover, with the ancients, that God has made the universe geometrically, by line, scales, weight and measure. Geometry, then, although an abstract science, is indispensable to the study of astronomy, geology, or even the geography of the earth. After the geology of the earth come its minerals, vegetables, animals. Each of these become separate and distinct subjects of science. Its minerals occupy the precincts of mineralogy; its trees, shrubs, plants, flowers, fruits, constitute the science of botany; and all animated beings become the subject of its zoology. Finally, the elements and simple substances, which form all its creations and of which the terraqueous sphere is composed, and all its inhabitants, form the substratum of the immense and sublime science of chemistry. Chemistry, indeed, is a system of [133] science in itself, and extends its jurisdiction, as a sort of supreme court, over all the physical sciences, geometry alone excepted. Whatever is not explained or understood in geology, mineralogy, botany, zoology, whatever caput mortuum, whatever residuum these sciences leave, is within the jurisdiction of chemistry, which has for its rich and extensive domains the elements, the simple substances, the combinations and uses of all the bodies in or upon this terraqueous ball. Like the Germanic Empire, a cluster of principalities, of little kingdoms, it is a subgeneric which might count almost seven times seven individual sciences, such as the science of light, caloric, oxygen, azote, hydrogen, carbon, &c. &c.; nay, it disputes the ground with what was formerly called "natural philosophy," and claims the old sciences of optics, dioptrics, catoptrics, pneumatics, hydrostatics; it takes the fossils, the minerals, the metals, the earths, the salts, the atmosphere itself, the solids, the liquids, the gases of our earth, under its care and keeping. Plants and animals are not wholly beyond its assumptions. Such is the seventh of the first series, or the last verse of the first chapter of the science of sciences.

      Such, my young friends, is the process of reasoning from which sprang the division of physics into astronomy, geology, geometry, mineralogy, botany, zoology, and chemistry. I wish you to bear in mind that man, in his physical constitution, belongs to the science of zoology; and, under this head, we may, perhaps, contemplate him at some other time.

      2. Metaphysics are not confined to any kingdom of nature, not even to the material universe; but in their daring and presumptuous flight speculate on time, space and eternity; on being, truth and goodness; on God, angels, and demons; on moral good and evil; on free agency and necessity; on mind and matter; on thought and language. We have the metaphysics of every science, such as speculative theology, speculative morality, speculative language, speculative philosophy, &c. &c.

      3. Mechanics.--Trigonometry, mensuration, surveying, navigation, gauging, dialling, architecture, sculpture, painting, &c. are chief among the sciences called mechanical. These sciences are often regarded as arts; but they are sciences first and arts afterwards.

      4. Ethics call for the whole science of man, and send us back to zoology for his animal existence. He is chief of the science of zoology. Of animated nature he is the consummation, as well as the head. But he is not all found in any one department of nature. There is a spiritual system as well as a material system. The science of Pneumatology, or of spiritual existence, is as comprehensive as the science of [134] astronomy. But as in physics, so in pneumatology. After speaking of astronomy, we take our earth, on which, and from which, to reason astronomically; so, after speaking of pneumatology, we take man, on whom, and from whom, to reason pneumatologically. For in man alone, of all physical beings, is there a distinct and an unequivocal portion of a spiritual system. But this view exhibits man as the subject of many sciences. Of all the physical sciences he is a part and portion, and he is himself the engrossing theme of a respectable number. His animal and human nature, in the hands of the physician, make him the subject of several sciences--such as anatomy, physiology, osteology, neurology, nosology, pathology and pharmacology.

      Besides these, in the hands of the jurisconsult he becomes the subject of the sciences of politics, of jurisprudence, of municipal, civil and criminal law. In the hands of the theologian he is also the subject of the canon law, the ecclesiastical law, the moral law and the Christian law.

      His perceptive, reflective, affective, communicative and mechanical powers make him the subject of the sciences of phrenology, grammar, logic, rhetoric, mechanics, ethics and religion.

      From these premises we may easily survey the sciences that properly range under the general head of Ethics. According to our best schools, they are--Natural Theology, as it is called, or the being and perfections of the Deity, as manifested in all the designs of material nature; Moral Science, properly so called; Political Science, properly so called; the Theory of a Future Life--Human Rights, Wrongs, Obligations and Responsibilities, &c. But, as Christians, we would abandon the doctrine of the schools, and substitute the Bible, the Law, the Gospel, the Adamic, Abrahamic and Christian institutions, as furnishing not merely a perfect code, but the proper motives and incentives to good morals.

      5. Symbolics.--This is our fifth and last head, and, as might have been inferred from our previous remarks on literature, we would enumerate seven distinct sciences as comprehended under this head. These are orthography, orthoepy, grammar, prosody, logic, rhetoric and every species of engraving or chirography. This is usually the first branch of science taught, but it ought also to be the last. The acquisition and the communication of knowledge being the chief end of education, that part which most subserves this high end ought to be first, midst and last.

      Gentlemen, after having made the tour of so many sciences, and ranged at large over a field so extensive, we have no time to descant upon the arts. I will only say that they are both the useful and the [135] fine or liberal arts. On the useful or mechanical arts there is no need that I detain you; and I will only say that the fine arts are not contrasted with the useful, as in opposition to them; but to distinguish them from such as are necessary or useful only. They are generally regarded as six; but I will add one to them. They are poetry, music, painting, sculpture, engraving, architecture of the different orders--to which I will add good manners.

      There remains but one point to consummate our plan--the connection of science, all true science, with religion. One might as rationally seek to comprehend an effect without any knowledge of its cause, as to comprehend any part of the science of the universe without some knowledge of its Author. God and his works are the basis of all the science in the world. But as the universe is not without God, nor God now without his universe, so no science, physical or ethical, can be thoroughly learned without the revealed knowledge of God. We study man in his works and in his word, and we contemplate our Creator through the medium of what he has done and said.

      The works of God are his first and most ancient revelation of himself; and had not man, by his apostasy, lost the art of reading and studying the works of God, he would not have stood in need of any other medium of knowing him, or of communicating with him, than this wonderful and greatly diversified volume of nature. And, even as it is, the intelligent Christian makes the greatest proficiency in studying nature and the Bible by making them subservient to each other--sometimes interpreting the Bible by nature, and at other times expounding nature by the Bible. They are two voices speaking for God--two witnesses of his being and perfections; but neither of them is wholly adequate to meet all the variety of human circumstance without the other.

      But we need no more striking evidence of the intimate connection between science and the Bible than the well-established fact, that all the great masters of science were believers in the Bible and cherished the hopes which it inspires. Bacon, the founder of the inductive philosophy; Locke, the great mental and moral philosopher; and Newton, the interpreter and revealer of nature's secrets, are known to the religious as well as to the scientific world as believers in the Bible and expounders of its doctrine, its precepts, types and promises. They are as eminent for their homage to the Bible as for their devotion to the studies of nature. Philosophy, with them, and Christianity were not at variance.

      They saw the immutable and inimitable traces and characters of one and the same Supreme Intelligence clearly and boldly written on every [136] page of the volumes of Creation, Providence and Redemption. They were persuaded that the still small voice which whispers in every star and in every flower speaks aloud in the language of authority and of love in all the precepts and promises of the law and of the gospel. Such were the great founders of the reigning philosophy and sciences of the present day. But I speak not of the first class only; for it seems as if the Father of Lights had vouchsafed all useful sciences, discoveries and arts to those who acknowledged his being and perfections, and to none else. So general, if not universal, is this feature of his providence, that I know not the name of the founder of any science, or the inventor of any useful art, or the discoverer of any great master-truth in any department of human thought; who did not acknowledge the God of the Bible and cherish the hope of a future life.

      I have permitted my mind to take a long retrospect into the annals of the great inventors and discoverers, the authors and founders of those sciences and arts that have since the dark ages new-modelled society and the world, to see if there was any one of them who had divorced nature and religion, or who had rejected the being, perfections and providence of God, or denied the authenticity and inspiration of his word. By the examination I have been greatly confirmed in my theory, that "the Secrets of the Lord are with them that fear him," even the great secrets of nature, as well as of his purposes and will in reference to the future. Beginning with the invention of the mariner's compass, in the early part of the fourteenth century, by Flavio Gioia, born A. D. 1300, and descending in a direct line down to Sir Humphry Davy, who but a few years since passed the Jordan of time, I observe that all the sciences and arts that have been introduced or perfected during the last five hundred years--which have made this century so unlike the year 1300--have been given to us by men who looked through nature, society and art up to nature's God.

      Of this sort were Dr. Fust, or Faust, a goldsmith of Mentz, who invented the art of printing on wooden blocks, and gave it to the world in 1430; Schaeffer, his son-in-law, who, in 1442, invented the casting of metallic types; Christopher Columbus, born at Genoa, 1442, who discovered a new world in 1492; Copernicus, born at Thorn, in Prussia, 1472, who proved the errors of the Ptolemaic system of the universe, and suggested the elements of the present demonstrative system; Tycho Brake, of Sweden, born in 1546, and Kepler, of Weil, of Wurtemberg, born 1571, who, though of somewhat conflicting opinions in some branches of the Copernican system, greatly advanced it by their discoveries; Galileo, born at Florence, 1564, who first discovered the gravity [137] of the air and sundry new astronomical truths, inventer of the pendulum and of the cycloid, and an able defender of the Copernican system; Descartes, too, a native of Touraine, born 1596, though erroneous in his doctrine of the vortices and in some metaphysical speculations, nevertheless in mathematics, algebra and in his Analytics greatly advanced the cause of science, and became the founder of the Cartesian philosophy, now reviving in some of its branches in Europe; Boyle, inventor of the air-pump,¹ born in 1626--one of the most retiring and devout of philosophers; Isaac Barrow, the light of the age in mathematics, philosophy and theology--the instructor of Newton--born in England, 1630. Passing over the famous epocha of Sir Francis Bacon, born 1561, Locke, born 1632, and Newton, born ten years after, 1642, we will only name Franklin, the American sage and distinguished philosopher, born 1706; Euler, born 1707; Ferguson, born 1710; Sir William Herschel, born 1738; James Watt, LL.D., born 1730, improver of the steam-engine first invented by the Marquis of Worcester, 1660, and author of various useful inventions; Robert Fulton, the inventor and constructor of the steamboat, born in Pennsylvania, 1766; and Sir Humphry Davy, born 1778, the enlarger and perfecter of the science of chemistry--all mighty men in science, or in the useful arts and discoveries which have really new-modelled the world. These, however, are not all the men of renown that should be mentioned in a catalogue of public benefactors in science and art. Some, indeed, might plausibly think that we ought to have begun with Roger Bacon, almost a century before the age of Gioia, and have given him and Schwartz a conspicuity in this class of renowned and noble spirits--Bacon, for his many new discoveries; and Schwartz, for his invention of gunpowder; but we have been rather too particular, our object being only to name the mighty chiefs in each department, and to adduce them in proof of this important point--that true science and religion are intimately associated both in theory and practice: otherwise we should have embellished our cloud of witnesses with the names of such men as Harvey, Gall, Spurzheim, &c. &c.

      There is but the name of La Place concerning whom infidelity itself could have the hardihood to complain. It might be said that the atheist La Place is worthy of a rank amongst the greatest of philosophers; but I ask, What new truth or science, or new art, did he discover or teach? Newton opened the door and led the way for him into the study of nature. [138]

      "But Franklin," says the skeptic, "belonged to us." Strange arrogance, indeed! Read the epitaph on his tombstone, sketched by his own hand; and see his hope of a future life and his acknowledgment of his Creator and Benefactor unequivocally expressed therein.

      It was observed that one of the principal difficulties in the proper classification of science and of human knowledge is found in the fact that all the sciences run into each other, and are separated rather by gradations than by clear and prominent lines of demarcation. Now, if this be true in physics or ethics, it is most certainly and evidently true of their connection and intimacy with religion. In the natural sciences we cannot advance a single step without the perception of adaptation and design. The cosmical adaptations are so numerous, obvious and striking, that we are compelled to notice them, and to see that, like the leaves that envelop the rose-bud, from the inmost petal that enfolds the germ to the outermost covering, they are all shaped and fitted, not only to one another, but to the central stamina, for whoso protection they seem to have been made. Thus the whole solar system seems to exist for our earth; our earth for its vegetable and animal productions; and these, again, for man. Our earth, however, appears to be adapted to the universe as the universe is to it; and after it has subserved human existence as its ultimate end, it again repays to the system of nature the aids and advantages furnished it by its neighboring planets. Thus the whole universe, both in its general laws and in its particular arrangements, is one immense system of means and ends, suggesting to the true philosopher one great First Cause and one grand Last End, between which all things exist.

      It is as impossible, then, to understand any portion of such a system with a clear comprehension, viewed apart from this great First Cause and Last End of all things, as it would be to understand a human finger without a human hand, a hand without an arm, an arm without a body, a human body without a mind, a mind without the Supreme Intelligence.

      If it be folly, plain, palpable folly, to pronounce an opinion upon a part, when ignorant of the whole to which that part belongs, what shall we say of his philosophy who dogmatically pronounces upon science in general, who has not studied any one fully; or of him who has studied but a single chapter in the volume of nature, and yet presumes to judge the whole library of the universe! And is not this, gentlemen, his character who would presume to divorce the study of nature from the knowledge of its First Cause, or from the science of the Bible, on the [139] pretence that it is unnecessary, or, which is the same thing, that any one science may be as fully comprehended without, as with, the knowledge of Him who is himself, his being, perfections and will, the sum and substance, the Alpha and Omega of them all?

      But who, of unperverted reason and of uncorrupted affections, could wish to study science without tracing its connection and its intimacies with the most magnificent, sublime and interesting of all sciences the knowledge of God, of our own origin, destiny and duty? If there be beauty, grandeur, sublimity, immensity, infinity in this stupendous temple of the universe, how infinitely beautiful, lovely, grand and glorious must be that august and adorable One who had from all eternity the archetypes of every system, and of every creature, existing in his own mind, unexpressed; awaiting the moment which infinite wisdom, power and benevolence had fixed upon as the most fitting to speak them forth into being! To make the universe and all its science the way, the means to know him, appears to us the true wisdom and the true happiness of man. He clothes himself with light as with a garment; nay, he has clothed himself with his own creations, insomuch that the clear intelligence of them is the clear intelligence of himself.

      To me it has ever been a paradox, a mystery, how any one can feast on nature, or luxuriate in the high enjoyment of the arcana which science reveals--how any one can in ecstasy and rapture contemplate the celestial and the terrestrial wonders of creation, and yet be indifferent either to the character or will of Him who is himself infinitely more wonderful and glorious than they--how any one can admire the developments of the Creator, and forbear himself to adore. Assuredly there is something wrong, some superlative inconsistency or mistake in this matter; else it would be impossible to delight in the works and neglect or despise the workman.

      When education shall be adapted to the human constitution and conducted in full reference to the rank and dignity of man, then will the connection of science and religion, of nature and God, be made not merely the subject of an occasional lecture, but a constant study; the universe will then be but a comment on the Supreme Intelligence; the being, perfections, providence and will of the Almighty Father will always be the text; and every science but a practical view of Him in whom we live and are moved and have our being, and of our responsibilities and obligations to Him who has endowed us with these noble faculties and powers, on account of which we rejoice and triumph in existence. [140]

      Meanwhile, young gentlemen, I would remind you that there is one science, and one art springing from it, which is the chief of all the sciences and of all the arts taught in all the schools under these broad heavens. That science, as defined by the Great Teacher, is the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ whom he has commissioned. This, he says, is eternal life. And that art which springs from it is the noblest and the finest in the universe: it is the art of doing justly, of loving mercy, and of walking humbly with our God. [141]

[PLA 125-141]