WE have now reached the proper stand point from which to view the Reformation of the sixteenth century. And as this great movement has most weighty bearings upon the subject of hermeneutics, it will be well for us to pause here for a short time and note the precise condition of things immediately anterior to it, that we may be enabled to appreciate better the value of the principles of Protestantism; afterwards we shall inquire whether these principles have been carried out.

      When Martin Luther came upon the stage, the authority of Aristotle was equal or paramount to that of the Bible. Eugenius, Bishop of Ephesus, and after him Georgius Scholasticus, maintained, says Brucker, that the opinions of Aristotle "were consonant to the truest and best doctrines of the Christian religion, and were even more true!" And although we might not be justified in saying that this extreme ground was maintained by all, it is true that the spirit of the doctrine so recklessly expressed by Eugenius was cherished by all those who gave tone and direction to society, religious and philosophical. The Bible, the writings of the fathers, and the decrees of the Church, were therefore all explained by Aristotle, and forced by the alkahest of his dialectics to be dissolved and mingled into [128] the mass of philosophical speculation. Hence the appositeness and wisdom of the remark made by Luther in his letter to Jodocus, that it would be "impossible to reform the church without entirely abolishing the canons and decretals, and with them, the Scholastic theology, philosophy, and logic."

      So utterly opposed was he to the Aristotelian Logic and Metaphysics that, not pausing here, "he inveighed," as Mr. Hallam says, "against those sciences themselves;" a course in which, in the beginning of his career, he was seconded by the powerful aid of the erudite Melanchthon. In time, however, the latter was induced to change his mind, and he who at one period denounced the philosophy of his day in language which would seem to indicate that it could not be made the source of valuable truth,¹ subsequently became a strenuous advocate of Aristotle, and introduced into the University of Wittenberg a scheme of dialectics and physics founded upon the peripatetic school. But though his influence with Luther was sufficient to induce him at length to retract some of the sweeping invectives which he had hurled against philosophy, it never caused him, during the contest waged with Rome, to resort to an alliance with Aristotle for an explanation of the [129] Bible, or a defense of those capital principles since known as the fundamental and distinguishing principles of Protestantism. And so far as the example of this prince of reformers is worth anything, we may say, without qualification, that he began by throwing off the shackles of all human authority, religious and philosophical, and determined to exercise his own understanding and to follow his own judgment, instructed and guided by the word of God alone. He next set his face against the cause of corruption and ignorance, exposing and uprooting, as far as he was able, those false methods of interpretation which could never result in undoubted truth, and which gave birth to a thousand contests carried on in a spirit of rancor and selfishness utterly at war with the spirit of Christianity.

      What is true of Luther is true also of his cotemporary coadjutors. Their movement, in its incipiency, was a grand and determined effort to burst the bonds of ecclesiastical authority, to separate the Bible from its unholy and unnatural alliance with philosophy, to bring it to bear upon the minds and hearts of men responsible for the reception given to it, and to determine its meaning from its own words, without respect to recognized and consecrated dogmata. Their success is known and read of all. The reformation of religion they wrought out was only equaled by the reformation of science which was superinduced upon it. Their sturdy and manly blows battered down the walls which shut out the light of scientific truth, at the same time that they forced the corrupters of the faith to retire [130] from the contest, and leave the Bible in the hands of responsible men in the exercise of common sense.

      But although these benefactors of the world labored nobly and with surprising success, they did not and could not finish the work. Scholasticism was too strong to be so readily destroyed. Modes of thought which men had been accustomed to all their lives could not at once be laid aside, even by those who felt that others might be better. Besides, there were many friends of the old system left, many who thought that philosophy might aid a true as it had so long supported a false religion. Melanchthon introduced Aristotle into the leading university, prevailed on Luther to modify his opposition, and presently the authority of the Stagirite was again fully established in a sway which he maintained without serious opposition till the writings of Lord Bacon curtailed his influence, and finally, in physical science, destroyed it altogether. It is true, then, as we shall presently show more fully, that in a very early period of the Reformation the reformers practically abandoned their own ground--a retrogression which, unfortunately, has not even yet been corrected.

      To appreciate this, the most important phase in its history, it will be necessary for us to inquire into the specific principles of Protestantism, as theoretically propounded, and as practically carried out. And I have mistaken the subject wholly if we do not find in this inquiry principles of interpretation developed which will account for many if not all the discrepancies which have of late so disastrously [131] affected the church. The fundamental and distinctive principles of Protestantism are numerically as follows:--

      1. The Bible is the only rule of religious faith and practice, to the exclusion of all canons, decretals, traditions, and philosophies.

      2. Private judgment or interpretation is the right and duty of all.

      These constitute the very core of Protestantism. Its genius and spirit are expressed by them; its essential and distinctive features are portrayed by them; and they form the cord which binds all its votaries together. Here is the common ground upon which all sects and parties stand; the punctum saliens of every new movement; the cardinal and elementary principles which, without modification, have been cordially embraced by every man who has claimed to be a true Protestant, from Luther down. Equally true is it that the opposites of these principles constitute the foundation, and permeate the superstructure of the Papacy. What better definition, indeed, could be given of that system than to say that it imposes canons and decretals, bulls and philosophies, as of equal authority with the Bible, and that it denies the right of men to interpret the Bible for themselves? The above, then, not only are, but they must be, the principles of Protestantism. There can be no such thing conceived apart from them. Upon what other basis could we possibly rest any protest against any usurpation or corruption whatever? We could refuse nothing sanctioned by authority; we could declaim against nothing, if deprived of, or if renouncing, the right of [132] private judgment. Take away or nullify, then, these principles, and all the so-called Protestant sects would become, eo instanti, but parts and parcels of the Romish Church; because it is in these, and in these alone, that the two systems are radically distinguished, while all other peculiarities grow directly out of these roots.

      There can be no doubt, therefore, that every man who claims to be a Protestant will instantly recognize, as all such have ever recognized, the above as the cardinal and necessary principles of his system. Thus they are, have been, and doubtless ever will be, theoretically embraced, adopted, and retained by all,--while in practice they are carried out by very few. This is evident with respect to each one of them.

      I. The Bible is not, and has not been, the only rule of faith and practice among Protestants. Certainly, they do not notice the decrees of the Councils of Constantinople, of Lateran, or of Trent; they are free from those masters, and this is a great deal; but still the authority of other high ecclesiastical councils, and of other great names--of their own liking--is as binding upon them practically, as such authority is or ever was upon Papists. Some are bound by the acts done at Geneva, some by those at Westminster, others again by those at Augsburg. Some defer to the authority of Luther, some to that of Calvin, and others to that of Arminius and Wesley. Protestants listen to different men, and reverence different names, and bow to different councils from those recognized by the Papist,--and this is one distinction. [133] Another is, that Papists claim the right to impose such authority, while Protestants deny the right, but still bow to the authority. They have reserved to themselves the nominal privilege of rejecting ecclesiastical decretals when they choose, while those that impose them take care to have them so commingled with something else that is desirable, that they always choose to yield. The Protestant system is in this respect more complicated,--less open and avowed, and less freely exercised,--and being generally accompanied by a courteous disclaimer of power, men are disposed to believe that it does not exist, and that their system does not constrain or bind them. They have yielded to the influences to which they are subjected, until they are no longer felt. But let them resist--let them commence to exercise the freedom which they imagine themselves to possess, if they would learn the existence and the power of the authority which binds them.

      The great struggle for human freedom in matters of religion has resulted, we contend, merely in a change of masters. This change, doubtless, was a great gain. Protestant rules and rulers are better and wiser than those we exchanged for them. But why should we be ruled at all except by the plain authority of the word of God? Why call, or receive any man for, our master, besides Him who is in heaven? This is our theory--the theory of Luther, and Calvin, and Zwingli, and of all Protestants; while if our church, or synod, or council ordain anything, however obnoxious to objections, or however grating to our sense of right and propriety, we yield implicit obedience to the [134] mandate; not that we will submit to human authority--that is Romish--we do so for the peace of the church and the advancement of the cause!

      But what is a man to do? In nine cases out of ten he must submit or be deprived of church privileges. The fact is, that in almost every Protestant sect there are other rules besides the Bible which are binding upon the life and conscience; rules the violation of which excludes from communion, and the rejection of which debars from membership! When we hear men speak of the "Constitution and Laws of our Church," we never think of the Bible, which is theoretically the only constitution and law; and when we hear them ask an applicant for membership if he will "consent to be governed by the rules of this church," we know the "only rule" is not what is meant.

      But it is contended that there is no such thing as compulsion in all this; no authority is exercised; and if any one do not believe these things, and be not willing to be governed by them, he is left perfectly free,--let him go somewhere else. But this, in the first place, leaves out of sight the numerous pains and penalties--not physical, not papistic, but mental--which are resorted to, to make men "willing" to submit; and, in the second place, it is delusive by speaking of a freedom which exists only in name, and not in fact. Suppose we ask where this "freeman" is to go? It is vastly easy to say, "let him go somewhere else," and thus throw off the responsibility of his case; but if all Protestant sects have human creeds or rules of one sort or another, and he have conscientious scruples about [135] accepting any such, this "somewhere else" must be by himself. And then, is not every man of learning and piety in Protestantdom engaged in warning him of his danger, and in assuring him of damnation for not belonging to "the church," for making no profession of religion, for renouncing its privileges and failing to perform its duties? Or if a number of such unite and form a church without a human creed or a human rule, and religiously devote themselves to the study and practice of the Bible, will not the dignified clergy pronounce them heterodox, and for the sole deficiency of a human creed declare them unsound, untrustworthy, and dangerous?² But further, unless the members of the various sects are hypocrites--which we cannot at all believe--they must regard their own peculiar doctrines and rules as being right, and consequently that those opposed to them are wrong. If wrong, then they ought not to prevail. Let us suppose that they did not; that this one only system, with its creeds, its articles, its rules, its constitution, and its discipline, were recognized as Protestantism or the Protestant Church. And let every reader suppose, if he please, that this is not his, but his neighbor's church. Now what follows? Evidently that every man's freedom from human authority--these constitutions and rules being confessedly human--must be exercised in every case at the expense of all church privileges. He must either be a hypocrite, and profess to believe what he does not, or he must give up his own judgment and take [136] that of others upon trust, or he must be a freeman at the hazard of his soul--they being the judge.

      But it may be urged in support of these rules, or articles of faith, that they are in accordance with the Bible, and therefore it is divine and not human authority which enforces them. But the very fact that this plea is put in by so many different parties, casts the strongest suspicion upon it. It is but a revival by each individual sect of the old papal claim to infallibility. According to our interpretation, or our "standards," the Bible must teach so and so; and as our interpretation cannot be wrong, no man is entitled to membership who rejects it. But to debar one from membership, or to exclude one from communion upon grounds of difference respecting these points, is to inflict pains and penalties for the purpose of enforcing acquiescence; in other words, an infliction of punishment on account of "heresy." I have said that the Papists, like the Protestants, claim that their canons and decretals are in accordance with the Bible; because, even in those cases where there is no shadow of express verbal warrant, they are still made by the church, and this, it is claimed, has authority delegated by the Scriptures to make and enforce them. Thus, by a process of logic, all of them are shown to be scriptural. Now with respect to Protestant articles of faith and rules of government, they must either be in the express language of the Bible--and then there will be no need of transcribing them--or else they must be supported by a process of reasoning--which yields the distinction between Protestants and Papists. [137]

      And the case is not relieved by prefixing (as is commonly done) to these articles one which must be incompatible with them; for, although it is customary to begin with the cherished theory that the "Bible is the only rule of faith and practice," every one knows that it is anything but customary to stop there.

      But we shall be told that any other than the course we are opposing will deprive those who prefer that course of the liberty of exercising such preference. Have we not the right and the liberty, say some, of making or adopting any creeds or canons we choose? Unquestionably. But that is a very different thing from claiming that these, when made or adopted, must be regarded as a fundamental or integral part of Christianity, and that they must be actually or virtually enforced upon others, upon peril of the loss of the divine blessings. It is the regarding of them as a part of the Christian religion, and, by all the powers that may be lawfully employed, compelling their adoption, that we oppose. Human creeds or canons, while their very existence is a standing departure from Protestant ground, become intolerable only when they would invade the liberty of men. Civilly speaking, every one has the privilege of making, changing, enlarging, or curtailing his religion, or of having no religion at all,--but in Christianity there is but "one Lawgiver." So long, therefore, as any one is willing that his enlarged system of articles and rules shall not be held or regarded as Christianity, either in whole or in part; so long as he recognizes the Bible as the only source of that, and gives to his deductions no force, and [138] no place as forming a part of that system,--so long he may claim respect, and to this extent be may exercise the most unlimited Christian freedom.

      But, to disregard all other aspects of the case, we are here only concerned with it as it affects interpretation. Let it be observed, then, that in so far as the rules and articles of faith which we now have under review claim to have scriptural warrant, they rest not upon the express words of the Bible, taken in their connection, but upon inferences and deductions from them, From premises often hastily adopted, and from texts often disjointed and misplaced, certain logical conclusions are drawn, and these conclusions are made fundamental, and are built upon as scriptural truth. They become the constitutional and elementary principles of the system, and, as the system is supposed to be pure Christianity, they are regarded, as the cardinal principles of that system, and consequently the standards of all subsequent interpretation. All, now, who embrace these conclusions, read the Bible with both the expectation and the desire of finding them there; and experience but little difficulty in doing so. Every man must either interpret the Scriptures so as to make them support the doctrines of his church, or, unless he is a hypocrite, he must give up those doctrines and be without a church, or he must accept them, as he commonly does, upon the authority of the church, in opposition to the Bible--he himself being the judge.

      If he take the former course, he perverts the Bible; for evidently no more than one of the many different and conflicting [139] doctrines of the various churches can be sustained by the Bible without perverting it. If he take the next course, he cuts himself off from the privileges and enjoyments of the church. And if he take the last, he abandons a cardinal principle of Protestantism. Hence the failure by Protestants to carry out their fundamental principle of "the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible,"³ must result, as it has hitherto resulted: 1. In perverting the great source and fountain of all truth, by the infusion of all manner of crude and pernicious deductions, which are virtually held as a part of the Bible itself. 2. In weakening their influence and limiting the good they might do, by deterring such multitudes of thinking and conscientious men from accepting the divine and good, as it can only be enjoyed by taking also so much that is human and bad. 3. In making the interpretation of the Bible, for all practical and plain men, utterly uncertain and dubious,--thus to a great extent paralyzing its authority over the conscientious, and exposing it to the contempt and ridicule of the skeptical.

      II. It will require but few words to be said on the other great principle of Protestantism,--the right of private judgment. This springs from the previous one. The two are always present or absent at the same time. Hence the [140] "Bible alone," being a mere theory, the right of private interpretation is also discouraged in practice; for it is evident that if all Protestant churches have rules and articles of faith which rest upon inferential and deductive conclusions, made by those who fill or have filled high stations in the church, and if the acceptance of these is necessary (as it often is) to membership, then the right of private judgment, so far as all those matters which are professedly fundamental are concerned, resolves itself into the dubious privilege of thinking for yourself, provided you take care to think as your leaders do. Certainly in these cases it hath this extent, no more.

      It is presumed, indeed, that no one will question that the confessions of faith control the judgment. This is their nature, their design, their object. For if they do not, they are utterly worthless and useless, and not one argument can be introduced in their favor. They are but clumsy impediments to the mind, effecting neither good nor evil: passive, inert, powerless, they must speedily perish from their own impotency. But if they do control the judgment, then we have seen that they are pernicious, and destructive of the fundamental and necessary principles of Protestantism.

      But am I occupying broad catholic ground in thus contending that Protestants have departed from their principles, or have I taken the position merely to serve a purpose? If motives so unworthy are attributed to me, let us see how the subject appears to others, who could have had no ulterior object in view. [141]

      Mr. Hallam, in his Introduction to the Literature of Europe, vol. i. chap. vi. sec. 33, says: "It is often said that the essential principle of Protestantism, that for which the struggle was made, was a perpetual freedom from all authority in religious belief, or what goes by the name of the right of private judgment. But to look more nearly at what occurred, this permanent independence was not much asserted, and still less acted upon. The Reformation was a CHANGE OF MASTERS,--a voluntary one, no doubt, in those who had any choice; and in this sense, an exercise, for the time, of their personal judgment. But no one, having gone over to the confession of Augsburg or that of Zurich, was deemed at liberty to modify those creeds at his pleasure. He might, of course, become an Anabaptist or an Arian; but he was not the less a heretic in doing so than if he had continued in the Church of Rome.

      "The adherents of the Church of Rome have never failed to cast two reproaches on those who left them: one, that the reform was brought about by intemperate and calumnious abuse, by outrages of an excited populace, or by the tyranny of princes; the other, that, after stimulating the most ignorant to reject the authority of their church, it instantly withdrew this liberty of judgment, and devoted all who presumed to swerve from the line drawn by law to virulent obloquy, or sometimes to bonds and death. These reproaches, it may be a shame for us to own, 'can be uttered and cannot be refuted.'

      "Protestantism--whatever, from the generality of the word, it may since be considered--was a positive creed; [142] more distinctly so in the Lutheran than in the Helvetic churches, but in each, after no great length of time, assuming a determinate and dogmatic character. The pretensions of Catholic infallibility were replaced by a not less uncompromising and intolerant dogmatism, availing itself, like the other, of the secular power, and arrogating to itself, like the other, the assistance of the Spirit of God. The mischiefs that flowed from this early abandonment of the right of free inquiry are as evident as its inconsistency with, the principles upon which the reformers had acted for themselves."⁴

      The above is clear, and directly to the point. And thus it appears that Luther and the other leaders of the reform movement contended with the Catholics for the great principle or right of private judgment, when they needed it to justify themselves in coming out of the Catholic Church; but no sooner had they become strong enough to feel perfectly independent of Rome, than they took away the right from others and reserved it as a special prerogative for themselves, perhaps claiming it now by right of conquest.

      Another authority says: "Protestantism owns two fundamental principles--that the Bible contains the sole rule of faith, and that it is the right of every one, without respect of person, to judge of that rule with all the aids which divine grace, reason, and conscience can inspire. At the same time it may be noticed that, generally, in practice, [143] each church possesses certain standards of belief to which it is expected its members will adhere."⁵

      Here is the contrast: theoretically, "the Bible is the sole rule of faith," practically, "each church has certain standards" besides the Bible; theoretically, it is "the right of every one to judge of that rule," practically, every one "is expected to adhere" to some one of these "standards."

      We will next hear from Madame de Staël: "The right of examining what we ought to believe is the foundation of Protestantism. The first reformers did not think thus; they thought themselves able to place the pillars of Hercules of the mind according to their own lights; but they were mistaken in hoping to make those who had rejected all authority of this kind in the Catholic religion submit to their decisions as infallible."⁶ Hence the multiplicity of sects.

      Perhaps the reader would like to contemplate the subject from a Papist's point of view. We therefore give an extract from Balmes:--

      "If there be anything constant in Protestantism," says this learned Catholic, "it is undoubtedly the substitution of private judgment for public and lawful [i. e. Catholic] authority. This is always found in union with it, and is, properly speaking, its fundamental principle; it is the only point of contact among the various Protestant sects,--the basis of their mutual resemblance. It is very remarkable [144] that this exists for the most part unintentionally, and sometimes against their express wishes. However lamentable and disastrous this principle may be, if the coryphaei of Protestantism had made it their rallying point, and had constantly acted up to it in theory and practice, they would have been consistent in error. But if you examine the words and acts of the first reformers, you will find that they made use of this principle as a means of resisting the authority which controlled them, but they never dreamed of establishing it permanently; that if they labored to upset lawful authority, it was for the purpose of usurping the command themselves."

      Again: "The only way that Protestantism has of preserving itself, is to violate as much as possible its own fundamental principle, by withdrawing the right of private judgment, inducing the people to remain faithful to the opinions in which they have been educated, and carefully concealing from them the inconsistency into which they fall when they submit to the authority of a private individual, after having rejected the authority of the Catholic Church."⁷

      One more quotation must suffice upon this point. The Edinburgh Review for October, 1855, says:--

      "It is, we believe, universally agreed among Protestants of all denominations, that the Bible is their one, great, paramount authority; and that they repudiate all traditionary lore or human teaching; and that every man, [145] depending on his own judgment, and availing himself of his right to use it, looks to the sacred Scriptures, and to the sacred Scriptures alone, for the spiritual light which should both inform his faith and direct his conduct. Such is the theory, but it is little more than a theory. If Christians acted upon it honestly and more freely than they do, they would, in all probability, find their differences diminish and their charity increase. But the fact is, that the right of private judgment, in religion, is a principle more vaunted than exercised. And the experience of society would lead us to infer, that while we and the rest of our fellow-Protestants profess to follow the instructions of the Bible, we are far more generally led by the opinions of our respective ministers; and that our doctrinal views are never so much really derived from the letter of the sacred text as from the notes of some favorite expositor in the margin. But whatever influences may interfere to warp its operation, all Protestants, whether Churchmen or Dissenters, are agreed in the principle, that our only authoritative religious teacher is the Bible."

      From all that has gone before, we may conclude with McCrie that it is generally, nay universally, agreed, that "if there is one principle more essential than another to the Reformation, it is that of entire independence of all masters in the faith. Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri."⁸ And although it has been departed from in practice, let us hope that the mischiefs which have thence [146] resulted may yet be removed by a speedy return to principles so evidently right, and so imperiously necessary; especially let us remember that, while the power of the Romish hierarchy has been so long and so fearfully wielded in opposition to the right of private judgment, her principle, like So many of her doctrines, is derived from paganism.⁹ [147]

[TOOS 128-147]