IN the general outline with which we commenced the present book, it was attempted to be shown that the method of science was a union of two methods--the inductive and the deductive; that these two processes were mutual complements of each other. And we think it evident that neither can be relied on as a sufficient guide to [263] truth, independently of the aid and support of the other. For, as Sir John Herschel remarks, "It is very important to observe that the successful process of scientific inquiry demands continually the alternate use of both the inductive and the deductive method. The path by which we rise to knowledge must be made smooth and beaten in its lower steps, and often ascended and descended, before we can scale our way to any eminence, much less climb to the summit. The achievement is too great for a single effort; stations must be established, and communications kept open with all below. To quit metaphor, there is nothing so instructive, or so likely to lead to the acquisition of general views, as this pursuit of the consequences of a law once arrived at, into every subject where it may seem likely to have an influence. . . . For it is hardly possible to arrive at the knowledge of a law of any degree of generality in any branch of science, bat it immediately furnishes us with the means of extending our knowledge of innumerable others, the most remote from the point we set out from; so that, when once embarked in any physical research, it is impossible for any one to predict where it may ultimately lead him."

      Mr. Mill, also, has clearly proved that the deductive sciences are, at the same time, altogether inductive; that their first principles, or axioms, are generalizations from experience; that they are the highest class of inductions the simplest and easiest cases of generalization from facts furnished by our senses or by our internal consciousness.¹ [264] And he has shown that the deductive method consists of three operations: the first, one of direct induction; the second, of ratiocination; and the third, of verification.²

      Although Bacon did not clearly develop the deductive process in his method, it is evident that it was contemplated; for he says, "The signs for the interpretation of nature comprehend two divisions: the first regards the eliciting or creating of axioms from experiment; the second, the deducing or deriving of new experiments from axioms," (de ducendis out derivandis experimentis novis ab axiomatibus.)³

      It will appear from the above exhibition of the principles of legitimate deduction that it differs from the dogmatic method in this: that while deduction proper requires, as the first step, the pursuit of induction, with all its cautious observation and comparison, as the means of procuring the premises from which it proceeds, dogmatism generates these premises, either independently of all facts, or, what is perhaps worse, by means of that vicious induction which proceeds by simple enumeration.

      While, then, deduction is constantly to be employed as a means of verification, even during the successive steps in the process of rising to an inductive law, we shall be understood as advocating its use in the discovery of new truth only in those cases where axioms or generalizations have been reached in the manner pointed out in the [265] previous chapters of this book. By that method we elevate ourselves upon a platform which we are sure is sound and immovable; and then, by this, we stand and survey the new objects which such elevation has brought within the purview of our observations. Deduction proceeds upon the principle, that the NECESSARY consequences of a truth must themselves be true. Guided by this index, let us inquire how this method facilitates the acquisition of Scripture truth; and in this inquiry we shall be brief, as we do not deem it necessary to dwell upon a principle the application of which is evident and universal.

      If asked what use, apart from verification, we can have for deduction in a case where all the facts involved are spread out before us, we reply that its uses are twofold 1. To illuminate dark or obscure facts; 2. To conduct to the knowledge of truth which is not specifically expressed, but which is left to be learned by this method.

      That there are obscurities in many parts of the Bible, is well known; passages which contain allusions difficult of comprehension; facts which, viewed by themselves, are dark and mysterious; but which, nevertheless, we can perceive to be in some way related to a class of facts which are well understood, and from which we have risen, or may rise, to an inductive generalization. We therefore "follow out," deductively, "into all its consequences, this inductive result, and apply it to all those cases which seem even remotely to bear upon the subject of inquiry; so that every new addition to our stock of causes becomes a means [266] of fresh attack, with new vantage ground, upon all those unexplained parts of former phenomena which have resisted previous efforts." ⁴ In this way our generalizations become, as it were, lighted torches with which we go back to those objects which were previously enveloped in darkness, and view them in a clear light. And thus the meaning of many individual facts is disclosed, their relations and connections are perceived, and the bearing and influence of their attendant circumstances are ascertained with a clearness not otherwise possible. Thus, too, seeming exceptions are made to disappear; apparent contradictions are seen to harmonize; and difficulties, the most formidable and discouraging, are resolved with ease and satisfaction.

      It requires no argument to show the propriety and necessity of availing ourselves of the light of the clear and well known, in seeking to understand the doubtful and obscure. No principle of exegesis is better established--no one more generally admitted and received. But, like most good things, it is liable to abuse and misapplication. When we rush hastily to a conclusion, before collecting a sufficient number and variety of facts, and then make such conclusion the guide and standard of all subsequent interpretations of passages upon the same subject--passages which may not be obscure in themselves, but are only so in being compared with our imperfect and perhaps unsound generalizations--the process is grossly abused, and, instead of leading to truth, does but multiply obscurities, [267] perversions, and falsehoods. It cannot, then, be too emphatically repeated, that before deduction can be relied on to direct us to truth, its premises must in all cases be reached by means of the most careful induction from the largest number of facts, the meaning of which, as individuals, can be certainly known. With such precautions, it is invaluable; without them, it is pernicious.

      To us it has seemed to be of more importance to give emphasis to this point than to occupy apace with illustrative examples; for every one is familiar with the deductive process, which, as a process, is the same whether the premises be sound or unsound. It has ever been found necessary to read a large part of the Old Testament in the light of the New, in order to appreciate its full significance; and so familiar are we with the process, that we often fail to observe that it is pursued, or to note the source of the light which enables us to see things so clearly. The parables, also, and the various figures of speech, in so far as they are themselves obscure, are to be interpreted upon the same principle, as we attempted to show in a previous part. And whatever be the nature or the cause of any obscurity, there can be no better way of reaching its meaning, and of bringing it out into prominence, than that which is here indicated.

      If, then, it be true, that no proposition or text in the Bible is so utterly destitute of light, when viewed in its connections and circumstances, but that we may determine from it what its subject really is, though that subject, as therein presented, may be altogether incomprehensible, [268] there seems to be no barrier to the above process; for, when this is learned, we know immediately in the light of what generalization it is to be viewed, which light, when properly cast, will almost always elucidate its obscurities Pad unravel its perplexities.

      2. But, in the second place, the process of deduction enables us, in a certain sense, to enlarge the borders of revealed truth--to perceive a thousand things to be true which are not expressly mentioned. Full and elaborate as are the Scriptures, they suggest much more than is verbally enunciated. All the logical consequences of their propositions are as true and obligatory as those propositions themselves. Every individual truth is a member of a system of truth. Nothing is isolated, nothing independent. The truth of one proposition necessitates the truth of another, and that of another, and so on ad infinitum. Now, while the Scriptures furnish the first, and it may be several of the succeeding links in this series, they do not and could not furnish them all. Many are left to be discovered by the human mind, guided by those logical rules which have been induced from its own nature, and the correctness of which is self evident. In all cases, therefore, in which our premises are the result of a true and rigorous induction, and in which our conclusions from them are the result of the sound and legitimate process of ratiocination, we have the same assurance of the truth of such conclusions that we do of the truth of the premises which contain them.

      Or, to look at the subject from a different angle, the [269] Scriptures present us with a number of facts on a great variety of subjects; and on these facts, as we attempted to show in the early part of this book, the truth is virtually written. But besides the facts actually employed by the Holy Spirit in exhibiting the truths and requirements of Scripture, there are numerous others belonging to the same classes, to which the law or the truth adheres as naturally as to those recorded for the purpose of enabling us to learn that truth. Hence, it is our privilege and duty to deduce from the law of the facts given, the law of the facts not given. And this is what we mean commonly by the practical application of Scripture. The Bible does not say that A, B, or C, living in this nineteenth century, shall repent, but it gives a general law which includes A, B, and C. It does not tell us that horse-racing and faro are wrong, it does not express these sins by name, but it gives us a general law which includes these specialities. And so of the various specific vices of modern fashionable society; "they are evidently and clearly unscriptural and forbidden, not because they are expressly mentioned, but because we light upon them when we descend from general and well-established principles.

      Again, the Bible does not say that it is wrong for the church to make laws for its own government; but it tells us "there is one lawgiver;" that we are "under law to Christ;" that we are to "hear him;" that we belong to him; and from these it follows that no one else has the, right to be a lawgiver, or to make laws either for himself or others, in spiritual matters. While, therefore, the [270] Scriptures declare that "there is one lawgiver," we must regard the Roman Catholic Church and her copyists as a living denial of its truth.

      Enough has now been done, it is hoped, to indicate the sphere of the deductive process in the scientific method of interpretation; but before dismissing the subject, it may be important to remark, that the very fact that this process is so prolific of results, and can be employed with so much readiness and facility, renders it necessary to be doubly cautious in its use. For as from one truth we may by this process deduce a whole system of truth, so from one falsehood we may deduce a whole system of error. This false system, too, will be logical in form, and perfectly consistent in its several parts. There will be but one point open to attack--but one weak and unsupported part--the starting place. If this had been sound, the whole would have been sound; but this being false, diffuses its nature through every subsequent development. Whenever the head--the fons et principium--is corrupt, the whole stream will be of the same nature. Hence the importance of the remark made by the authors quoted above, that the first step in the deductive method must be a direct induction. This supplies us with truth to start with; gives us a solid foundation to stand upon; and then, if the deduction be properly made, the result of the second step, the ratiocination, will be truth. But lest we should by any means be mistaken in a matter so important, we have one concluding step left, the verification. We can test the correctness of our deductions by collating the conclusions of our ratiocinations [271] with observed facts. And he who is really in search of truth will not be satisfied until this is done. For, "to warrant reliance upon the general conclusions arrived at by deduction, these conclusions mast be found, on a careful comparison, to accord with the results of direct observation wherever it can be had."⁵

      The author has now completed the main part of his design,--that upon which the claims of this work to popular favor must chiefly rest,--the exhibition of the inductive or scientific method in its application to biblical exegesis. Of the many imperfections in what he has done, none can be more sensible than himself; and he would fain withdraw the attention of the reader from its logical and rhetorical blemishes, whatever they may be, and fix it wholly upon what he regards the all-absorbing importance of its subject matter. Though he does not affect to be altogether indifferent to the judgment which the public may pronounce upon the work as a literary production, this is by no means the, object of his chief solicitude. His constant aim has been to present great principles in a light so clear that none could fail to understand them; and he has written, from first to last, with the determination to sacrifice, if necessary, everything else to perspicuity. If he has succeeded in this object to the satisfaction of the reader, he would now solicit from him a candid and independent judgment upon the principles which have been elaborated. [272]

      Are they true or false? Are they good or bad? Do they seem to be valuable or worthless? What effects might be anticipated from their adoption? Is there any better method? Is this complete and sufficient? Would its general adoption heal the divisions in the body of Christ; divisions which have paralyzed its influence, and which have emasculated the inherent power of the word of God in its hands? If this method will not, what other one will? Mysticism? It originated the present state of things! Dogmatism? It carried on and perfected the unholy work! There is no hope from these methods. They have been weighed in the balances--fairly and impartially weighed--and found wanting. It does seem, therefore, that there is but one other refuge--a resort to that method which, in whatever department it has been tried, has proved itself to be perfectly reliable, and which has uniformly produced precisely those effects which are so desiderative in religion.

      The history of science may be written in one sentence. She first repudiated those false methods we have imperfectly exposed, and, by a sublime declaration of independence, threw off the shackles of party which they had forged; she then embraced that method which she now commends to us, which enabled her to look with a clear and unbiased eye upon the facts of the world, and to rise to the exalted dignity which she now maintains; sitting like a queen of nature upon a throne of eternal truth, while with the scepter of common sense she sways authority over creation, and compels the universe to support her dominion. [273]

      We have sought to inspire the votaries of religious truth with the resolution, while we pointed out to them their ability, to climb to at least an equal elevation. And now it is for the reader to say whether the recommendation is foolish or wise--whether the proposal is chimerical or practical. And when he shall have deliberately made up his judgment in the light of the whole argument, and under a sense of his own responsibilities, it will remain for him, if he agree with us, to act for himself. Parties, with all their power and patronage, will not suddenly change; it need not be expected that great bodies will speedily release themselves from the fetters of a cramped, a rigid, and an inflexible "orthodoxy." The work most be done by individuals. It is for them to lead the way. It is for isolated persons, like the reader, to resolve that the birthrights of Protestantism are too valuable to be bartered for a mess of pottage, and to rise in the strength of immovable principle, and with the bold avowal of inalienable right, and determine to learn the truth from its original sources, and to receive and obey it "at all hazards and to the last extremity."

      Profoundly confident as we are of the ultimate triumph of all the essential principles herein advocated, we have had too much reason to know the strength and pertinacity of religious prejudice, to flatter ourselves that they will be accepted otherwise than through the gradually increasing pressure of outside influences. The incrustations which cover the existing bodies of Protestantism have become too hard and inflexible to be broken from within. The next [274] reformation must commence from without. The intelligence of society at large must break the shell of partisan prejudice, before the inmates can see the light. Hence it is that we appeal to individuals,--whether connected with a church or not,--whosoever is outside of this indurated crust, to hammer it with all the powers of reason and Scripture. This is the only hope, but in this we have an abiding confidence.

      It now only remains for us to place the principles and laws which regulate the meaning of words, on a basis of certainty and simplicity equal to that which we have laid down for the passages which contain them. This undertaking, with our reasons for deferring it till the last, will occupy us in the subsequent and concluding part of this book. [275]

[TOOS 263-275]