THE whole superstructure of exegetical science rests upon two axioms. And as we have just shown that the object now to be accomplished is yet more elemental in its character than that already gained in the foregoing part, we shall begin with these nethermost stones of the foundation. We have seen that the lowest basis of natural science is the assumption that nature is uniform in the principles of its operation. This assumption rests upon the immutability of God, or, if you please, upon God himself; so that all scientific truth reposes securely upon Him who is truth absolute and essential. Thus, also, the axioms of the science of interpretation are not only self evident, [280] but necessary truths springing from the character of Him who is the author of revelation; principles which the mind intuitively perceives could not have been disregarded by the author of a divine revelation, without defeating his own ends, and doing violence to his own character.

      If, therefore, God has spoken to man in human language--a proposition which is assumed in this work, and if he thus spoke with the desire and intention of being understood, the affirmative of which results of necessity from his character--then he must have acted in harmony with two principles, which are the axioms that underlie the interpretation of his words.

AXIOM I.

      Every word in a given passage has, in that place, one fixed meaning, and no more.

      If the reader will, for a moment, suppose this axiom false, and will trace out the consequences of its falsity into all their issues, he will be led to the strongest possible conviction of its necessary truth and fundamental importance. He will perceive that not only the rules which we are to lay down must rest upon it, but that, as Ernesti says, "there can be no certainty at all in respect to the interpretation of any passage, unless a kind of necessity compel us to affix a particular sense to a word, which sense, as I have said before, must be ONE; and unless there [281] are special reasons for a tropical meaning, it must be the literal sense."¹

      The above axiom expresses the specialty of hermeneutics. There is nothing corresponding with it, as to its form, in the substructure of science, until after it is thrown into the form of revelation. But so soon as this is done, its basis becomes not only similar, but identical. For whenever scientific phenomena are thrown into the form of revealed phenomena, i. e. when they are expressed in words, they stand, like the Scriptures, upon axiom first; but when natural phenomena are contemplated directly without the aid and intervention of word, and when revealed words are viewed as being the phenomena of spiritual facts, and consequently analogous to the phenomena of nature, then, again, they both stand together upon another basis, which for each is identical in kind, but which, for the sake of perspicuity, may be differently expressed. In contemplation of the object now before us, we may express this basis in the form of the following axiom.

AXIOM II.

      Whatever be the true sense of a word under any given set of circumstances, it will in all cases retain that sense under the same circumstances.

      This axiom is the foundation of all lexicography. The meaning of words must, in the first instance, be learned in every case, from the circumstances connected with their [282] use. But if these do not always teach the same thing, or if a given word may have, under the same circumstances, now one meaning and now another, all knowledge of the sense of words is abandoned, as beyond the limits of possible attainment. Not only, therefore, must all rules of interpretation rest upon this axiom, but the reliability of the definitions in the dictionaries must also depend upon its truth. It is fixed in the profound necessities of philology, and can only be given up when we are prepared to give up all hope of being instructed by words.

      But what equivalent to this do we have in the interpretation of nature? We will answer in the language of Sir John. Herschel: "The only facts which can ever become useful as grounds of physical inquiry, are those which happen uniformly and invariably under the SAME CIRCUMSTANCES. This is evident; for if they have not this character they cannot be included in laws."²

      Without further explanation or argument, we will leave the above two axioms with the reader, believing that if he be not already satisfied of their necessary truth, and of their fundamental position in the science of interpretation, his own reflections must surely lead him to this conclusion. We shall now place upon this foundation two general principles, or laws for the interpretation of words; which, it is believed, will cover the whole subject, or embrace the whole science of hermeneutics, so far as the primary inquiry into the meaning of words is concerned. These principles, for the sake of perspicuity and convenience, we shall afterwards [283] resolve, severally, into the less general rules which are contained in them. But we desire to be distinctly understood as saying that the whole science of verbal interpretation, whether of the Scriptures or of any other book, is contained in the two general principles to be laid down, and that the subsequent development of those principles is not an addition to them.

FIRST GENERAL PRINCIPLE.

      In ascertaining the meaning of any word in a given text, the first step is to generalize it.

      This means that we are, first of all, to determine by induction the primary or general signification of a word, before we pronounce upon its force in the passage given.

      OBSERVATION.—The primary is not necessarily the etymological meaning, but that which would be suggested to the mind of one well acquainted with the language if he heard the word pronounced alone, or saw it written upon a sheet of blank paper.³

      But let us suppose that we are wholly ignorant of the sense of this word, and that the whole force of the passage turns upon it; or, what is the same thing, let it be a word whose meaning is in controversy. Our first care should be to place ourselves in the condition of one familiar with the language; and this can only be done by learning first the general meaning of the word. If it have secondary senses, [284] or if it have been turned out of its ordinary sphere to perform extra service, be it so; all this we shall attend to in its proper place; but these special uses and exceptional instances do not now concern us, and could not in the least contribute to our first object. Our only business is now to ascertain the primary, as a guide to the secondary senses; to determine the general and proper signification, as a means of reaching the special and tropical. To facilitate the conduct of this generalizing or inductive process, we submit, in the first place, the following rule.

RULE I.

      The primary meaning, as given in the dictionaries of the language to which the word whose definition is sought belongs, may be temporarily accepted as the basis of subsequent inquiries.

      The definitions contained in dictionaries are the results of inductions made by their authors. They commonly exhibit before us at once both the facts which are required in the investigation and the conclusions which have been reached from those facts. They, therefore, have an authority precisely analogous to that of standard works on natural science. We seldom deem it necessary to call in question the results of the investigations of physical philosophers, and commonly rest satisfied with what they propound as general laws--particularly if they give the facts upon which those conclusions depend--without ourselves actually testing their correctness. And hence, if the [285] biblical student should do no more than consult the best dictionaries for the primary meaning of the words of Scripture, his knowledge would be as accurate and reliable as that possessed by the mass of well-informed men on physical science.

      Still it is always our privilege, and in cases of doubt or uncertainty, our duty, to go behind the conclusions others have reached, and to determine for ourselves the point under investigation, by a direct appeal to the facts. In this case, the definition of the dictionaries may be either wholly disregarded,--and then the process will be an induction de novo,--or, what is better, it may be made, as contemplated by rule first, the basis of the investigation; and the process will partake more of the nature of verification. We will endeavor to frame a rule which will embrace both these characteristics.

RULE II.

      After the dictionaries have been consulted, the next resort, in determining the general meaning of a word, is a direct appeal to the facts.

      It is evident that this rule calls up under it all those inductive canons which we attempted to explain and illustrate in the first part of this book, with all the principles connected with them, and preparatory to their employment. It requires, therefore, that we first collect and classify, in the manner already explained, the various facts involved in the explanation of the word of whose meaning we are [286] in search. And now, having carefully performed this preparatory work, if we find cases clearly presented and obvious, in which "the assigned peculiarity"—i. e. in this case, the definition in the dictionary--"is wanting or opposite," we shall conclude, according to canon first,³ that if such be its meaning in any case, it is destitute of that high degree of generality claimed for it, and of which we are in search, but if, in our large and varied collection of facts, there be one point in which "they all without exception agree,"--one well-defined sense that can be traced in every individual case,--then, according to canon second, we shall conclude that to be the general meaning we seek. There may, and doubtless there will be, various shades and differences of meaning besides this discernible in the same word as used in different individual passages, but these peculiarities of signification are not yet the objects of our investigation.

      On the other hand, it may be that the definition of the lexicons will seem to be extremely difficult of detection in a given passage, or we may be unable to perceive how the text is to be understood and harmonized with others, if such meaning is to be taken as correct; while, nevertheless, the analogous passages may present no such difficulty, but be "cogent and unanimous" in favor of the assigned meaning. In this case canon third would become applicable, and prevent us from rejecting a strongly supported troth, merely because we are unable to understand all its applications. [287]

      Or, if we discover a case in which the absence of the meaning given in the dictionaries can be accounted for by considering the neutralizing influence of opposing causes, this too, as shown by canon fourth, will but establish its generality. But, not to multiply illustrations, it is enough if the reader perceive that the various canons of the inductive method which are applicable to natural science and to the doctrine of whole passages are equally applicable to the individual words which compose those passages.

      This, then, is what we mean by saying that to ascertain the primary sense of words, the first step is to generalize them. As we have in the dictionaries generalizations to start with, we may, for ordinary purposes, content ourselves with these inductions made by others; but in cases of peculiar importance, we should either carefully verify the conclusions of lexicographers, or, disregarding them altogether, rise at once from the facts to an original induction, which induction, however, must itself be verified before it should be regarded as true in itself and in its consequences. It now only remains for us to indicate the sources of the facts which are to be collected in this inquiry.

      1. THE BIBLE ITSELF. It is true that a few words are used but once in that book, and hence, could not be compared without going outside of it; but these cases are rare and exceptional. In a large majority of instances the same word is of frequent occurrence. We shall find it used in different connections by the same writer,--by different writers, in different dispensations, in stating different [288] facts, in conducting different arguments,--occurring, in short, in a variety of circumstances, relations, and influences. We are then to consider it in the light of these various circumstances,--the context, the subject-matter, the scope and design of each several passage in which it occurs,--in the light also of the definition given in the lexicons, the verification of which is the immediate object (in most cases) proposed. In this way we collect and arrange the materials for induction from the Bible itself.

      2. COTEMPORARY LITERATURE. As the Holy Spirit did not make new words, but gave us a revelation of truth in the words then current among men, it is evident, as he intended his communications to be understood by those to whom they were addressed, that he used those words in their current and received acceptation. Hence it is perfectly legitimate, and often necessary, in determining the general meaning of a word, to compare it, as used in the Scriptures, with the use made of it by those authors whose works were well known and received at the time the Scriptures were written. And in this case, as a matter of course, the same observations apply as in the former.

      3. INCIDENTAL EXEMPLIFICATION. The Scriptures often supply us with a commentary upon their own words. True, this might be considered as embraced under the first head above; it is intended to include those incidental allusions and historical exhibitions which often point out with great clearness the sense then attached to a word, but which vie feared might not be included in the inventory of our resources unless expressly mentioned. In the preceptive and [289] statutory parts of Scripture, particularly, we can in many cases learn what the persons addressed understood by an important word, by observing what they actually did, when obeying, what they were commanded to do.

      4. TRANSLATIONS, PARAPHRASES, SCHOLIA, AND COMMENTARIES. These, when made by those who lived at a period so near that in which the Scriptures were written as to furnish a strong presumption that the true sense was not yet lost, nor the original meaning changed, may sometimes be consulted with advantage. Such facts, however, we regard only as corroborative and secondary, and would never recommend a resort to them in the first instance, particularly upon any subject which appertained in any way to the doctrines and polity of the great apostasy, the elements of which were at work even in the times of the Apostles. Still, if discreetly used as confirmatory evidence, they need not be wholly disregarded.

      Such are the vast resources accessible to him who would inductively study the meaning of the words of Scripture. And we are persuaded that whoever will take the pains to engage in this pursuit will be led to conclusions as perfectly satisfactory and as strongly established as any that can be reached on any analogous subject of inquiry. And what though the method be, as Isaac Taylor says, "laborious and difficult," he will find that the labor will be sweet,--labor ipse voluptas,--for it will lead to conclusions which are "certain." And what though it be but a word that calls out this labor and pains,--it is A WORD OF ETERNAL LIFE! All the magnificent achievements of science, great [290] and marvelous as they are, and productive of the ease, comfort, prosperity, and enlightenment of men as they have been, sink into worthlessness in comparison with the modest achievement of acquiring a knowledge of the words of God; FOR THEY ARE SPIRIT, AND THEY ARE LIFE. [291]

[TOOS 280-291]