CHAPTER XVI.
Making Tests of Fellowship and Causing Division.

One of the most common defects in the reasoning process as conducted by most men in all ages, is the practice of using a term in different senses in the same connection. Such reasoning is nothing short of "beating the air," and it leads to constant misunderstanding and hopeless confusion. In much of the controversy during the last quarter of a century over the question of union among Christians, and especially over the mooted question of making tests of fellowship, this defect has shown itself conspicuously, and it is still seen in the pulpit, in social conversation, in books, and in the periodical literature of the age. One speaker or writer will charge another with making some opinion or practice "a test of fellowship," while the latter replies, not only stoutly denying the charge, but turning it back in a fierce countercharge upon his accuser, alleging that the accuser himself is the one who is guilty of the thing charged. Thus, charge and countercharge follow each other in quick succession, and general confusion is the result. The truth of the matter is that, in many instances, though from different points [251] of view and for different reasons, both sides, as we shall see, are responsible for the thing charged.

Now, that we may have no such misunderstanding and confusion in the present investigation, let us, first of all, have a clear and definite understanding as to the meaning of our terms. What, then, are we to understand, as properly meant, by making a thing a test of fellowship? Back of this, we should first understand what is meant, in such a connection, by the term "fellowship" itself. Certainly if those who use these terms in debate are not agreed on what the terms mean, and hence do not use them in the same sense, it is folly to be charging one another with making tests of fellowship, or to be attempting to use such terms in discussion at all.

The word "fellowship" in the English New Testament is used as a translation of the Greek word koinonia (κοινωνια). Hence our first duty is to ascertain whether the meaning assigned by the Greek lexicons to κοινωνια, and that assigned by the English lexicons to fellowship, are the same. If they are, then, if the lexicons are reliable, we shall not only know that the one is a correct translation of the other, but we shall necessarily have the idea which the two terms in common convey. According to the very highest authority, the Greek word, as defined in English, means "joint participation, intercourse;" and according to equally high authority, the English word is defined as follows:

Webster: "A state of being together; companionship; [252] partnership; association: hence, confederation; joint interest."

Worcester: "Partnership; joint interest."

Standard Dictionary: "The condition of being sharers or partners; community of interest, condition, or feeling; joint interest or experience; as, fellowship in prosperity or adversity."

The Century Dictionary: "The state or condition of sharing in common; intimate association; joint interest; partnership; as, fellowship in loss."

March's Thesaurus: "The state of being a companion; community of interest."

Murray's New English Dictionary: "Participation, sharing (in an action, condition, etc.); something in common, community of interest, sentiment, nature, etc. 2. Companionship, company, society; an instance of this."

The reader will observe that all of these authorities give substantially the same definition, and that they use very much the same language in framing their definitions. Accordingly, we see that the two terms, fellowship and κοινωνια, mean in common such an "association," "community," "partnership" and relation of persons as involves a "joint interest," "sharing a thing in common," or "joint participation." Hence, it follows that, if two or more persons do not have a "joint interest" in a thing, "share it in common," or "jointly participate" in it, they do not have fellowship with each other in that thing. This, from the premises before [253] us, is self-evident. Furthermore, it follows, with equal clearness and conclusiveness, that whenever and in whatever capacity persons are so associated and related as to "share things in common," and to be "joint participators" in certain obligations and privileges, they may be said to be in fellowship with one another. We are, therefore, led to this necessary conclusion that, to fellowship one, means to have "joint interest" or be a "joint participator" with one in a given thing, and to disfellowship one, means to refuse to have such "joint interest" or "joint participation."

Moreover, according to the facts now before us, it does not follow, because one refuses fellowship--"joint interest," "joint participation"--with another in any particular thing or act, that therefore fellowship--"joint interest"--in all things and all acts is refused. In all such cases, there may be only the refusal to have fellowship with another in some special thing or act. Of course this particular act in which fellowship with others is refused may or may not be of a character to justify refusal of fellowship with them in all acts, but this would be a question to be determined strictly upon its own merits, and has nothing whatever to do with the special point of making a thing a test of fellowship, which is the only point now under discussion. A single act might so vitiate one's character as to justify withdrawal of fellowship from him, not only in the particular vitiating act, but from the person himself, as [254] such, because of his own character as affected by that act.

But, what sense must we attach to the word "test" in the phrase "making tests of fellowship?" Defining the word "test," Webster says: "Discriminative characteristic; standard of judgment; ground of admission or exclusion." Accordingly, anything which is made either a "ground of admission" to, or cause for "exclusion" from a given fellowship, is thereby, and in both instances, made a "test" of fellowship.

With this definition of terms before us, we are now prepared for the conclusion that whenever and wherever anything either prevents "joint participation," on the one hand, or is made a condition of it, on the other hand, it is thereby, and in both instances, made a test of fellowship, and it is made so primarily by those who constitute it into such a condition, and secondarily by those whom it thus prevents. Those constituting it into such a condition say, by their act, we will not permit "joint participation" with us, except on this condition. Those whom it prevents say, by their act, we will not have "joint participation" with others where the said condition exists. Just here we have nothing to do with the reason or cause for the course pursued by either party. Logically, this has nothing whatever to do with the naked question now before us, namely, what it is to make a thing a test of fellowship, and who does it.

It is proper, in this connection, to inquire into the class or character of things which should be made a test of fellowship. Be it observed, then, first of all, that men should make nothing a test of Christian fellowship which they do not regard as either essential or detrimental to Christian character; but, conversely, certainly whatever they do so regard should be made such a test. This statement of the case will doubtless go unchallenged; but it is utterly impossible to either think or speak intelligently and without confusion on the matter of making tests of fellowship until the fact is first clearly understood and appreciated that it may be done, as we have already seen from our definition of terms, from two very different points of view, and for very different reasons. For example, one may refuse to fellowship another as a Christian because of not regarding the latter as a Christian; or, in the case of one who is regarded as a Christian, one may refuse fellowship--"joint participation"--in a given act or course of conduct regarded as unbecoming in a Christian.

Now, it must be evident to any thoughtful mind that, while the act of making a test of fellowship occurs in both of these cases, yet the act in the two cases is superinduced by very different considerations. In the former, fellowship is withheld because those from whom it is withheld have not yet become Christians, or at least are regarded as not having become such, in which case they, of course, have to [256] be so treated; and in the latter there is merely a refusal to participate or join in an act or course of conduct with those who, notwithstanding they are regarded as Christians, yet are guilty of conduct in this particular case which is thought to be inconsistent in a Christian. The refusal of fellowship--"joint participation"--with them in this latter case is, therefore, not necessarily a pronouncement upon their Christian character, except in so far as it is thought to be affected by the particular course of conduct in question. It merely means that one Christian cannot conscientiously join with another in an act which is thought by the former to be wrong.

In the light of these principles, let us now examine the mooted question of making instrumental music in Christian worship a test of Christian fellowship. Two questions at this point claim our attention. First, is it made a test of fellowship by those introducing it, by those withdrawing from it, or by both sides? Secondly, to the extent that guilt is involved in the case, to which side does it attach?

As to the first of these questions, that those introducing it make it a test of fellowship is so demonstrably true, that it is strange that it was ever called in question. In substance they say to others: "We will not permit you to have fellowship with us without the use of instrumental music in the worship," thus making it a "ground of admission" to fellowship, the identical thing which Webster says is a test. If stipulating a thing as an absolute sine qua [257] non--an indispensable condition on which men can have fellowship in a given fraternity, and without which they cannot have it, is not making it a test of fellowship, then it is difficult to see how such a thing can be done at all.

It is a significant fact, too, that when departures from the original principles of the Restoration of the nineteenth century began first to appear, this position was openly avowed and defended by some of the ablest scholars and logicians of the time who lived and died with the same convictions. The American Christian Review, the Apostolic Times, and other religious journals were strong in its defense; and the disposition on the part of many in recent years to take the opposite position only shows how rapidly men drift with the current of apostasy when they are once loosed from their moorings. From the Apostolic Times of September 8, 1870, from an article by Brother J. B. Briney on "Who Makes the Test?" we take the following extract:

Let us suppose a case. A company of men and women, tired of sectarianism, agree to throw away all human creeds and confessions of faith, and adopt the simple worship of the New Testament. Their motto is, Where the New Testament Scriptures speak we speak; where these Scriptures are silent, we are silent. Time moves on and they are happy. But in process of time ideas of expediency and progress come in, and some of the brethren think it expedient to have an organ in the worship; and others, not viewing the question as simply one of expediency, [258] oppose the introduction of the new element as a matter, with them, of conscience. By count, however, it is discovered that the majority are in favor of the organ. The minority protest. They say, Brethren, this is not in harmony with our original motto. The New Testament Scriptures know nothing of the organ. They are silent here. Our consciences will not allow us to worship with the new element. The others say, We have the majority. This is a question of expediency, and in all such questions the majority rule. The minority reply, You can give neither precept nor example for the use of the instrument. We desire to live in fellowship with the congregation in which we have seen so many happy days, but we cannot do it if you bring in the new item of worship. We regard it as unauthorized and corrupting; as calculated to carnalize the worship. But, say the majority, we have determined to use the instrument, and you can either accept that or withdraw from the congregation. Here, now, is a new test of fellowship. Who has made it? Certainly the majority, as it seems to me. They say to the brethren, "You cannot have the fellowship of the congregation unless you accept the organ. We think more of our unauthorized instrument than we do of either your consciences or your fellowship."

The foregoing extract, in so far as it deals with the action of those introducing the organ, is correct. The fact, thus far, it is simply unanswerable. Its author has since gone over to the side of those introducing the instrument, but his argument, nevertheless, remains irrefutable. But it does not, in our [259] judgment, go the full length of the principle involved. Discussing this principle apart from any concrete example, we saw that when a thing either prevents fellowship, or is made a condition of it, it is thereby, and in both instances, made a test of fellowship.

It only remains to show now that, in an important sense, but from a radically different point of view, the opposing side--those whom the instrument prevents from entering a fellowship, also make it a test of fellowship. But in what way and to what extent do they do this? First of all, they do not do it in the sense that they will not, under any circumstances, fellowship the persons themselves who engage in the practice. Here is a distinction which is often overlooked. It is one thing to withdraw fellowship from a person, as such, but certainly a very different thing to merely decline joining with a person in an act which is held by those so declining to be wrong. So far as the principle now under review is concerned, the opposing side in the instrumental-music controversy simply decline to participate in an act which they believe to be wrong. It does not necessarily follow that they pronounce judgment upon the Christian character of those from whom they withhold joint participation in the particular act in question only in so far as they may regard that act as inconsistent in a Christian. To that extent they believe such pengons are doing wrong, but just how far the wrong may vitiate the character [260] and standing of such persons before God so as to render them unworthy of Christian fellowship at all, is a question to be determined upon its own merits, and should not be confused with the mere act of declining "joint participation" or "fellowship" with them in what is held to be wrong. Now, the way in which this latter class makes the mooted practice a test of fellowship is in the fact that their fellowship--"joint participation"--with others is made to turn precisely on this practice. In substance, they say to the other side: "Remove this practice, and we will enter your fellowship; retain it, and we will stay out." Never mind now about why they stay out. The reason for their act has nothing whatever to do with the point which we are now considering, namely, in what way is fellowship affected by their act?

To state the case fully and in its simplest form, it is as follows: One side says: "We will not permit you to enter our fellowship without the organ." The other side says: "We will not enter your fellowship with the organ."

As just observed, we need not mind now about the reason for the action of either side. It is what each side does, and not the reason for it, that we are here considering. The reason why an act is performed may have much to do with the propriety or impropriety, the innocence or guilt which the act may involve, but it can have nothing whatever to do with the mere act itself, and it is the latter which is now [261] under review. But in a case where one side will not permit persons to enter a fellowship without the organ, and the other side will not enter that fellowship with the organ, in what way and to what extent is it thereby made a test of fellowship? It is here maintained that both sides make it such a test--the one in making it a "ground of admission" to, and the other in making it a "ground of exclusion" from, fellowship; and thus, in both cases, according to Webster's definition of terms, it is made a test of fellowship.

We are now prepared to consider the question of guilt involved in the case. To which side does guilt attach? Or, does it attach to both sides? So far as anything practical is concerned, the answer to this question turns upon the motive or motives which prompt the parties to action. If action on either side is prompted by the conviction that God cannot be pleased in the case by any other action, then those taking such action are compelled to it in order to avoid an outraged conscience. On the other hand, if action in either case is prompted by a mere preference which the parties to it believe they can waive without the Lord's disapproval, then, if they refuse to waive it, the conclusion is irresistible that all the guilt which is involved in a needless schism in the body of Christ attaches to them. There is no possible escape from this conclusion.

Now, touching the particular case in hand, those who introduce the organ in worship only claim to [262] do so on the ground of a liberty in Christ which permits them to have it or not to have it as they may prefer. This, of course, leaves them free to have it or to dispense with it according as they may like. Hence, whatever else may be said for or against their course in any given instance, they are not, according to their own admission, shut up to any one course to the exclusion of all others. The "liberty" on which they profess to act, if they really have that liberty, permits them to dispense with the organ in worship, if they will do so, under any and all circumstances. And hence, the solemn and serious situation which confronts them is the deliberate creation and perpetuation, on their part, of division in the body of Christ in the face of the fact, according to their own admission, that they could prevent such division and still maintain a pure conscience before God and before man. This is assuming a fearful responsibility.

Now, on the other hand, those who oppose the organ in worship do so under the conviction that the practice is displeasing to God and that they, therefore, cannot engage in it without doing what they believe to be wrong in the sight of God. Never mind now about whether they are right or wrong in their convictions. That is not the question. Their convictions on this point may be wholly unnecessary and their judgment at fault in drawing the conclusion on which they act, but that is not the point now before us. Whether their judgment is correct or [263] not, and whether their convictions are necessary or not, has nothing whatever to do with the fact as to what their convictions are. Every thoughtful mind is compelled to see that whatever their convictions are, they cannot be true in the sight of God and not act on them; and their convictions, in the present case, are that the use of instrumental music in the worship of God is displeasing to Him, and they are, therefore, according to all the facts in the case, compelled to refrain from it. Unlike those on the other side, these are shut up to one course, to the exclusion of all others, and they are compelled to pursue this course in order to maintain an inviolate conscience, and thus be true in the sight of God. From their point of view, and the motives prompting their course, if division in the body of Christ comes, they cannot help it. They cannot do, and the Scriptures do not require them to do, what they believe to be wrong in order to prevent division. When it comes to guarding this sacred principle, the Son of God himself said he came to send division. While division in itself is essentially wrong, it should be carefully remembered that guilt does not necessarily attach to the one who causes it. Hence, the inspired apostle does not pronounce condemnation upon Christians for merely causing division, but he is careful to specify the particular way of causing division which he condemns, and which is always and everywhere to be condemned. In his own words, it is thus expressed: "Now I beseech you, brethren, mark [264] them that are causing the division and occasions of stumbling, contrary to the doctrine which ye learned; and turn away from them," Rom. 16: 17.

Thus, it will be seen that the words, "contrary to the doctrine which ye learned," constitute the divine criterion by which to determine when causing division is wrong, and when it is not. When men cause division by urging what God has taught and requires, they do right; when they cause it by urging what God has not taught and does not require, they do wrong. In view of this principle, our Savior said: "Think ye that I am come to give peace in the earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division," Luke 12: 51. Of course this only means that He came to cause division in cases where some accept His teaching, and others depart from it. Hence, to cause division according to "the doctrine"--that is, by urging what the doctrine requires, is right; but to cause it "contrary to the doctrine"--that is, by urging what the doctrine does not require, is wrong.

Finally, according to facts unanimously admitted by all parties on both sides, the case now before us stands thus: One side introduces a practice admitting that the Lord does not require it, and knowing, in advance, that division in the body of Christ will be the inevitable result; the other side refuses to engage in the practice believing that the Lord requires them to stand aloof from it. Hence, here is an instance of division in the body of Christ mutually caused by both sides in a case of two opposing parties, [265] but with this radical difference, viz., it is caused by one side when there is not only no necessity for it, but the most solemn of all reasons against it; while it is caused by the other side when there is not only a stern necessity for it, but when it is the last resort in order to maintain a pure conscience toward God and toward man. In the latter case, innocence can be maintained in no other way; in the former, only guilt is incurred.