Freedom and Ethics

W. Carl Ketcherside


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     In the preceding issue of this journal I wrote the first of a series of articles on what has been dubbed "the new morality." Perhaps you wonder why we are taking the time and space for such a discussion. You will recall that a certain mountain climber upon being asked why he purposed to assault a specific peak, replied simply, "Because it is there." It could be that will explain my moving into this realm of involvement, although I should like to believe it is a little more profound than that.

     It is true that "the new morality" is here, and I predict that it will be around for a long time. It will not go away by ignoring it, or by misrepresenting it! But we do not have to challenge everything to a duel just because it is here. I am doing so because I feel that as a commando for Christ I must face up to the problems of our day, and do so without quibble or fear.

     I think, perhaps, I am not too thrilled by the fact that some attacks on situation ethics have not been ethical, although I should not be surprised at it, realizing as I do that all of us are caught up in the human predicament. Our brethren have been putting forward a very talented and perceptive champion who has publicly discussed "the new morality" with such worthy foes as Anson Mount, religious editor of Playboy magazine, Bishop Pike, a sort of playboy without a magazine, and Joseph Fletcher, who is neither a playboy nor a magazine editor. If I am any judge, I think our brother has done a remarkably good job.

     What disturbs me about the affair is that I keep running into folks who think that we ought to push these discussions with limelight figures because this is our chance to put the Church of Christ on the map and in the news, and get some free publicity. One cheerful soul said, "It doesn't make too much difference who wins the skirmish. The important thing is for the world to know that the Church of Christ can turn out someone who can appear on the same platform with the big guns in theology." With "old ethics" like that it is obvious that a "new morality" could be somewhat of an improvement. One is reminded of the policeman who forgot to slip on his

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trousers in his haste to get out and arrest a man for indecent exposure.

     Probably one of the easiest and safest ways to deal with "situation ethics" is to deal with something else. There is a lot of straw floating around in the intellectual realm right now and it would be easy to gather up enough of it to stuff into some wornout mental overalls, and make a rather gigantic scarecrow which one could cuff and clout around with a great deal of gusto and absolute safety to purse and person. But straw-men are generally fought by straw-Christians, neither of them being genuine.

     So I shall try to deal with the real proponents of the disturbing philosophy, and not simply because it is disturbing. We need to be disturbed, one meaning of which is to have the mind agitated. It will do us good to have the mental waters troubled so we do not stagnate and develop a thick green scum over the surface of our consciousness. We need to re-assess and re-evaluate some of our positions but we also need to scrutinize with care what is being offered in their stead.

     I have known men to swap cars and before they had gone a hundred miles they were wishing they had the old one back. I am on a journey to a destination and I want to be sure that what I "buy" will take me there before I allow a glib salesman to push the pen on me to sign the contract. I insist on reading the fine print. And I am convinced that there are some real flaws in the new morality structure.

     With these few lines let us get on with the task of reviewing ethics as propounded by John A. T. Robinson, of "Honest to God" fame. We must not overlook the fact that Dr. Robinson does not title his book "Morals Today," but "Christian Morals Today." That makes it of special concern to me, for what is advocated by the Bishop of Woolwich claims to be an explanation and development of the Christian ethic. The book consists of three lectures given at Liverpool Cathedral, the first of which was titled "Fixity and Freedom." Although careless critics may associate freedom with license, the author insists that his employment of the term "the new morality" was "certainly no invitation to license." Still we must not forget that the opposite of fixity may not be freedom. It could just as well be "looseness." And if the bishop prefers to use the word freedom, we have a right to enquire "Freedom from what and for what?" Freedom in a vacuum would be useless.

     It is charged that opponents have made the term "the new morality" a slogan--relieving those who use it of any need to distinguish between widely different views, or even to know what they are. This complaint is probably justified. I know what happens when people are sold on slogans, having grown up in a movement where slogans were often used as a substitute for genuine faith. So I shall not be jolted or jounced about by terminology, nor allow the expression "the new morality" to turn me off or tune me out. After all, I am not interested in whether what I am investigating is something novel, but if it is Christian.

     But if the good bishop is bothered because critics tend to misrepresent his views, I find myself a little critical of the impression he seeks to create about those who have found comfort in what he calls "the old morality." It is implied that up until now Christians have accepted a written code consisting of a set of rules which must be applied to every situation which arises, with inflexible rigidity. I question this. I know of a lot of fine Christians who never did endorse that approach, and I know of a lot more who thought they did, but never did practice it. They were better than their creeds. And if morality has to do with thought expressed in action, I can truthfully say that I have never met a Christian who did not believe that circumstances alter cases--that is, in some circumstances and in some cases! And I have met some pretty rugged ones in my time.

     The bishop should be willing to eat from his own spoon and if he accuses more humble folk of being unreceptive and aggressive when on the defensive,

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he should not exaggerate the thing which he is attacking when he comes under question by its proponents. I find myself quite ready to concede that a lot of what he says is valid and I concur with the following, among other views, as he states or implies them.

     1. It is impossible for a person or society to continue for any period of time without a recognized and accepted ethic. Either one is doomed to "come unglued" or fragment in the absence of a proper standard or guideline.

     2. Jesus did not come to earth to give us a code of ethics, properly classified, catalogued and indexed, pre-scheduled to fit specifically every contingency, and with a ready answer to cover any behavioral emergency or temptation.

     3. The ultimate in our relationship to God and men is embraced in love, and every other requirement or injunction is suspended from this supporting and sustaining principle. I grant that it is the one absolute in the divine-human encounter, the golden chain that binds all together.

     4. The ideal, or pure center of our relationship, is the realm of greatest certainty, and it is in the outworking or application of the eternal verity that we experience the greatest diversity and ambiguity.

     To some philosophic minds it will appear that this last is a complete surrender to the bishop's position. I trust, however, that the philosophers will not deliver me up prematurely and without reading further. The mere admission that I do not know, in some cases, how to apply the dynamic of love, in no sense argues that there is no rule for its application in such cases, or that there is not a right way to do it. I may recognize the claim upon my citizenship of the principle of taxation without knowing exactly how to fill out my income tax form in every detail. One can be quite conversant with the center of the city and become confused in the suburbs, but this does not prove that there are no maps or street guides.

     This will suffice at present for the areas of agreement, and I shall get on with the task of the critic. In listing a few of the things to which I do not subscribe I do not overlook the fact that between Dr. Robinson and myself there is "a great gulf fixed" with reference to our attitude toward the scriptures. This same thing can be said about every other prominent advocate of contextual ethics with whose writings I am familiar.

     1. I do not accept as a proven fact the documentary hypothesis as applied to the sacred writings of the old covenant. This is the theory that the scriptures as we have them, are not necessarily the works of those to whom they are credited, but are a compilation from various and unknown sources, and that they simply grew out of the experiences of men in their struggle to achieve meaning in life. The idea of most of the modern theologians is that there was no revelation of a moral pattern of behavior from God but that man evolved a system of taboos and talismanic superstitions which took on special significance. I just do not believe that!

     2. I do not agree that there is a basic difference in the ethical teaching of Jesus and that of the apostles, especially Paul. Too many people think that the early Christians simply wrote books to attempt to fit the teaching of Jesus into the life situation which arose in their contact with the world. In this view it is held that the epistles do not necessarily represent an exemplification of the divine will, but rather the attempt of men to explain how they felt the moral values of Jesus could be best applied.

     I regard the apostolic writings as unique, different from those of others who followed them. The Spirit spoke to and through the apostles as the chosen envoys of Jesus. The apostolic writings have a sense of authority not possessed by other writings. And properly understood there is no difference between what Christ taught and what the apostles wrote. The epistles are simply to tell us how Jesus would have reacted in the situations which gave rise to them.

     3. Dr. Robinson holds that there are

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no changeless principles which we are to apply. It is his contention that God is in history speaking to us through various forms and altering values. I agree that God is our contemporary and that he is a history-making God. But he does not fluctuate with the changing fortunes of history. History does not create God, but the reverse. It is incongruous to think of a God who became morally better or more enlightened as he worked with men. To conceive of such a God is to be guilty of mental idolatry, to make God after the image of man. And each generation will have a better God, but never a real one.

     The God of the old covenant is the God of the new, and he has not changed. Man has grown toward maturity, but God cannot become "more perfect." If there are things which seem strange in his dealing with the ancients, they are only so to me, and not to him. And the reason they are strange to me is because I am limited by time and space. I cannot see the end from the beginning. Actually, they are not inconsistent with God at all, for not being divine I am unable to postulate what God-like consistency demands. They are only inconsistent with my ideas of what God should do under certain circumstances, but if I am not careful I will get my ideas confused with God and end up worshiping the ideas.

     If I believe that God is, I must accept that he is God. And if he is God I must accept on faith a lot of things that I cannot explain with my finite mind. A God who can be captured and confined by man is not the God of the universe. In the consummation of all things when human ignorance gives way to perfect knowledge I may be able to look back and see the answer to all of my questions and I will no doubt find that the answer lies in my transcendent knowledge of the divine nature which I cannot grasp here.

     The good doctor has a catchy phrase he likes to employ, affirming that God is in the rapids as much as in the rocks. By this he means we need not fear the tumbling, frothing waters of change, and that we may cast ourselves freely into the flux of relativity. He declares that Christians are free to swim and not merely to cling. All of this sounds good. It is an interesting metaphor. But Dr. Robinson fails to identify the rocks. A careful reader of his thesis comes to the conclusion that he may think God is only in the rapids and not in the rocks. Thus, he is guilty in reverse of the very same thing of which he accuses some of us.

     What is it to which we are free to cling? If the rapids represent the relativity and change, what do the rocks represent? Or, does he have rapids flowing over nothing? Remember that the figure of speech is his and not ours. I agree that there are rapids and that we are forced to swim in them, but I also accept the concept that there is something abiding, unchangeable and eternal. Man is not a fish and he cannot swim all of the time. When he is forced to find the banks between which the stream of relativity flows, and climb out upon the rocks, to what will he then be clinging?

     Are there no bounds of relativity? Is there no line drawn beyond which relativity cannot go, no voice to say, "Hitherto, and no farther shall thou come, and here shalt thy proud waves be stayed"? If not, then relativity itself is an absolute, a universal. Is relativity not a measuring rod or criterion? If so, who is to do the measuring and upon what will he stand that is firm and immovable while he gauges the universe or plumbs its depth?

     But I must not tarry longer in dealing with "fixity and freedom," or, with what may turn out to be "fixity and looseness." I must get on to the lecture which is the real crux of our problem and which is titled, "Law and Love." And once again I find myself in agreement with a great deal of the content. Obviously, all of my readers should also read the original thesis of Dr. Robinson. We should see for ourselves what is being criticized and not accept a second-hand version. I hold no brief for that kind of arrogance which feels that an elite corps of preachers may safely read a thing and forbid everyone

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else to do so. My experience is that preachers are about as gullible as any other group.

     Dr. Robinson argues that since we are under grace, and not under law, that love not only fulfils the law but also abolishes it as the foundation of our vital relationship with God and man. He contends that the Christian ethic can never be set forth as law plus love, or as law qualified by love. And I concur with this. For several years, and before I read one word from Robinson or Fletcher, this was my contention. I reached the conclusion from my own study of the sacred writings that the law of Christ, or "the perfect law of liberty" was love!

     My statements may not have been as trenchant as those of the much more erudite Anglican scholar, but an examination of my writings will show that I have sought to say in substance what he has said so succinctly, that if law usurps the place of love because it is safer, that safety is the safety of death. It is impossible to take the sayings of our Lord, and his exemplification of them in attitude and deed and warp them into a legalistic code to cover every exigency of life. The "Sermon on the Mount" cannot be defined into an inflexible creedal system. It was delivered to offset that very kind of system.

     What then, if anything, is the difference between my thinking and that of the situational ethicists of today. To begin with, let me state that I am not a defender of either "the old morality" or "the new morality." I do not belong to either camp and am not fighting under either banner. I am fully aware that the advocates of the latter are vociferous in denying that there is such a thing as a system of morals which must be studied and applied to every situation. And I concede that it is not their intent to devise a systematic code of regulation.

     But their very use of the terms "the old morality" and "the new morality" seems to me, at least, to indicate that they are shot down with their own weapon. For if there is such a thing as the new morality as opposed to the old morality, it appears that, whether the latter is codified or not, it is systemic. And it is made to appear that one must be encamped in one valley or the other. This I deny for the simple reason that there cannot be two valleys without an elevation to separate them, and I may choose to remain on that elevation.

     The superiority of such an alternative is at once apparent. It enables one to look at what is going on in both bivouacs without being committed wholly to either. I am confident that the same God who gives us love as the fulfillment of the law is the one who gave the law of which love is the fulfillment. As I examine his law as a basis for justification, impossible though it was for sinful beings to attain, I am made more aware of the provisions of love. Indeed, the giving of the law was not in itself an act of law upon the part of God, but an act of love.

     Our problem goes deeper than some situational ethicists may realize. It is not enough to say simply that love is the fulfillment of the law, for we must then face up to the question of the nature of that love which fulfills law. There must be a definition of love for men use the term to apply to a great many attitudes, and it is possible for love to be employed to "cover a multitude of sins," in a sense which the Biblical writer did not intend by that statement.

     No one will deny that love has sometimes been confused with selfishness, and selfishness is a tricky thing. Since it is a negative quality which derives from a deficiency of justice or benevolence, it projects itself in different shapes according to the dispositions of men, but always seeks justification through rationalization. With his propensity for evil and motivated by temptation, it is not difficult for man to be misled into thinking that his concern for self is a concern for others.

     There must also be a definition of "situation." Does it apply simply and exclusively to an immediate personal confrontation without antecedents and consequents? If so, is life composed of wholly unrelated actions, without connection or continuity? If not, then what all is in-

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volved in a "situation"? How can one make an immediate and "one-shot" decision which professes to be based on concern while actually showing unconcern for many factors and persons?

     Since man is a social being he tends to conform to the standards of the culture in which he resides. Will he not be inclined to go with the tide in his decisions as to behavior in the situations which he confronts, rather than to weigh the effects of his actions dispassionately? If so, will not the general standard retrogress rather than otherwise? Will not the current be turned into a channel of lowering moral values?

     We propose to discuss in a future article love as the divine nature and show that love as a fulfillment of law can never be workable on a universal basis but must be implemented by those who have been born again and are a part of the new humanity. These have been made partakers of the divine nature and in them the love of God can be perfected. Meanwhile, those who are not a part of the new humanity must still be regulated by law in their social conduct.


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