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Alexander Campbell and Robert Owen Evidences of Christianity: A Debate (1829) |
MR. CAMPBELL'S SECOND REPLY.
Mr. Chairman: At this stage of the discussion I do not wish to occupy many minutes in descanting upon the method of debate; but I must beg to be indulged in a few general remarks on the matter or the allegata of this discussion, and the method adopted by my opponent. I do cherish the most kind feelings toward Mr. Owen. I am sorry that controversial rules require me to call him my opponent. This term I use with perfect good-will toward him. I am satisfied that Mr. Owen is doing that which he conceives to be just and right. I take this occasion explicitly to declare that such is my conviction. At the same time I am just as fully persuaded that the aberrations and mistakes into which he has fallen are properly referable, not so much to any want of verity in his documents, as to his loose and illogical reasonings upon what he is pleased to call "facts" and "laws of nature."
My friend and opponent has stated some facts accordant with the experience of all mankind. To discriminate his real from his imaginary facts is not now my object, so much as it is to advert to the method he adopts. His manner, rather than his matter, now claims my attention. His manner is certainly loose and declamatory; and as he does not exhibit any bearing or connection existing between his allegata and the affirmative propositions which he intends to prove by them, he necessarily imposes upon himself as well as the audience. Therefore, in order to bring the allegata and probata of our logical disputation (for I trust this is to be a logical disputation) in a more orderly way before us, it will be necessary for me to advert to the original propositions which have been mutually acceded to, as constituting the topics of the discussion at present before us.
Here Mr. Campbell read the propositions which Mr. Owen stood pledged to prove:--
"TO THE CLERGY OF NEW ORLEANS.
"Gentlemen: I have now finished a course of lectures in this city, the principles of which are in direct opposition to those which you [24] have been taught it your duty to preach. It is of immense importance to the world that truth upon these momentous subjects should be now established upon a certain and sure foundation. You and I, and all our fellow-men, are deeply interested that there should be no further delay. With this view, without one hostile or unpleasant feeling on my part, I propose a friendly public discussion, the most open that the city of New Orleans will afford, or, if you prefer it, a more private meeting; when half a dozen friends of each party shall be present, in addition to half a dozen gentlemen whom you may associate with you in the discussion. The time and place of meeting to be of your own appointment."
"I propose to prove, as I have already attempted to do in my lectures, that all the religions of the world have been founded on the ignorance of mankind; that they are directly opposed to the never-changing laws of our nature; that they have been, and are, the real source of vice, disunion, and misery of every description; that they are now the only real bar to the formation of a society of virtue, of intelligence, of charity in its most extended sense, and of sincerity and kindness among the whole human family; and that they can be no longer maintained except through the ignorance of the mass of the people, and the tyranny of the few over that mass."
"With feelings of perfect good will to you, which extend also in perfect sincerity to all mankind, I subscribe myself your friend in a just cause."
"ROBERT OWEN."
Now, said Mr. Campbell, it is surely illogical to say that what will logically prove the first proposition, will logically prove the second. If each of these positions is to be distinctively asserted, the facts and reasonings supporting each must be as distinctly adduced. Each position requires a regular induction of facts and documents to sustain it. There can be no separation of argument from fallacy by the clear, simple rules of pure unsophisticated logic, if we deal in such loose and general declamations. Our argumentation might thus be drawn out ad infinitum, without the remotest probability of ever arriving at any logical conclusion. If the truth is to be elicited, for the love of truth let us close the door against the admission of all extraneous and irrelevant matter.
We have heard some positions, called "twelve facts," or "twelve fundamental laws," stated; but the question (logice) is, What are these "twelve facts" to prove? How are they logically to be applied? To the first, second, or to all these five positions? I must reiterate that what may logically prove the first position, cannot, ex necessitate, prove the last; and that such facts and reasonings as may prove the last cannot [25] prove the first. We must have a regular logical connection and dependence between the allegata and probata. Without this, how can our hearers or readers learn (for this matter is for the press) how much logical argument, how much fact, how much demonstration has been elicited in this discussion?
I now state another preliminary difficulty or objection to our modus operandi, which a feeling of self-respect requires me to have removed. It is not improbable, from the turn that things have taken, that there are numbers who at this moment misapprehend the true object of this controversy. From a letter which appeared in the London Times last October, it had been stated in the public prints in this city, that I had agreed to meet Mr. Owen for an object, toto coelo, different from that contemplated in my acceptance of Mr. Owen's challenge.
In that communication I was represented as being about to co-operate with Mr. Owen in an attempt to expunge the abuses of all religions, and to form out of them all a consistent and rational religion adapted to all ages and nations. But we shall permit this letter to speak for itself:--
"LETTER IN THE LONDON TIMES"
"Sir: I authorize you to state that the paragraph which appeared in the Times and some other London papers, a few days since, purporting to give a detail of my intended proceedings, and which was copied from the Scotsman newspaper, published in Edinburgh, was given to the public without my knowledge, and that it is incorrect in some important particulars. The object of the meeting between the clergy and myself, in April next, in the city of Cincinnati, state of Ohio, in the United States, is not to discuss the truth or falsehood of the Christian religion, as stated in the Scotsman, but to ascertain the errors in all religions which prevent them from being efficacious in practice, and to bring out all that is really valuable in each, leaving out their errors, and thus to form from them collectively a religion wholly true and consistent, that it may become universal, and be acted upon conscientiously by all."
"Neither is it my intention to remove finally from this country, as stated in the Scotsman. On the contrary, I have purposely made arrangements to be, without inconvenience, in any part of the world in which my earnest endeavors to ameliorate the present condition of society shall appear to be the most useful, as I do not entertain the least doubt of an entire change being near at hand, in the commercial, political, and religious policy of all nations."
"The very small amount of benefits that is affected for the great mass of mankind, with the extraordinary powers for insuring general [26] prosperity, now possessed by society, united with the daily growing intelligence of the population in civilized countries, render, I think, this change not only unavoidable, but not very distant.
"ROBERT OWEN."
You will perceive that this representation of this discussion is very different from Mr. Owen's challenge, published in New Orleans, upon which the debate is based. I now put the question to my friend Mr. Owen, categorically, whether I ever did, directly, or indirectly, accede to, or propose, a scheme of the character portrayed in this letter? This is a question which Mr. Owen will soon have an opportunity to meet and answer. Mr. Owen's simple affirmation or negation on this point will clear up the whole of this preliminary difficulty, and exonerate me from the calumnies of one of the editors of this city. And while on the subject of preliminary difficulties, it is necessary for me to remark, that there can be no development of logical truth without the nicest precision and co-intelligence in the use of our terms. It is a rule of logical interpretation, that all words are to be received and understood according to their most usual and known acceptation; and if there is to be any co-intelligence in the use of terms between Mr. Owen and myself, he must not establish a peculiar vocabulary of his own, but permit me to understand his terms according to their usual and most ordinary acceptation. Let me not be supposed destitute of a just contempt for mere verbal criticism or hypercriticism. I am not contending that if the law of the state of Ohio should say that whoever drew blood in Cincinnati should suffer death, that this law should be interpreted to apply to the case of a surgeon who opened the vein of a man who fell down in Main Street with a fit. But I do contend that between Mr. Owen and myself, there must be, in the course of this discussion (if it is to be governed by polemic laws), a co-intelligence, co-application, and co-acceptation of such terms as are of cardinal importance in the questions at issue. For example, the terms, divine, divinity, religion, virtue, moral law, created, Creator, etc., etc., are to be found in the Christian vocabulary. These terms Mr. Owen uses; but in what sense? In the Christian acceptation, or in a private interpretation of his own? I may very appositely inquire of Mr. Owen whether he has not a peculiar phraseology of his own, and whether he does not annex a very different meaning to these terms, divine, divinity, religion, intellectual, moral, virtue, vice, etc., from what he may rationally suppose is my acceptation of them and that of all other Christians? Is it candid or honest to use our terms in a sense different from that we have stipulated? I hold myself bound to render the most precise definition of any term which I may [27] use, when called upon by my opponent; wherefore I apprehend that he cannot complain that I should mete out the same measure to him, and insist on the like precision and perspicuity on his part. If Mr. Owen will use Bible terms, let him use them in the Bible sense, or tell us honestly what meaning he attaches to them. He must either believe in the Bible, or he conceives its language superior to all other language, or he would not impose upon our understanding by a parade of words, well approved in the vulgar sense, but rejected in his acceptation. But I confine not this inquiry nor these remarks to Bible terms only, but to all the current terms in religious discussion, morality and philosophy. Everything depends upon precision and co-intelligence in the use of terms. I apprehend it is altogether unnecessary to elaborate this matter any further. Will Mr. Owen have the goodness to explain himself in this particular? The simple naked question is, Does Mr. Owen use certain very significant terms, such as those specified, in the commonly received significance?
I would appeal to the gentlemen who moderate this discussion, whether the exceptions I have taken to the course pursued by Mr. Owen, are not reasonable; whether the queries I have proposed to him for solution, are not pertinent and necessary; and especially, I would request them to decide one important question of order, viz: whether Mr. Owen is not logically bound to show some logical connection between the matter he reads and some one of the positions he has undertaken to prove. The same matter cannot be received in evidence of each position; it must apply to some one in particular; it cannot to all, unless they be identical positions.
Here it was suggested to Mr. Owen (by the Board), that all the arguments which he might be about to introduce in support of any one of his positions might have exclusive relevance, and pertinence, and logical connection, with that single position. The Board thought that Mr. Owen was, logice, bound to exhibit the logical connection and dependence between his proofs and positions.
Mr. Campbell proceeded--As matters now stand, everything is perfectly intangible. There has been nothing presented that mortal man can logically prove or disprove--no matter whether he espouses the affirmative or negative of the proposition. And why? The why is as plain as the way to the parish church. The why is, that there is not a single quod erat demonstrandum logically before Mr. Owen, myself, or the audience. It must, I repeat, be obvious to men of the plainest understanding that the clear and simple rules of unsophisticated logic (indispensable to the elicitation of truth in all literary questions) can never be brought to bear or to apply in the present vascillating state of the premises. In this chaotic state of the premises, what can Mr. [28]
Owen's twelve fundamental laws, or, as he calls them, facts, prove, even admitting that they carried along with them internal evidence of their own absolute verity.
Now, were I to admit that Mr. Owen's laws contained a great many facts, and this I am by no means unwilling to admit, yet how can I save any one of these facts from the general wreck which must await his deductions, if he will not place himself logically in my power? Must I deny all Mr. Owen's philosophical and mathematical, or other scientific facts, in order that I may place myself in a logical predicament to take exceptions to any two out of the whole twelve?
If Mr. Owen attempts to prove a metaphysical position by those arguments which, in the nature of things, can only elucidate a truth in physics, how can I join issue with him? How can this be expected from me? The corollary of the whole matter is this, that if this matter be not logically discussed, it cannot be discussed at all in the manner its own intrinsic dignity requires, or in the manner which public expectation and the deference the disputants owe to the public would seem to require. And if Mr. Owen will not acknowledge himself amenable and conformable to those equitable laws which govern and control all argumentative discussions, it is impossible for me to dispute with him. It is impossible for me to reply to anything he may advance in a shape so loose, so desultory, and so intangible.
There is no man, and perhaps never was there a man, more distinguished for moral courage than Robert Owen. Let this moral courage now support him; and let him boldly, frankly, explicitly and logically, come out with those premises, if any he have, which I stand here prepared to combat. But if Mr. Owen will not take an affirmative logical position, nor sustain those which he promised to sustain, let him avow it, and then I will abandon my vantage ground, and take affirmative positions, subversive of his whole scheme, which I think are as logically immovable as the rock of Gibraltar.
Mr. Owen well knows if he were to take up a mathematical position and fortify it, he would laugh at and condemn every other weapon but mathematical weapons. He would exclaim against all other proofs, illustrations, or reasonings, save mathematical axioms, deductions, and demonstrations. He would tell me that I might as reasonably expect to batter down mud or stone walls with roses, as to adduce Doctor Darwin's "Loves of the Plants" in refutation of a mathematical hypothesis.
Mr. Owen well knows that a mathematical discussion must be argued mathematically--so of botanical, geological, and astronomical questions, and so on throughout the whole circle of the sciences. [29]
Mr. Owen, in his essay and in his comments upon his fundamental laws of human nature, has brought forward mathematical illustrations; but does he expect to prove to your minds, the fallacy of Christianity by mathematical demonstrations, by the verity of those laws which establish the mathematical properties of triangles? I contend that the grand question at issue is a question of fact, chiefly dependent upon historic evidence. Now, can we take a pair of brass compasses and measure that evidence as we would measure the degree of any given angle in mathematics; or by addition and subtraction prove it, as we would a question in arithmetic? We cannot measure historic evidences as if they were so many mathematical lines. If this be a mathematical, anatomical, botanical question, let Mr. Owen, with that candor which he claims as so peculiarly and almost exclusively his own--I say, let him at once openly avow which of these it is, and then, perhaps, we may be able to discuss its merits, either mathematically, botanically, or physiologically. I aver that the Christian religion is founded upon facts, upon veritable, historical, incontrovertible facts--facts triable by all the criteria known to the courts of law in the ascertainment of what is or is not established in evidence--facts triable by all the historic criteria which any respectable historian of ancient or modern times has ever had for his pilots. These facts of which the Christian religion is predicated, either are or are not susceptible of proof. Let Mr. Owen impugn them, or put me to the proof. I say again, rather let him do this than read irrelevant matter, or loosely declaim against everything in the general, and disprove nothing in the detail. If this be a simple question of fact, it must be tried and examined as such. It would be unjust to try it before any other tribunal. Mr. Owen would not expect me to ascertain the number of cubic inches in any given tub of water, if he require me to measure it by a peddler's ell--nor could he expect me to measure the length of a given web by a gallon. Were he to require me to prove his axiomatic mathematical truth that 2 and 2 make 4, I might reply that this was axiomatic or self-evident, and therefore incapable of proof, unless he was prepared to deny that this whole is made up of the sum of all its parts. But suppose he could, so maneuver as to put me on the proof, would I go about it in like manner as I would essay to prove the locale of Washington's nativity, or as I would essay to analyze the moral qualities of that moral hero? Would I essay to prove an axiomatic truth in mathematics by the same process of reasoning which I would adopt to prove a topical fact, or a moral truth? My caveat is that this is purely a question of fact, subject to all the common sense criteria by which all facts ever have been [30] and ever must be tried, and that it is not triable by those criteria which we could rationally institute and recognize as the fair, true, and legitimate criteria of the verity of mathematical, botanical, geological, or even moral facts, if you please. 'Tis a naked, simple, historic question, and ex necessitate rei, can only be passed through the historical, logical, and philosophical crucibles. Mr. Owen, I think, cannot deny this. As a lover of truth he is bound to declare whether he conceives me obliged to defend my cause by historic and veritable evidence, or by mathematical demonstrations. Only let him tell me what are his rules of evidence; what species of evidence he conceives admissible, and what inadmissible; and then we may happen to light upon tangible and pertinent premises. But as matters now stand, all must necessarily be air-built; for this plain reason, that there is not one hair's breadth of foundation for either of us to erect any other kind of superstructure upon.
My friend, Mr. Owen, must perceive that here is neither time, place, nor subject, for vain, empty declamation. His own tact, discrimination, and knowledge of the world and its concerns, must indicate to him the necessity of our mutually confining this discussion within its legitimate and logical bounds and precincts.
Perhaps I have elaborated this matter to tediousness; but I claim a fair start in this race, and in conclusion, as my half hour is out, I call on Mr. Owen for a precise and technical definition of his terms--and for an explanation of the misrepresentations in his letter to the editor of the London Times, if, indeed, that was his letter.
[COD 24-31]
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Alexander Campbell and Robert Owen Evidences of Christianity: A Debate (1829) |