Gentlemen Moderators: I am perfectly aware of the difficult circumstances in which my friend's course has placed you. You have been selected by Mr. Owen and myself for the express purpose of moderating this discussion, with the fullest confidence, on both our parts, in your ability and impartiality. To insure the most perfect impartiality, you were mutually selected. I am well aware, therefore, that you must feel yourselves responsible to us and to the community for your course in the management of this discussion. I have not the slightest reflection to make upon your mode of procedure--it is reasonable and consistent. You have entered your protest against Mr. Owen's course in this debate; for that, it has been irrelevant, impertinent, and out of the purview of the discussion contemplated; and to which the public have been invited. You also perceive my difficulties. I am here to reply to my friend's arguments in support of his own theses; the obvious scope of which was the subversion of all religion. I came here prepared to show that my opponent was not able to make good a single point which he had assumed; that he could not adduce a single logical proof in corroboration of his positions--therefore, I could not expect to have to open this discussion. This was not a supposable case. Had I known that I was to have taken the affirmative, I should have come forward prepared with some plan of argument in which my opponent might have joined issue with me; and I would have led the discussion in such manner as would soon, in my opinion, have led us to rational conclusions. Surrounded with these difficulties, gentlemen, it appears necessary that some decision should be made on the course of investigation.

      Yesterday I introduced a series of arguments, calculated, in my opinion, and in that of the public at large, to subvert Mr. Owen's propositions. He would not argue the merits of one of my positions. For two days Mr. Owen has been presenting a great variety of topics which we might have introduced as pertinently in any other discussion as the present. I have taken up his own positions in his own terms, and agreed to rest the merits of the controversy upon his own allegata. But as I stand pledged to subvert Mr. Owen's whole theory, I proposed yesterday to introduce a regular and connected argument, without paying any respect to anything which might be offered by him, unless it were pertinent to the subject-matter in debate. This morning we had a disquisition upon marriage, commerce, and a code of natural laws, none of which has any bearing upon, or logical connection with, the question at issue. I therefore ask you, gentlemen, to allow me to pursue what I deem the only correct course under present circumstances, and to declare your opinion of Mr. Owen's course in the management [137] of his part of this discussion. Perhaps this will be equally necessary for your vindication as for my own, inasmuch as the whole proceedings may become matter of record. It was part of my original plan, that every morning a brief condensed review, or recapitulation, should be presented of the arguments and positions of the preceding day. On reviewing the outline of the course already pursued, I have made up the following abstract:

      Mr. Owen's capital position, on which he has laid so much stress, is, that man, because he does not make himself or his circumstances, is an irresponsible being. In opposition to which we have urged this consideration--that, admitting its truth, it follows that infants, idiots, and madmen, philosophers, and the common sense part of the community, are all alike capable or incapable of society and moral government, because man has no more control over his own actions, than a mill-wheel has over its own revolutions. This was, as I conceive, reducing his argument to an absurdity.

      His next capital position is, that all religious institutions and all civil governments are erroneous, because they are founded on human responsibility; they require man to have more control over his own actions than a mill-wheel has over its own revolutions. In opposition to both these positions, we have urged that man is constitutionally responsible, because rational; that all the circumstances which can surround any human being, the savage and the citizen, concur in suggesting to his mind in the very first dawnings of his reason, his dependence and consequent responsibility. No human being can possibly be placed in any circumstances which do not impress upon his whole intellectual nature a sense of dependence and responsibility. Suppose a child born in a palace or a wigwam: in either case, the circumstances around him must, as soon as reason dawns, suggest to him a sense of dependence upon his protectors. This sense of dependence begets the idea of responsibility; and this principle of human nature is the foundation of all moral obligation of every social compact, of all civil and political security.

      A favorite corollary which Mr. Owen deduces from his views of necessity, or the fact that man did not create himself, nor his circumstances, is, that neither praise nor blame, merit nor demerit, can be ascribed to man. We have shown that also there can be no such thing as gratitude nor kind feeling, charity nor benevolence, due to any human being, more than to the fountain or rivulet which slakes our thirst, or to the tree which yields us its fruit. This I yesterday illustrated by showing that Mr. Owen's plan of cultivating the kind feelings would extirpate [138] all feeling; and that, as to sympathies, we should stand toward each other like trees in the forest.

      In preparing an amelioration of the condition of society, and consequently society itself, Mr. Owen asserts that the circumstances which now surround us, are of a vitiating, or of an irrational and antinatural character; on which we remark, that, as the circumstances which surround us are either topical, arising from our location, or social, the vitiocrity must be in the one or the other; not in the former, because it is natural; consequently it must be in our social circumstances. Now the question which he has not answered, and which we know he cannot answer, is, How came the social circumstances to be irrational and anti-natural, seeing necessity, or what he calls nature, has introduced them?

      The scriptures explain to us both the cause and character of these preternatural circumstances. Mr. Owen does not--cannot. The scriptures, too, adapt themselves to these preternatural circumstances, and bring men out of them. Mr. Owen's scheme is not adapted to them, neither can it educe man from these preternatural circumstances. Because founded upon an entire subversion of the laws of our nature, dependence, obligation, religion, individuality, matrimony, and the whole influence of natural relations, arising from these things; consequently unable to educe us from these preternatural circumstances.

      Another rallying point to which Mr. Owen often resorts, is, that it is impossible for rational beings to be virtuously happy under a government which involves perpetual partial pain and misery. (The illustration of Mr. Owen was, that if he could believe one sentient being was suffering eternal torment, it would mar his peace of mind.) On this hypothesis, no man ever was, and no man ever can be happy; for the more virtuous, the more unhappy! That is, if virtuous happiness is to be made to depend upon our feeling ourselves existing in such circumstances as to preclude all possible pain in any sentient being whatever; or if sympathy and virtue must make us miserable on beholding any kind of sentient suffering, the inseparable connection between virtue and happiness must thereby be destroyed. If I were afflicted with that morbid sympathy which the theory of Mr. Owen contemplates, the sight of a broken finger or a dislocated joint would make me miserable. On his hypothesis I could not be happy if a single instance of pain existed in the world. On the hypothesis that the more virtuous we are, the more acute and morbid our sensibilities, there can be no happiness or enjoyment in the practice of virtue.

      From some people with whom I have reasoned on the subject of future happiness, I have heard whole theories of religion founded upon the idea that the mercy of God is not reconcilable with the idea of [139] punishment, present or future. The system has been founded upon their view of God's mercy. I have hinted to them the danger of founding a theory of religion upon their imperfect, and, perhaps, inaccurate ideas of the character of God; and that however correct their views of divine justice or mercy, contemplated apart from all other perfections, yet the compound attributes of the divine character were beyond human comprehension. We must judge of the divine attributes from what exists in nature before our eyes, as well as from what is said in scripture. We have frequently requested such reasoners to reflect that animal and mental pain existed to a very great extent. We have asked them to imagine a great field, an immense area, in which all the animals of the various genera and species in the universe, that were suffering pain and disease, were congregated, what millions of suffering creatures, grouped together, each according to its kind, do we see in this immense area. To a man of morbid, or even of well-regulated sensibilities, what a sight is here presented! What painful sympathetic feelings are excited! If the very idea that the saddle on which I ride injures my horse's back, makes me feel excessively uncomfortable--how would the actual sight of all these millions of suffering animals, congregated within the limits of an undivided area, affect me? I shudder at the thought. And yet the beneficent Creator of the Universe has this sight before his eyes continually. They stand, in all their agonies, night and day, before him; and not a painful throb of their hearts, not a single spasm of nerve or muscle, that his all-seeing eye does not observe. The argument deduced is, that if it be compatible with the divine government and attributes to tolerate such a scene of animal suffering perpetually before him; how can we infer from these premises, that the future punishment of man would mar the felicity of his Creator, or be incompatible with his character? This will be received as a logical argument by all those who believe in future punishments. But the Divine Author of our nature has so constituted us that we are not to be made miserable by the contemplation of temporary or perpetual partial pain and misery. He has most beneficently established an inseparable connection between personal virtue and personal happiness, between personal vice and personal misery; and this may well be called a divine law of human nature. But, my friend's hypothesis would lead us to conclude that, just in proportion as we become virtuous, we must become unhappy.

      If there have been any argument offered by my opponent, in support of his premises, it amounts to this, Because religion is not founded upon the sciences of botany, agriculture, chemistry, geology, etc., because it does not make provision for the improvement of the breed of [140] animals, i. e., of men as well as dogs and horses; because it does not assimilate social man to the savage in a state of nature, without property, save his bow and arrow; because it did institute matrimony, and does not absolve men from the obligation of the marriage contract, and all other moral and civil contracts--ergo, it is not divine, not true, not worthy of universal reception. I affirm that from the reasonings before us, this is the logical force of the argument.

      [Here the Chairman rose and stated, that, Mr. Campbell had made an appeal to the Board of Moderators, and the Board desire to know if you wish the point to be now decided before the argument progresses. This decision seems now to be necessary, after advancing whatever you may wish to offer on this point.]

      Mr. Owen rose and said--This meeting was called in consequence of my undertaking to prove certain positions, and Mr. Campbell engaging to disprove them. At our first interview at Cincinnati, I proposed to Mr. Campbell that I should state the whole of my arguments first, and having gone through with them, that Mr. Campbell should reply at full length; but Mr. Campbell wished that each party should speak but half an hour at a time. Knowing that the truths I had to advocate were plain and incontrovertible, I could have no objection to Mr. Campbell's taking the course he suggested; but in consequence of our having to speak for half an hour, Mr. Campbell has been replying to he does not know what. Most probably Mr. Campbell expected that I would have taken up the arguments which he anticipated, and which he had prepared himself to refute. Had we proceeded as I suggested, Mr. Campbell would now have been in possession of the whole of my arguments, and I think by this he would have also been convinced of their incontrovertible truth. When I have got through with my arguments and illustrations, I will place my manuscript in Mr. Campbell's hands, and allow him his own time fully to consider them. This is the first morning that Mr. Campbell has attempted any answer to my arguments; and this shows that I was perfectly correct in my view of the order of this debate which I opened to Mr. Campbell at our first interview. Mr. Campbell is now beginning to come to the point.

      [The Hon. Chairman rose and said--I can only observe, that the Moderators are of their former opinion, that they consider the subject now under discussion to be the first proposition in Mr. Owen's challenge, viz: an offer to prove that all religions were founded in ignorance, from whence the implication arises that they are all false. From the beginning we have been of opinion that the rules of fair discussion required that each party should confine himself strictly to that single isolated proposition; and of this opinion we still remain, viz: that it is [141] incorrect and illogical to deviate from the course just designated. The Board are unanimously of opinion that Mr. Owen's first proposition is the only one in controversy, and that each party should confine himself to matters strictly relevant and pertinent to that proposition. That in order to observe the established controversial rules, the party holding the affirmative of this proposition should proceed to demonstrate that all the religions, now existing in the world, originated in ignorance, and are founded in error. And after he shall have demonstrated all the religions, the Board consider that it would be proper for the party holding the affirmative of the proposition, to offer a substitute for the system abolished, to state what the new system is, and the consequences resulting from it; because, until the fallacy of all existing systems be detected and demonstrated, it does not follow that all the anticipated advantages of the new system may not be the legitimate results of the existing systems.]

      Mr. Owen remarked--Having heard your wish on this point, I have strictly conformed to it: all I have been saying goes to prove the past and present ignorance of man; when I shall have exhausted this part of the discussion, I shall then adopt any course which the Board may suggest.

      Mr. Campbell rose--Gentlemen Moderators, I agree perfectly with you in the sentiment that it would be incompatible with your feelings and the dignity of this controversy, to dictate to the disputants what course they shall pursue. I am perfectly aware of the delicacy which you must feel in exercising anything like dictation in the course of this controversy; all that I washed, was, that you would express your views relative to the manner in which the controversy has been conducted, so that they might be recorded; and that I might be authorized in adopting the course which I have suggested.

      I conceive, Mr. Chairman, that I am entitled to so much of my time as has been occupied by the Board and disputants in the discussion of interlocutory topics.

      [Mr. Campbell is allowed fifteen minutes to make up his half hour.]

      Mr. Campbell then rose and said--Yielding to the circumstances in which I am placed, I now propose to submit to your consideration an analysis of the infant man: It is certainly true, as Lord Bacon observes, that "all our valuable knowledge of the world has been gleaned from minute observation;" therefore, an analysis of our corporeal and mental endowments, is indispensable in arriving at anything like a correct view of the creature man. I intend not to elaborate this matter, but merely to glance at the five senses of man, regarding them as the only means to the soul or mind of man through which we acquire all [142] our simple and original ideas of the universe around us. My object is, to demonstrate from a brief analysis of human capacity the utter impossibility of man's originating those supernatural ideas which are necessarily involved in the frame and institution of every system of religion. I know that the system of natural religion, is founded upon the hypothesis, that man, by the exercise of his natural reason, is capable of arriving at the knowledge of God and the relations to him and one another. In order to establish the true line of demarcation in this matter, I affirm, first, that there is a God, all nature cries aloud through all her works. But we must have ears to hear this voice. In other words, all things around us and within us prove the existence of God when that idea is originated. 2. I affirm that all nations have derived their ideas of Deity (and there is no nation without these ideas), from tradition and not from the light of nature. 3. I deny that man, in possession of but five senses, and with no other guide but the light of nature, could ever have originated the idea of Deity. But it is more than probable that no human being having but five senses would be a fit subject for an experiment whereby to ascertain whether it were in human nature, unaided by the light of revelation or tradition, to originate the idea of a God; because all who have a full organization have heard of a Creator. Therefore, the matter is to be demonstrated on purely philosophic principles. Now the admissions are, that all nature vouches the existence of God--that the tradition concerning God is the common moral property of all nations. And the negative is, that man cannot originate the idea of God.

      Now it is conceded on all hands that we have but five senses, and that these five senses are the only avenues through which intelligence concerning material things can reach us. These are the senses of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, feeling. For example, let us take the sense of smelling, as the most simple of all our senses. Now there are in nature many substances possessing odorous properties. Upon a chemical analysis we discover that these odors are nothing but small particles of matter, sometimes exceedingly minute. These particles falling off from the bodies, are pressed into the atmospheric air; in the process of respiration they reach our sense of smelling. They penetrate the nasal membrane, and strike upon the olfactory nerve, and the impressions which the impulse of each of the odorous particles makes upon this nerve is communicated to the sensorium. Bring a rose into a dark room, within the reach of this sense, and although we cannot see it we know it is there, because the odorous particles flying off and commingling with the atmosphere of the room, we inhale them. This impression made upon the sensorium by means of the impulse of each [143] particle upon the sense, we call sensation. Though it be a digression, I would call upon the materialist to reflect upon the wisdom and design manifested in placing this sense exactly where it is. Air is the real pabulum vitæ, but were it not for the locale of this sense, being in the very channel through which this fluid passes into our lungs, how could we discriminate between the salubrious and insalubrious qualities of the air we inhale? We know the extent to which the most minute miasmata may affect our health; and although many of the odorous particles are so minute, or so weak in their impulse, as not to be sensibly felt, yet still all the grosser and more common impurities are detected by this sense. Now had the locale of this sense been in the hand, it would have been useless for the preservation of health and life. Its position therefore proves wisdom and design in its formation. [144]

      But to return, odors are material things; small particles of matter flying off from bodies, so small as to be invisible. Now, had we not this organ we should be deprived of all those ideas which come by that sense. We could not, without the sense of smelling, have any more ideas of odors than a human hand could have of music. It would be impossible to communicate to a man, born without the sense of smelling, any idea of odors, because he would be without archetype, or analogy for the conception of any such idea. The corollary then is, that all our ideas of this class are derived through the medium of this sense.

[COD 137-144]