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Alexander Campbell and Robert Owen
Evidences of Christianity: A Debate (1829)

 

MR. CAMPBELL'S ELEVENTH REPLY.

      Mr. Chairman: As this is so much of the evidence to be adduced in support of my friend's first proposition, I presume that I must submit to hear it read; but I shall protest against its being read five times to prove the five positions. If it had the charm of being a new theory--if it had not been detailed to us before, and its practicability and utility had not been tested by experiment, we might with more patience and interest listen to the outline. But the experiment made in the State of Indiana has gone much farther to dissipate the influence of the illusions of my friend's philosophy upon the public mind that he is aware of.

      I shall now proceed to our brief analysis of the five senses. Next to the sense of smelling is that of tasting, as respects simplicity in its use and operation. By this sense we become acquainted with the qualities of aliment, so as to discriminate the qualities between what is agreeable or disagreeable, conducive or prejudicial to health. The Author of Nature has wisely ordered the locale of this sense also. Located elsewhere than where it is, it would be valueless to the animal man. When a material, vegetable, animal, and sometimes mineral substance, is presented to the discrimination of this sense, the particles are solved by the saliva which is its adjunct. This saliva, which always moistens the organs of taste, is one of the most universal menstruums in nature, and possesses the power of solving all the aliments necessary to animals; so as to enable the tongue to discriminate the qualities of the object as pleasing or displeasing, healthy or the contrary. The impressions made upon this organ are immediately communicated to the brain, and an idea of the savors of bodies necessary to life or health is thus acquired. Thus, after a little experience, we are enabled to discriminate the nutritious and unwholesome properties of all aliments. It is true that this sense may be much obtunded, and that it has been grossly perverted; but it is the safest criterion by which to ascertain the healthful and agreeable properties of aliments. Whatever may be the extent of our ideas of savors or tastes, they are all derived through the medium of this sense.

      Feeling being not so local in its design, but more local in its object, is wisely and beneficently transferred through the whole animal system; and through this avenue of intelligence we become acquainted with the tactile properties of bodies--their roughness, smoothness, hardness, softness, etc., etc. All these sensations, through this medium, find their way to the sensorium. The wisdom of transfusing this sense generally is as obvious as the specific location of the smell and taste. This sense, however, is not equally transfused, being most exquisite in the most useful organs, particularly in the organ of vision. It is obvious that if we could conceive a man were born without this avenue to intelligence, closed up he must ever remain in ignorance of all the tactile properties of bodies, and he could never originate the idea of material tangibility. The thing is physically impossible.

      The sense of hearing is given to us that we may discriminate all the vibrations and motions of the air. Every impression made upon the outward ear reaches to the tympanum, and conformably to the impulse given to it, it gives us the idea of the whole gamut of [148] harmonious or discordant sounds. We all know that a man born deaf can have no idea of the nature of sound, and therefore can never be taught the art of speaking, which is simply the art of making such an impression upon the auricular sense as to communicate our ideas to others through the medium of that sense.

      We come next to seeing. This most perfect and delightful of all our senses, is, in like manner, admirably adapted to its specific object. It is the avenue of intelligence through which all our ideas of color, magnitude, and distance are derived to us; and the impressions made upon this sense reach the sensorium through the optic nerves.

      Now it is only necessary to name these five senses, and their respective uses, in order to discover in them all that beneficence, wisdom, and design which suggest the idea of a supremely intelligent First Cause, manifesting its wisdom and benevolence in the animal organization of man, to discover that man has been endowed by his Creator with an organization which enables him to elicit every valuable property of matter. We discover an admirable adaptation of these senses to the conception of all ideas of colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and tacts; and that all our intelligence on these subjects is derived through these five channels.

      The conclusion, therefore, from these premises, is, that a man born without any one of these senses, must ever remain destitute of all ideas derivable through it; that a man born deaf, dumb, blind, and without tactability, has all these avenues to intelligence closed up, and must therefore remain an idiot all his lifetime. Is it not self-evident that a blind-born man can never acquire any ideas of colors, nor a deaf-born man any idea of sounds? But if we would suppose a man born destitute of all the five senses, he would not only be idiotic, but he would be a lump of insensible matter. Well, if all the ideas we have of sensible objects are derived through these media, there must be a model or archetype of each of these ideas presented to the appropriate sense. Before I can have an idea of the color or shape of a rose, it must be brought within the jurisdiction or cognizance of my ocular and olfactory sense. Therefore, every writer who has undertaken to analyze the senses, has come to the conclusion that we cannot have an idea of material objects, or the qualities of matter, that is not derived from the exercise of our senses upon the material objects around us. Well now, this being the basis of all our knowledge, the powers which we call rational, or intellectual, are necessarily circumscribed by the simple ideas thus acquired. The senses put us in possession of all the materials which the intellect has to work up--in, like manner as the raw material must first be put into the hands of the manufacturer [149] before it can be manufactured for the various uses of life. All mechanical or intellectual ingenuity is unavailable without the material. There can be no ship without timber--no penknife without metal. Thus a child, from the time its powers of discriminating sensible objects begin to be developed, acquires a fund of materials, or simple ideas, on which its intellect begins to operate.

      In consequence of inattention, we imagine that children are making no advances in information during the first months of their existence. But a superficial observer can form no idea of the important acquisitions of knowledge made by an infant in the first few months after its birth. It is employed most industriously in learning to use its hands, to move its different members, to adjust its different senses to their proper objects. The minute observer will notice its first efforts to trim its eyes so as to have a discriminating vision; he will remark how its soft, pulpy fingers are in almost continual exercise in order to acquire a discriminating tact.

      There are many mysteries existing in our animal economy which have never yet been developed. We well know that upon the first presentation of a candle to the vision of an infant, there is one distinct and separate impression made upon the retina of each eye, precisely as if two candles were in the first instance presented to the vision of the infant. How comes it then to pass that the infant mind has such a power of minute attention, as very early to have a consciousness of the presence of but one candle. There are many secrets yet inexplicable in the operations of each of these senses. I will mention one which the wisest physiologists have not yet been able to explain. It is well known that there is no anatomical connection between the nerves or muscular systems of either eye; that the muscles which control the movements of each eye are as independent as those which move each arm; yet we turn both eyes involuntarily at the same moment to any particular object, giving precisely the same turn to both our organs of vision. This is as perfect in the new-born infant as in the full-grown man. The mind appears in its first acts to possess a sort of innate power over the organs of vision. From the first dawn of rationality the mind appears conscious that illusion has been practiced by the singular phenomena of two distinct impressions upon the retina of either eye. No one has yet fathomed these physical mysteries of animal economy, nor is it any part of my present business to attempt to fathom them. It is enough for me to establish the position that all our ideas of sensible objects are derived from, and only derivable through, the five senses; that the mind begins to operate upon these materials as soon as they are presented to the senses, and that this gives us the first [150] intimation of the existence of infantile intellect. Having rather stated, than analyzed the power called sensation, let us turn our thoughts a moment to perception.

      The mind forms ideas in accordance with the sensations impressed upon the brain. The mind is perfectly conscious of the existence of these impressions; they are communicated directly to the sensorium; and here begins the intellect process of reflecting upon, comparing, and recalling them; then presenting them in different views, separating, abstracting, combining, and generalizing them. All this is in the natural operation of the intellect on the objects presented to it by sensation. Thus it is that we derive our ideas of sensible objects, and thus we begin to reason upon them. Therefore, we cannot imagine a sixth sense--we cannot conceive what it would be. The reason is, that we have never seen any animal possessed of it. Had we been endowed but with four senses it would have been equally impossible to conceive of a fifth sense; with but three, of a fourth, etc. These are truths which I think must be palpable to the plainest understanding, and which require no philosophic subtilty in their elucidation. Now, to expect a man destitute of the light of revelation to have ideas not derivable through any of his senses, would be as absurd as to expect a man, without the organs of vision, to have all the ideas of color possessed by those who enjoy the very clearest vision. You might as reasonably expect a person born deaf to have all the ideas of harmony, as a man destitute of supernatural revelation to have the ideas of God and a spiritual system--without seeing or hearing some supernatural personage, all natural objects would be inadequate to originate any spiritual ideas. Many experiments have been made upon the deaf, who have been restored to hearing, to ascertain whether by the other senses, and all the reasonings which the mental powers were capable of, they had acquired any idea of God; and all have concurred in attesting the utter impossibility of acquiring such without the aid of revelation. No, my friends, the man on whom the light of revelation has never beamed, can no more conceive of those ideas which in a system of spiritual religion are native, inherent, and discoverable, than the deaf-born man can be moved by the "concord of sweet sounds." It would be as rational to talk of seeing by the hand, or hearing by the tongue, as to talk of knowing God without a communication from himself. We can by things already known be taught things not known; but there must be a teacher.

      But I must tell you, while speaking of revelation, that perhaps I am misunderstood; and certainly I am, if I am supposed to use this term in the vulgar sense. For now it is usual to call the whole Bible a revelation from God. I must explain myself here. There are a thousand [151] historic facts narrated in the Bible, which it would be absurd to regard as immediate and direct revelation from the Almighty. Paine defines revelation very accurately, although he did not believe we had any, properly so called. He says, page 14, "Age of Reason" "Revelation cannot be applied to anything done upon earth. It is a communication of something which the person to whom that thing is revealed did not know before"--and I add, could not otherwise know. (That intelligence which could never have been derived to us through the agency of our senses.)--"Consequently all the historical and anecdotal part of the Bible is not within the compass and meaning of the word revelation." Revelation, from the import of the term, must be supernatural. But the historic parts of both Testaments, present a great variety of topographical and historic facts and incidents; colloquies between friends and enemies, of apostles, prophets, and patriarchs, and of distinguished persons, good and evil; wars, intrigues, amours, and crimes of every dye. Now it would be neither philosophical nor rational to dignify and designate these colloquies, narratives, geographical and biographical notices, etc., by the term revelation. The term revelation, in its strict acceptation among intelligent Christians, means nothing more or less than a Divine communication concerning spiritual and eternal things, a knowledge of which man could never have attained by the exercise of his reason upon material and sensible objects; for as Paul says, "Things which the eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man to conceive, has God revealed to us apostles, and we declare them to you." Now the corollary is, that, to a man to whom this divine revelation has never been made, it is as impossible to acquire ideas of spiritual and eternal things, as for a blind man to admire the play of colors in a prism.

      In the Old Testament, to distinguish the ordinary information from the divine communications, such intimations are made as "The word of the Lord," or "A message from the Lord came" to such a person. Sometimes, "The Lord said." But in the New Testament, the phrase "The Word," or "The word of the Lord" or "The Truth" is almost exclusively appropriated to the testimony which God gave concerning the person and mission of Jesus Christ. It may also be remarked, that in a volume such as the Bible is, and having the object which it professes, it was necessary that the worst deeds and the best deeds of all sorts of men, in all sorts of circumstances, should be detailed. It teaches us man, it develops human nature, it reveals to us the character and purpose of the Maker of the universe. Moreover, the persons who are employed to make these communications are so supernaturally guided as to make them infallible witnesses in all the facts they attest, [152] as well as all the communications concerning supernatural things. The ridicule which some ignorant skeptics have uttered against the contents of the book, under the general title of a revelation from God, as if it were all properly so called, is, if it have any point, only directed against their own obtusity of intellect, and negligence in making themselves acquainted with the most important of all books in the world.

      Our reasoning upon these premises must therefore necessarily be in the following order: Objects of senses are presented to the infant mind, it perceives them, begins to reflect upon them, and after exercising its power of discrimination, it arrives at certain conclusions respecting them. And this leads us to notice the intellectual powers of man. 1. Perception, by which we become acquainted with all things external. 2. Memory, by which we are enabled to recall things past. 3. Consciousness, which acquaints us with all things internal. Perception has present sensible objects for its province. Memory is the record which we have of the past. But consciousness has respect only to things present. I perceive a numerous assemblage now before me, and I am conscious of my own thoughts at the time. I remember that there were such and such persons here yesterday. These three powers of perception, memory, and consciousness, are the primary powers of the mind. Over these three we have shown that the will has no power; that they are independent of volition. For example, I often have perceptions contrary to my volitions; matters written upon the table of my memory, by singular associations, will involuntarily present themselves in a vivid manner before me, and it certainly is felt by all, that our being conscious of our own thoughts depends not upon any act of the will, but upon the constitution of mind itself. But in exercising the faculties of recollecting, reflecting, imagining, reasoning, and judging, I discover that all these are subjects to the control of my volition. For example, in exercising the faculty of imagination, I can, at will, transfer the external peculiarities of one animal to the body of another, and thereby create any kind of imaginative monster; I can by imagination take the head, trunk, and arms of a man, and put them on horseback, and thereby present to my mind's eye, the fabulous Centaur. But this license of imagination is entirely under the control of my volition. I can recollect only by making an effort, and consequently must determine to make that effort. I can reason only when I decide to reason; and my placing myself in the attitude of a judge, is as much in obedience to a previous determination, as the eating of my supper, or my going to bed. These matters are so plain to those who do reflect, that to demonstrate them, appears something like an insult to the understanding of such an audience as this. [153]

      I was about to state some facts in proof, that the deaf cannot form an idea of God, a future state, or of a human spirit. But I am informed my half hour is out.1


      1 From some cause these facts were not given in the Debate. The next speech failed to call them forth. I shall Just state one case here, as a specimen of the documents alluded to. I believe all experiments yet made upon such persons have proved that faith, or the knowledge of God, and of a Creator, has come by hearing. By faith, Paul said, and not by reason, "we know that the worlds were made by the word of God." This case is extracted from "The Memoirs of the Academy of Science at Paris"--
      "The son of a tradesman in Chartres, who had been deaf from his birth, and consequently dumb, when he was twenty-three or twenty-four years of age, began on a sudden to speak, without its being known that he had ever heard. This event drew the attention of every one, and many believed it to be miraculous. The young man, however, gave a plain and rational account, by which it appeared to proceed wholly from natural causes. He said that about four months before he was surprised by a NEW, and pleasing sensation, which he afterward discovered to arise from the ringing of bells; that as yet he heard with one ear, but afterward a kind of water came from his left ear, and then he could hear distinctly with both; and from this time he listened with the utmost curiosity and attention to the sounds which accompany those motions of the lips which he had before remarked to convey ideas or meaning from one person to another. In short, he was able to understand them, by noting the thing to which they related and the action they produced. And after repeated attempts to imitate them when alone, at the end of four months he thought himself able to talk. He, therefore, without having intimated what has happened, began at once to speak, and affected to join in conversation, though with much more imperfection than he was aware.
      "Many divines immediately visited him, and questioned him concerning God, and the soul, moral good, and evil, and many other students of the same kind; but of all this they found him ignorant, though he had been used to go to mass, and had been instructed In all the externals of devotion, as making the signs of the cross, looking upward, kneeling at proper seasons, and using gestures of penitence, and prayer. Of death itself, which may be considered as a sensible object, he had very confused, and imperfect ideas, nor did it appear that he had ever reflected upon it. His life was little more than animal, and sensitive. He seemed to be contented with the simple perception of such objects as he could perceive, and did not compare from him. It appeared, however, that his understanding was vigorous, and his apprehensions quick, so that his intellectual defects must have been caused, not by the barrenness of the soil, but merely by the want of necessary cultivation." [154]

[COD 147-154]


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Alexander Campbell and Robert Owen
Evidences of Christianity: A Debate (1829)