"A copious history of the Jewish legislator is given by Antapanus, in which the oppression of the Israelites; the flight of Moses into Arabia, and his subsequent marriage; a circumstance similar to that of the burning bush; his divine commission to deliver his countrymen; the transformation of his rod into a serpent; the various plagues of Egypt, the spoiling of the Egyptians; the passage through the Red Sea; the destruction of Pharaoh and his host; and the support of the Israelites by manna in the wilderness, are all mentioned. He is further said to have been the person whom the Greeks call Museus, the preceptor of the celebrated Orpheus. The same author asserts that the passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea was not unknown to the Heliopolitans, who gave the following account of that supernatural transaction. 'The king of Egypt, as soon as the Jews had departed from his country, pursued them with an immense army, bearing along with him the consecrated animals. But Moses having, by the divine command, struck the waters with his rod, they parted asunder, and afforded a free passage to the Israelites. The Egyptians attempted to follow them, when fire suddenly flashed in their faces and the sea, returning to its usual channel, brought a universal destruction upon their whole army.'

      "The circumstance of the Egyptians being struck with lightning, as well as being overwhelmed by the waves, is mentioned in the 77th Psalm, although unnoticed in the Pentateuch.

      "Diodorus Siculus relates, that the Ichthyophagi, who lived near the Red Sea, had a tradition handed down to them through a long line of ancestors, that the whole bay was once laid bare to the very bottom, the waters retiring to the opposite shores; and that they [257] afterward returned to their accustomed channel with a most tremendous revulsion.

      "Even to this day, the inhabitants of the neighborhood of Corondel preserve the remembrance of a mighty army having been once drowned in the bay which Ptolemy calls Clysma.

      "The very country where the event is said to have happened, in some degree bears testimony of the accuracy of the Mosaical narrative. The scriptural Ethen is still called Etti. The wilderness of Shur, the mountain of Sinai, and the country of Paran, are still known by the same name; and Marah, Elath, and Midian, are still familiar to the ears of the Arabs. The grove of Elim yet remains, and its twelve fountains have neither increased nor diminished since the days of Moses.

      "The names which are assigned by Moses to eastern countries and cities, returned to them immediately from the patriarchs, their original founders, are for the most part the very names by which they were anciently known all over the East; many of them were afterward translated, with little variation, by the Greeks, into their systems of geography. Moses has traced in one short chapter, all the inhabitants of the earth, from the Caspian and Persian seas to extreme Gades to their original, and recorded at once the period and occasion of their dispersion. "The late Sir William Jones has very satisfactorily traced the origin of all the people of the earth to the three roots, Shem, Ham, and Japhet; according to the account given in the 10th chapter of Genesis. The fact mentioned by him is worthy of remark, that the first dynasties of Peruvian kings are dignified exactly as those of India are, by the name of the Sun and Moon.

      "Sir William Jones has shown, that the traditions of the present heathen nations of Asia are not of more ancient authority than the traditions of the ancient nations of Asia and Europe. 'States and empires,' he says, 'could scarcely have assumed a regular form till fifteen or sixteen hundred years before the Christian epoch; and for the first thousand years of that period we have no history unmixed with fable, except that of the turbulent and variable, but eminently distinguished nation descended from Abraham.'

      "The Chinese themselves do not pretend that any historical monument existed among them, in the age of Confucius, more ancient than 1100 years before the Christian epoch.

      "The dawn of the true Indian history appears only three or four centuries before the Christian era; the preceding ages being clouded by allegory or fable.

      'Truth is always consistent with itself, and acquires an accession of [258] evidence from everything with which it stands connected. It is not only beyond the power of perverted ingenuity and learning to invalidate the truth of the facts recorded in the earlier parts of the scriptural history, but they are confirmed by the traditions of all nations in a manner the most indubitable."¹

      We have now, we presume, exhausted your patience on this dry but still interesting part of the argument. We predicate nothing of these documents further than this, that, so far as the antiquities of nations have descended to use, there is corroborative evidence of the Mosaic account, and not a single testimony against it.

      There is more absurdity in my friend's last address than could, perhaps, be disproved in a week. I have enumerated fifty-four distinct assertions adduced in his last address, and in the same space of time I could utter fifty-four entirely distinct from my opponent's. But what would be the results, what the convictions arising from such a style of disputation? If this is to pass for argument, demonstration, or proof among the skeptics, I think their case is indeed irremediable. Men do, indeed, talk of reason, and eulogize her, and compare her with Christianity; but I have uniformly remarked that skeptics, after a few compliments to their goddess at the threshold, afterward treat her with great neglect. I had intended to-day to present a recapitulation of my argument, and of my opponent's also, but on examination I could not find that he had advanced a single new idea. I could discover nothing but what he has already more than once presented. He has only given us another revisal of his divine code. In reiterating this code he did, I acknowledge, pass a few compliments upon the general character of man. We have been told, among other things, that we have not rational faces; that there are few indices or proofs of any sort of reasoning powers exhibited in any Christian community; and to Christian communities he ascribes all the vices of the world. For what purpose should I attend to such a style of argument? No good could result. By recognizing it as worthy of notice I should be deprived of opportunity to advance any good arguments in favor of Christianity. On Mr. Owen's principles he can commit no sin against decorum or anything else. He cannot recognize any being taking cognizance of his motives against whom he can sin. He acknowledges no responsibility to any tribunal, none to the moderators, none to the audience. Upon his own principles he cannot sin, and is, therefore, incapable of conviction upon our premises.

      Yesterday we were told that we were neither more nor less than mere particles of matter; consequently, that there is no such thing as either [259] virtue, religion, or morality, in the common acceptation of those terms. I know that the terms heaven, divine law, religion, virtue, and morality, are occasionally used by Mr. Owen. But in what sense or application he uses them is not known. We have called upon him repeatedly for a definition of these terms. Surely it must be known to Mr. Owen, that in argument definitions must be settled. Now I would ask this audience if they have any idea of what Mr. Owen means by virtue. What are his ideas of virtue? What virtue can a being who is altogether material possess? Why, he tells us that it is to pay a just regard to our passions and feelings; or, in other words, that a virtuous course is that which secures to us the greatest amount of animal enjoyment. So that virtue, with Mr. Owen, is nothing more than a new name for appetite gratified; and his morality is nothing more than the capacity to minister to animal enjoyment. This is most unquestionably what Mr. Owen means by virtue and morality.

      In regard to the term fact, Mr. Owen repeats that "anything which exists is fact." Now, I believe I hold mere verbal criticism in as slight regard as most men, but by this loose method of defining terms and using them, it is impossible ever to arrive at a logical conclusion. We asserted yesterday that whatever is done is a fact, but that nothing which is not done can be called a fact. This I affirm is the true import of the term. In common parlance we use this and other terms vaguely; but when we come to logical and philosophical discussion, this will never do. If it be necessary in mathematics to have a strict definition of our terms, it is equally necessary here. What is the difference between a fact, a truth, an opinion, and a belief? Why, there is just as distinct a meaning annexed to these terms in my mind, as to the eye, the ear, or any other organ or member of the human body. The term truth is the most general and comprehensive of all. We have logical and mathematical truths, and so on through the whole circle of the sciences; and it means no more than a co-existence and consentaneousness with the thing of which it is affirmed. When facts are called stubborn things, which are to revolutionize the world, it is surely necessary that we should understand the import of the term; but here we are at issue--Mr. Owen says a fact is that which exists; on the other hand we affirm that a fact is that which is done. Now, according to Mr. Owen's definition, everything that has any existence, real or imaginary, is a fact. If a house is composed of fifty thousand bricks, it is composed of fifty thousand facts! It is true that I have two eyes; but in the legitimate use of terms, it is not a fact. It is a fact that Mr. Owen has addressed you; that he has exhibited his twelve laws several times; expounded and applied them. But their existence upon that paper is [260] not a fact. It is a fact that they were written, read, and explained; because all these things were done. Historic facts are those which have been done in former times, and put upon record.

      After my opponent's definition of the term fact, he was pleased to admit that he had some credulity; that he believed that Julius Cæsar was assassinated in the Capitol, and that this same Cæsar conquered Pompey. He also admitted that he believed some other facts in Roman history. He believes in the existence of an inquisition, of the cruel persecutions of the Puritans, and he believes in the practicability of instituting a new social system, which is to revolutionize the world; these are facts which he says he believes. Now take the most notorious of these facts, viz: That Cæsar was assassinated in the senate-house, and let him produce the evidence on which his belief rests. I say, let him produce the historic evidence on which he rests his belief in this fact, and I will produce a hundred-fold more historic evidence of every species to prove that Jesus Christ rose from the dead.

      My friend is himself a striking contradiction to his whole doctrine of circumstances, because we see him before us such a being as it is impossible his circumstances could ever have formed. His views, sentiments, feelings, and whole course of conduct are antipodes to those of men reared and trained under circumstances of the same character with his own. What, I should like to be informed, has distinguished Mr. Owen from his neighbors? He has asserted that our faith is entirely involuntary, and that our volitions have nothing to do with our belief; but he has just shown you that he disbelieves his own sixth law. He has the most voluntary kind of faith I ever knew. He wills to believe all history that reflects any stigma upon nominal Christians--the cruelties and persecutions practiced by pretended disciples of him who prohibited all violence, cruelty, and revenge; he wills to believe certain matters of fact from Roman history. The rest he wills to disbelieve.

      The reason why I have not replied to the calumnies cast by Mr. Owen upon the Christian religion, is, because we thought them unworthy of reply. But Mr. Owen ought to come to close quarters, armed with the artillery of his twelve facts. In order to bring Mr. Owen to close quarters, I presented him with a written outline of my exceptions to some of his most important facts, or laws of human nature, or whatever he may prefer to call them. This paper Mr. Owen has not condescended to notice. I shall, therefore, take the liberty to read it to you, in order that you may judge for yourselves whether it merits the contempt with which it has been treated. You will then judge whether Mr. Owen, as a philosopher, is not bound, and especially on the ground he has assumed, to discuss the merits of the document presented. [261]

      "6. That each individual is so created, that he must believe according to the strongest impressions that can be made on his feelings and other faculties."

      "9. That the highest health, the greatest progressive improvements, and the most permanent happiness of each individual, depend, in a great degree, upon the proper cultivation of all his physical, intellectual, and moral faculties and powers, from infancy to maturity; and upon all those parts of his nature being duly called into action at their proper period, and temperately exercised according to the strength and capacity of the individual."

      The object of his law is to prove man a necessary, and, therefore, an irresponsible agent.

      Belief must, in all cases, be the effect of testimony, as knowledge is of experience; which latter is always, and in all cases, the proper and necessary effect of sensation, perception, memory, and consciousness; or, is the necessary result of one or more of the faculties. Wherefore, unless we confound belief with knowledge, it has nothing to do with our sensations or feelings, whether external or internal feelings; but depends entirely upon testimony--of the validity of which reason is the sole competent judge. But suppose with the said law, that "our belief has no dependence upon our will," what then? How does this affect our responsibility, to destroy which, is the obvious design of said law? Is not will, or volition the last practical act of the mind--the determination of the mind to action, whether internal action or external? Is it not the effect of appetite--of affection--of passion--of judgment? And although it may proceed from any one, or more, of these motives; yet, in rational creatures, ought it not to be always under the control of reason--of judgment? And if we judge or reason rightly, according to the documents within out power, we will necessarily will to do what, upon the whole, appears right, or preferable to do. And this we will most certainly do, if we possess the documents of Christianity, and act accordingly. For it is axiomatically right for the rational creature to love, adore, and obey its Creator, Preserver, Redeemer, and gracious Benefactor, to whom it stands indebted for everything enjoyed or promised. These things being so, the only necessity the rational creature is subject to, according to its nature, is to act right; that is, according to the best documents which are within its power, or of which it can avail itself. To act thus, would most [262] certainly be to act circumstantially right; than which, no rational creature can act better, and, in the case supposed, would inevitably lead to piety, temperance, justice, and charity;--would infallibly secure benevolence to all, according to our ability and their necessity, etc. Now, if to these happy results of the just necessity of acting up to this sixth law of our rational nature, as explained above, we add the acquirements of the ninth, in order to promote and secure our highest and most permanent happiness by cultivating, in the best and highest manner all our powers and faculties, physical, intellectual, and moral, from infancy to maturity, and in calling them forth into action at the proper periods;--will we not especially cultivate and call into action, as fast, and as far as possible, these powers; the improvement and exercise of which contribute most to this high and benevolent design of our creation; namely, the knowledge and love of God; with all the blissful and glorious hopes and assurances of the gospel, both present and future, all of which are attainable by faith only? Will we not, therefore, cultivate the faculty of believing, with which we are so liberally endowed from our very infancy, that our progressive happiness, our diversified gratification, may increase as fast as possible--may grow with our growth and strengthen with our strength? For who know not that the chief of our gratifications consist in the exercise of our minds upon the most lovely and interesting objects? And what can equal for grandeur, for beauty, for variety, for interest, for permanency--the glorious, the wonderful, and lovely objects presented to our minds in the Holy Scriptures, to allure our souls to the love of piety and benevolence--of all manner of virtue and goodness? Or what so terrible or dissuasive as the exhibitions of the divine displeasure against every species of impiety, of iniquity, and cruelty to our fellow-creatures? And are not these things addressed and adapted to our intellectual faculties? Have we not the faculty of believing upon testimony--of discerning its credibility--of loving and hating--of hoping and fearing--of admiring, desiring, rejoicing--of gratitude and resentment? And does not our intellectual happiness consist in a duly apportioned succession of those exercises toward their proper objects? Does not the eighth law of our nature demand variety in order to healthful enjoyment? And does not the law under consideration call for the cultivation of our moral faculties? And are not the above objects adapted to the cultivation of these faculties?

      But to proceed. We have farther proof of the designed or involuntary ambiguity of our opponent. He still persists in the use of the word created. What is the import of the word created? In reply to this question, Mr. Owen says that he does not know whether he ever was created. Therefore, for Mr. Owen to use the term created is an [263] imposition upon our language and feelings. What is the import of the word feeling? What does Mr. Owen mean by applying the term belief to the strongest impressions made upon our feelings? If I put my finger into the fire, I feel that I am burned; but according to Mr. Owen's use of terms, from this feeling results my belief that I am burned; and I ought, to speak in his style, to say that I believe I am burned, and that this belief is involuntary. We have protested already against this licentious use of terms. We have affirmed that the term belief cannot have reference to our sensations, but can only be applied legitimately to matters dependent upon testimony; that where there is no testimony there can be no belief. It is common, we admit, to say that we have the testimony of our own eyes, or ears, but this is language merely eulogistic of the utility and perfections of those organs; but in strict propriety of speech, we cannot use the term belief where there is neither oral, written, or traditional testimony. But, with Mr. Owen, the word belief is nomen generalissimum--a word of the greatest general and comprehensive signification--almost equivalent, in the latitude in which he uses it, to a universal language. If I feel hot or cold, or wet or dry, or sick or well, weary, or refreshed, according to Mr. Owen's latitudinous use of the word, I must say that I believe that I feel all these varied sensations.

      He says that each individual is so created that he must believe according to the strongest impression made upon his eye, or ear, or nose, or heart, or any appetite, passion, or power which he possesses; or, in other words, fire will burn him, water will drown him, and the breeze will cool him whether he will it or not; and, therefore, this belief is involuntary. From such confusion of terms we may infer that there is a corresponding confusion of ideas; for confusion of terms is the offspring either of confusion of ideas, or a mistake of the meaning of terms. Whatever a person clearly conceives, he can clearly express. Verba sequntum res; or, in English--words follow ideas, is a true and instructive maxim. Whole systems of error, when analyzed, have been found to proceed from a misapprehension and misapplication of terms. And, indeed, I am not without very considerable misgivings that this may be one radical cause of the illusion which has captivated my friend and opponent, Mr. Owen.

[COD 257-264]