• Explanatory
• The General Position of Situation Ethics
• Particular Expositions of Situation Ethics
• Values in Situation Ethics
• Disvalues in Situation Ethics
• Conclusion
• One Dollar Gift

      E. L. WILLIAMS, M.A., Principal of the College of the Bible, Glen Iris, Melbourne is well-known for his writings, both in the Pamphlet Club and in other publications, on matters concerning Church and Christians.

      In this issue Mr. Williams turns his attention to Ethics, and in particular to Situation Ethics that basis of reasoning for conduct, which has played so prominent a part in discussion over recent times.

      This objective survey of the matter should be of considerable help to all those who want to know on what the so-called "New Morality" is based and how they should stand in relation to passing judgment upon it.

      In 1928 a book by Durant Drake appeared under the name of "The New Morality." It attacked supernatural authoritarian ethics and presented an ethic determined by practicality and usefulness. Four years later another book by the same title, written by G. E. Newcome, was published in protest against the new "morality" of libertarian sexual ethics as presented at that time by the late Bertrand Russell.

      The rise of a new form of philosophy known as Existentialism changed the meaning of the phrase "the new morality." It emphasised man's freedom and responsibility. Man must be open to the future and not be determined by the past. To act under laws which have come down from the past is to limit freedom and to deliver man from responsible decision. Man must invent or create in the light of the emerging situation. Moral choice must be guided by specific conditions rather than by prior prescriptions, laws, rules or principles. Harking back to Soren Kierkegaard, a Danish Christian thinker of the nineteenth century, Christian theologians have embraced existentialist thought.

      In 1950 a papal encyclical warned Roman Catholics against existentialism as a "new philosophy of error." Two years later a formal paper exhortation warned against moral judgments based upon considerations of situations alone and condemned what it styled "the new morality."

      Hence we have the now descriptive phrase, "Situation Ethics--The New Morality."

      A world of rapid social change, of technological development and scientific discovery makes us more and more aware of the complexity of the factors entering into moral decisions. It is difficult to fit all the novelty and complexity into neat patterns subject to moral prescriptions or ready made rules. There is a tax on discernment, a call for originality and responsible freedom. All this provides an occasion for the emphasis upon situation ethics which professes to take seriously the words: "New occasions, new duties; time makes ancient good uncouth. "

      All moral decisions are determined by the situation guided by consideration of persons rather than laws and motivated by love alone.

      Persons are ends and as such are more important than things. Laws are but things and means and must give way to persons.

      Because love is a debased word in common parlance, situation ethics is commonly misunderstood as allowing sexual licence in particular and general irresponsible freedom. For this reason situationists in emphasising love as the ultimate criterion in making moral decisions explain that by love is meant love as it is presented in the New Testament. This is "agape"--love that is based on respect, rooted in the will rather than in emotions, love that is a positive, creative attitude, characteristically giving rather than desiring, is always concerned with the need of another, is essentially altruistic rather than egoistic. This kind of love as distinct from sex love (eras), friendship love (philia) family love (storge), is always responsible in relationship.

      However, what love demands in any specific instance depends upon the situation.

      Situationists claim that this "new morality" is Biblical, for behind it lies the authority of Jesus Christ Himself.

      Rudolph Bultmann emphasises "radical obedience" in love as central to ethics. Formal obedience has to do with conformity to external rules. Radical obedience involves the total person--his inner being and his external action

      Man hears God's word in the concrete situation. The demand of the moment is discernible because somehow God's demand is written into the situation. The demands of the moment are made clearer by a knowledge of precedents and consequences, but the decision is never determined by this knowledge. The situation determines what one should do.

      J. A. T. Robinson says the old morality starts with general principles, supernaturally oriented, which sometimes take precedence over persons. The new morality begins with the particular situation and emphasises the priority of persons. "Love, alone, because, as It were, it has a built-in moral compass, enabling it to 'home' intuitively upon the deepest need of the other, can allow itself to be directed completely by the situation." ("Honest to God," p. 115).

      However, Robinson does imply that there are values that make inescapable demands upon us and virtually impose rules or principles upon us when he says: "I would, of course, be the first to agree that there are a whole class of actions--like stealing, lying, killing, committing adultery--which are so fundamentally destructive of human relationships that no difference of century or society can change their character" ("Christian Morals Today." p. 16).

      Joseph Fletcher says there are three approaches in making moral decisions, namely, the legal, the antinomian, and the situational approach.

      Legalism enters every situation encumbered with prefabricated rules and regulations. The letter of the law reigns. Principles, codified in rules are directives, not merely guidelines. Solutions are preset. You can look them up in a book. Prescriptive rules are drawn by reason from nature (natural law) or from the Bible. "One is rationalistic, the other Biblicistic; one natural, the other Scriptural. But both are legalistic" ("Situation Ethics," p. 21).

      "Casuistry is the homage paid by legalism to the love of persons, and to realism about life's relativities" (19).

      (N. B. Casuistry is the process of applying a principle or rule in a particular situation, particularly where there is complexity and conflict between principles, responsibilities and objectives. It takes in all cases where conscience is called upon to decide a "nicety" in the application of moral principles. It may develop into a systematic drawing out of rules as to when rules may be broken. It may further degenerate into humbug.)

      Antinomianism is the very opposite of legalism. Literally, it means against law and may issue in licence. "One enters into the decision making situation armed with no principles or maxims whatsoever, to say nothing of rules. In every 'existential moment' or 'unique' situation, it declares, one must rely upon the situation itself, there and then, to provide its ethical solution" (Ibid. 22).

      Situationism recognises one law or principle, one absolute norm, namely love (agape). It finds a guideline in the wisdom of the Church and culture which contains many general rules. Fletcher quotes Robinson: "Such an ethic (situationism) cannot but rely, in deep humility, upon guiding rules,

upon the cumulative experience of ones own and other people's obedience. It is this bank of experience which gives us our working rules of 'right' and 'wrong,' and without them we could not but flounder" ("Honest to God," 119-120).

      But Fletcher hastens to add that in situation ethics the most reverend principles may be thrown aside if they conflict in any concrete case with love. Principles, maxims, are illuminators, not directors.

      Situationism operates in the situation which is the moment of decision in which the responsible self decides whether the maxims of wisdom serve love or not. "This is the situational strategy in capsule form" (Ibid 33).

      Love is the only intrinsic good, malice the only intrinsic evil. Other "values" are not intrinsic. Hence they may be put aside by love with a clear conscience.

      Love justifies its means. Only the end justifies the means; nothing else. The end must be good and the means fitting. In making a moral decision we must consider the end, the necessary means, the motive and the consequences.

      Love and justice are the same. Justice is love distributed, love using its head, calculating. It is true that to be loving is to be just and to be just is to be loving. Here we agree with Fletcher that justice and love are the same or they can be the same. But it is necessary to do some analysing.

      Justice is a state in which rights are enjoyed and responsibilities are discharged by a person or a group. On the one hand justice is fairness, receiving what is due. It makes demands for a person or a group. Love will issue in a concern for rights, dues. Here justice is love in action. There is no tension. Love and justice are the same. On the other hand justice makes demands upon a person or group. It calls for a contribution, a price. In some circumstances it may call for a penalty as the price. Love may counter this demand of justice with mercy. Here there is a tension between love and justice. They are not the same. Shakespeare has well reminded us that in the course of justice none of us should see salvation. We all pray for mercy and that same prayer teaches us to render the deeds of mercy. To say that love and justice are the same is an inaccurate generalisation.

      1. It emphasises love as the basic, over-arching, dynamic principle of Christian ethics. Our Lord said that the whole of the law and the prophets were summed up in love for God and love for neighbour. Paul caught this insight when he said that love is the fulfilling of the law. He made it clear that one may be ever so correct in giving all ones goods to feed the poor, and in giving ones body to be burned, but if one have not love it all profits nothing. James said that love is the royal law and John made it clear that the only evidence of love for God is love of ones fellowmen.

      2. It puts concern for persons above concern for law.

      Jewish law put humane concern above religious law. Jesus drew on this in his reminder that an ox could be rescued on the Sabbath. His emphasis is seen in His observation that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath. So he justified healing on the Sabbath. He certainly put persons before religious or ceremonial law. Situationists may carry this too far in waiving moral laws. However, the spirit of Christ may be applied in concern for persons as against irrational obedience to moral rules. Our Lord's treatment of the woman taken in adultery (John 9) may be taken as a precedent for consideration of the person and the situation as against legalism.

      3. It is a corrective to legalism. Even if we think it goes too far, it

does lift us from the bondage of the letter of the law and rigorous absolutism that allows no exceptions.

      4. It draws attention to the complexity of life and the novelty of situations. Life is not all divided into blacks and whites. There are many greys. The complexity of life does not always neatly fit into prescribed rules. Novel situations defy precedents, prescriptive rules and patterns.

      1. It unduly exalts the situation as a factor in moral decision. The situation has a real and important place. Situation ethics rightly emphasises this. But it has to be kept in balance with other factors. The emphasis on any one factor without giving proper place to other factors is one-sided and over-simplifies the problem of decision making.

      2. It rests too heavily on maturity in moral judgment.

      Maturity in understanding the nature of love (agape) and maturity in discerning the application of love is assumed. Such an assumption is not realistic. It is an ethic for philosophers. Long ago Plato said the ideal state would exist when all kings were philosophers. Situation ethics requires that not only kings but all the people shall be philosophers.

      3. It is open to a subjective interpretation of Love.

      Love, even when properly understood, is a general principle. It tells us what our motive and spirit ought to be--that we ought to act in love. But it does not always tell us just what we ought to do. It is not directive or prescriptive

      We recognise that conscience is subjective and individualistic. It tells us that we ought to do what we think is right. What we think is right may be quite wrong. All sorts of outrages have been wrought in the name of conscience. It needs education, guidance, correction. Love is just the same. We must seriously question Robinson's statement that love "has a built-in moral compass" that "homes."

      With love left to itself and people left to themselves the value of freedom can easily turn into the licence of permissiveness in which every man does what is right in his own eyes

      In view of the undirective nature of love and the difficulty of determining appropriate love-action in given situations, the guidance of collective wisdom, the tradition of Church and culture, the guidance of specific values and precedents must be taken seriously and not easily set aside in the way that situation ethics appears to be ready to set them aside in the last resort.

      4. It denies an independent validity to values other than love.

      Love issues in honesty, truthfulness, purity, respect for life, justice, etc. It overarches and undergirds these. But it also stands alongside of these values. These children, born of love, stand in their own right and make their own specific claims. We should compare for instance such passages as Romans 13:9-10; Galatians 5:14-24.

      Situation ethics soft pedals on these demands of love and emphasises love alone in such a way that in the last resort these other values may be set aside with absolutely good conscience. Love is the only intrinsic value. Honesty, truthfulness, purity, justice, etc., have no intrinsic value. They have value only as they serve love. But as issues of love, have they not the same inherent quality as love? Particular values may be subjected to love when there is a tension in difficult situations but this can be done only with a relatively good conscience. If we go to war or endorse an abortion there can be only a relatively good conscience. The values that are subjected to love must continue to impose some kind of restraint and some uneasiness in our decided course of action.

      5. It unduly emphasises exceptions.

      In pleading for exceptions situation ethics majors on hard cases. But hard cases make bad laws. It is important to emphasise principles rather than exceptions. An emphasis on exceptions underestimates the danger of turning exceptions into precedents and tends to make a rule of the exception. Fletcher seems to do just this in discussing the claim that the end justifies the means.

      We agree that only a good end makes any means worthwhile. In this sense the end justifies the means. But the saying carries the suggestion that we may do evil that good may come. The means needs justifying because it is questionable. Fletcher accepts this meaning when he says that an "immoral" means does not destroy virtue. For example, a lie to save a victim from a murderer is justified. But this is a case of an exception in a difficult situation and the exception should prove the rule rather than become the rule. According to the situationist emphasis on love the means should be subject to love just as the end is subject to this one imperative principle. Further, the means should consider persons just as the end is required to consider them.

      Fletcher quotes Brunner as saying: "The necessary end sanctifies the necessary means." However, he fails to quote the rest of what Brunner says: "We have no right to believe that our action is approved by God unless we do all that lies in our power to make even these means, so far as possible, conform to the Divine End, that is to love. The means which have to be used for a definite end may even be of such bad quality that in this instance we feel it to be our duty to renounce the undertaking altogether" ("Divine Imperative." 246).

      6. It shows an undue reaction to law.

      It is true that an undue emphasis upon law leads to legalism, but an undue reaction to law with an overemphasis upon freedom easily leads to licence. Lawfulness should not be confused with legalism just as authority should not be confused with authoritarianism. Regard for and use of law is not necessarily legalism.

      Law is not only a guide and a necessary restraint for human weakness and immaturity, but it serves persons and is often a necessary protection for human rights. Life calls for a balance in emphasis.

      Anyone who knows anything about ethical theory knows that situationism in the sense of having regard for the importance of the situation is not new.

      Traditionalism and situationism may be seen as different emphases which need one another. They may be regarded as complementary and not as alternatives. Our formula here as elsewhere should be "both and" rather than "either or."

      In making moral decisions we should take into account persons and laws, the principle of love and other principles or values, society as a valid order and the situation. Cyclops, the one-eyed giant, seen regularly at football matches, is not likely to be a good ethicist.

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Bible Truth Publications, Ballarat
JANUARY, 1972 Number 201