THE good effects of Lord Bacon's writings were due, in a great measure, to the prominence in which he brought out, and the clearness with which he exposed, the sources of error. To accomplish this was his first object, as it has been that of all succeeding writers on method, whose learning and ability are such as to entitle them to be recognized as authorities. The author of the Novum Organum denominated the sources of error idola, a term which has given place in more modern productions to that of prejudice, which expresses substantially the same idea. We shall attempt a brief explanation of these terms, while we urge the acceptance of what is taught on the subject to which they relate as a necessary preparation for the pursuit of the inductive method. The sources of error are divided by Bacon into four classes, or four different kinds of idola, that is, "images," "false appearances," or prejudices, viz.:

      Although the terms employed in the above classification are strange and unfamiliar, it is believed that they will [200] present but little difficulty to even the most ordinary reader, if he will attend to the explanation of them furnished by their author.

      1. By the Idols of the Tribe, he meant to point out those sources of error which are common to the whole human race, and which result from the nature and constitution of the mind. For example, under this head he says "The human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things than it really finds; and although many things in nature be sui generis, and most irregular, will yet invent parallels, and conjugates, and relatives, where no such thing is." Again: "The human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down, (either from general admission and belief, or from the pleasure it affords,) forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation,"--as in the case of dogmatic creeds in religion. "Man always believes more readily what he prefers;" "admits a tincture of the will and passions," to affect his conclusions. The understanding relies upon the senses, notwithstanding their "dullness and incompetency;" and finally, it is, "by its own nature, prone to abstraction, and supposes that which is fluctuating to be fixed."¹

      2. By Idols of the Den, or Cavern, he meant those sources of error which derive their origin from the peculiar nature of each individual's mind and body; and also from education, habit, and accident. For example: "Some men [201] become attached to particular sciences or contemplations, either from supposing themselves the authors and inventors of them, or from having bestowed the greatest pains upon them." "Some are more vigorous and active in observing the differences of things, others in observing their resemblances. Each of them readily falls into excess, by catching either at nice distinctions or shadows of resemblance." "Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration for antiquity, others eagerly embrace novelty; and but few can preserve the just medium, so as neither to tear up what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise the just innovations of the moderns."

      3. The Idols of the Forum, or Market-place, represent those false conclusions which arise from the popular and current use of words which represent things otherwise than as they really are. "For men imagine that their reason governs words, while, in fact, words react upon the understanding. The idols imposed upon the understanding by words are of two kinds: they are either the names of things which have no existence, or the names of actual objects, but confused, badly defined, and hastily and irregularly abstracted from things." Who can estimate the prejudicial influence of the words "Trinitarianism" and "Unitarianism;" of the "Christian Sabbath," "eternal generation," "transubstantiation," and others of the first class, which represent logical deductions, and not things? Or of the word "regeneration," of the second kind, which has given birth to an interminable warfare about "word regeneration," and "spirit regeneration," and "baptismal [202] regeneration," when hardly one man in a thousand uses the term in its scriptural meaning?

      4. Idols of the Theater represent the errors resulting from false systems of philosophy and incorrect reasoning. For an illustration of this class, we respectfully refer the reader to the first book of the present treatise, parts second and third, and to the Novum Organum of Bacon, book i. aph. 61-68.

      If the sources of error are thus numerous and various, thus subtle and powerful, it seems to be but the dictate of common sense that we should make it our first and most earnest study to understand and to become free from them. And certain it is, that none but those who have the manliness to rise above these influences are capable of successfully pursuing the inductive method of biblical interpretation. As, therefore, it is all-important to the reader to have this matter presented in every light which can show it in its true character, we presume we need offer no apology for introducing the following admirable remarks of Sir John Herschel:--

      "Experience, once recognized as the fountain of all our knowledge of nature, it follows that, in the study of nature and its laws, we ought to dismiss as idle prejudices, or at least suspend as premature, any preconceived notion of what might or what ought to be the order of nature in any proposed case, and content ourselves with observing, as a plain matter of fact, what is. To experience we refer as the only ground of all physical inquiry. But before experience itself can be used with advantage, there is one [203] preliminary step to make, which depends wholly on ourselves; it is the absolute dismissal and clearing the mind of all prejudice, from whatever source arising, and the determination to stand and fall by the result of a direct appeal to facts in the first instance, and of a strict logical deduction from them afterwards." It is scarcely necessary to remark that the author does not mean by "experience" that which certain fanatics understand by it. For, while with him it is, "1. A series of experiments, or the results of such experiments; 2. Observation of facts or events happening under like circumstances;"² with them it is the remembrance of the peculiar feelings or emotions of which they have been the subjects. And while for him to say that the laws of nature are to be learned from experience, is the same thing as to say that they are to be learned from a careful observation and comparison of phenomena, just as the laws of Scripture are to be learned by a comparison of its phenomena; they would teach that those laws must be so and so, because such is their "experience." And by this they mean that such is their observation upon themselves, not upon outward phenomena.

      Our author proceeds to mention two kinds of prejudices:--

      "1. Prejudices of opinion.
      "2. Prejudices of sense.

      "By prejudices of opinion, we mean opinions hastily [204] taken up, either from the assertion of others, from our own superficial views, or from vulgar observation, and which, from being constantly admitted without dispute, have obtained the strong hold of habit on our minds. Such were the opinions once maintained that the earth is the greatest body in the universe, and placed immovable in its center, and all the rest of the universe created for its sole use; that it is the nature of fire and of sounds to ascend; that the moonlight is cold; that dews fall from the air," etc. And, we may add, such are the opinions even yet current in some sections, that repentance precedes belief; that faith comes without hearing; that the ordinary influences of the Spirit are the "baptism of the Holy Ghost;" that faith without obedience is sufficient for justification; and many others which have rested for years in the stronghold of prejudice, and which nothing but a strictly inductive exegesis can dissipate. But our author continues:--

      "Our resistance against the destruction of the other class of prejudices, those of sense, is commonly more violent at first, but less persistent than in the case of those of opinion. Not to trust the evidence of our senses seems indeed a hard condition, and one which, if proposed, none would comply with. But it is not the direct evidence of our senses that we are in any case called upon to reject; but only the erroneous judgments we unconsciously form from them, and this only when they can be shown to be so by counter evidence of the same sort." He instances the erroneous conclusions, that colors are inherent qualities, like weight or hardness; [205] that the moon is larger at its rising or setting than in the zenith; ventriloquism, etc., and proceeds:--

      "These, and innumerable instances we might cite, will convince us, that though we are never deceived in the sensible impression made by external objects on us, yet in forming our judgments of them we are greatly at the mercy of circumstances, which either modify the impressions actually received, or combine them with adjuncts which have become habitually associated with different judgments; and, therefore, that in estimating the degree of confidence we are to place in our conclusions, we mast, of necessity, take into account these modifying or accompanying circumstances, whatever they maybe."³

      Absolutely necessary as this is in the study of nature, it is no less so in that of revelation. A man reads a passage, for example, in the Psalms, or in the Epistle to the Romans, and says, with a triumphant air, Behold, how clearly my doctrine is taught! here is the proposition I contend for in iisdem verbis! And this is true. The sensible impression made upon his mind by the passage is correct, while the judgment he forms from that impression may be false; and for the very sufficient reason, that he may have culled the text from the body of an extended argument, addressed to people in peculiar circumstances, and designed to accomplish a particular end, while he has left out of the account all those circumstances which, when considered, greatly modify and limit its meaning. His proper course is, then, [206] to correct this erroneous judgment, by attending to the "counter evidence of the same sort,"--that is, he should hear all the witness has to say, and all that the other witnesses testify, before he makes up his decision.

      We should disregard both the pleasure and the interest of the reader, were we to conclude this chapter without spreading before him one or two extracts from the work of a modern essayist, which, in clearness, in truth, and in point, will serve as a happy sequel to those above presented from the masterly hand of the distinguished natural philosopher:--

      "The most favorable moral condition," says this writer, "in which the inquirer can be, is, unquestionably, when he is possessed with a simple and fervent desire to arrive at the truth without any predilection in behalf of any opinion whatever, and without any disturbing emotion of hope or fear, affection or dislike. 'To be indifferent,' says Locke, 'which of two opinions is true, is the right temper of mind that preserves it from being imposed on, and disposes it to examine with that indifferency, till it has done its best to find the truth--and this is the only direct and safe way to it. But to be indifferent whether we embrace falsehood or truth, is the great road to error.'

      "If a man is possessed with a desire to find a given opinion true, or to confirm himself in a doctrine which he already entertains, he will, in all probability, bestow an undue attention on the arguments and evidence in its favor, to the partial or total neglect of opposite considerations; but if he is free from all wishes of this kind, if he has no [207] predilection to gratify, if his desires are directed solely to the attainment of correct views, he will naturally search for information wherever it is likely to present itself; he will be without motive for partiality, and susceptible of the full force of evidence.

      "However unaccountable it may at first sight appear, it is a fact, that few human beings, in their moral, religious, and political inquiries, are possessed with this simple desire of attaining truth; their strongest wishes are directed to the discovery of new grounds for adhering to opinions already formed; and they are as deaf to arguments on the opposite side, as they are alive to evidence in favor of their own views."⁴

      To these admirable remarks he adds, in the next section, the following:--

      "Impartiality of examination is, if possible, of still higher value than care and diligence. It is of little importance what industry we exert on any subject, if we make all our exertions in one direction, if we sedulously close our minds against all considerations which we dislike, and seek with eagerness for any evidence or argument which will confirm our established or favorite views. A life-long investigation may, in this way, only carry us farther from the truth. What duty and common sense require of us is, that our attention be equally given to both sides of every question, that we make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with all the conflicting arguments, that we be severely impartial in [208] weighing the evidence for each, and suffer no bias to seduce us into supine omission on the one hand, or inordinate rapacity for proof on the other.

      "This, too, is anything but a light and easy task. It can be performed to a certain extent by every honest and sincere inquirer; but perhaps to achieve it in perfection, would require a mind at once enlarged, sagacious, candid, disinterested, and upright. A man who perfectly accomplishes it, however, cannot fail to command the esteem of his fellowmen by the worth and dignity of his conduct. It is painful to think that such an example is rare; that instead of it we usually find the mere partisan, one evidently engaged, not in the pursuit of truth, but in searching for every possible argument to support and confirm a conclusion predetermined by his interests,. his prejudices, or his position in society.

      "What a contrast do these two present!--one, candid, upright, fearless of the issue of the investigation because solely intent on truth, searching on all sides, refusing no evidence, anxious only that every circumstance should be brought out in its true colors and dimensions, and free from anger against opposition; the other, directing all his acuteness to one side, prying into those sources of information alone where he imagines he shall find what is agreeable to his wishes, stating everything both to himself and others with the art and exaggeration of a hired pleader, sounding forth the immaculate merits of his cause, and filled with rancor against all who do not range themselves under the [209] same banners. Or, perhaps, instead of the angry partisan, we see (what is equally a humiliating spectacle) the timid inquirer moving cautiously along, as if alarmed at the sound of his own footsteps, shunning every track not palpably well-trodden, and looking at any evidence that may chance to cross his path, foreign to his ordinary train of thought, with as much trepidation as he would experience were he to see an apparition rising out of the earth. The annals of the world abound with instances of the most determined obstinacy, in turning away from sources of information which it was apprehended might subvert established opinions."

      Such, then, are the conditions upon which eternal truth is to be wooed and won. She requires evidences that she is loved,--deeply, devotedly, supremely loved; that she is loved for her own sake, and more than all the dogmas of the fathers, than all the doctrines of the most hoary antiquity, than all the brilliant innovations of the moderns; and she requires that her suitor shall manifest this love by taking every prejudice or former inamorata, whether of opinion or of sense, and every idol, whether of the tribe, the cavern, the forum, or the theater, and with a sublime and heroic devotion immolating them upon her altars as a willing sacrifice of propitiation. When this is done, she opens wide her doors and admits all to her eternal fellowship and communion.

      But, reader, if upon examination you find your inmost heart and soul not thus imbued with the love of truth,--if you find yourself clinging still to your idols, and unwilling [210] really to give up your prejudices, let me say to you in the language of Plato--"If ever you ought to pray you should do so now."⁵ [211]

[TOOS 200-211]