WE have at length reached the point towards which, in the precious chapters, we have been slowly advancing. In them we promised to give an analysis of the inductive process, to point out its several steps, and to illustrate their use and application by examples drawn from both nature and revelation. And as the only originality to which we pretend in this part of the work is the peculiar application, and not the discovery or the improvement, of the method of induction, we can see no reason why we should not transfer to our pages the lucid explanations of it which grace the works of the masters of science. And this will serve the double purpose of relieving us of the labor of trying to express in our own language that which has been already so well said,--thus enabling us to give our undivided attention to the single point which we seek to establish, while it will confirm the assurance given, that the method proposed for the interpretation of Scripture, is really the [211] method of science, and is not changed or perverted to serve a purpose. To those already familiar with the processes of science, this assurance may seem to be superfluous, but the author seeks never to lose sight of that large class whose investigations have not hitherto been directed to the points involved in the present discussion; and he confesses to a peculiar anxiety that the masses of the people, and especially the young, should be enabled to understand a method which has hitherto been so prolific of good, and which promises even greater results in the future.

      From among the authors who have subjected the method of science to a severe analysis, and who have sought to diffuse a knowledge of its principles and a sense of its importance, we have selected Sir John Herschel and John Stuart Mill as furnishing, the former in his "Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy," and the latter in his "System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive," the most complete, perspicuous, and reliable exhibition of that whose application we wish to extend. The former of these works, as being on the whole the plainest, we shall follow as a text, calling in the aid of the latter only when such aid may seem necessary to supply a deficiency or elucidate an obscurity. We begin, then, with the first step:--

      "Whenever we would either analyze a phenomenon into simpler ones, or ascertain what is the course or law of nature under any proposed general contingency, the first step is to accumulate a sufficient quantity of well-ascertained facts, or recorded instances, bearing on he point in question. Common sense dictates this, as affording us the means [212] of examining the same subject in several points of view; and it would also dictate, that the more different these collected facts are in all other circumstances but that which forms the subject of inquiry, the better; because they are then, in some sort, brought into contrast with one another in their points of disagreement, and thus tend to render those in which they agree more prominent and striking."

      Suppose, for example, we wished to ascertain what is the law of Scripture on the subject of conversion to Christ after dismissing all prejudice from our mind, the first thing to be done would be to collect the scriptural facts, or recorded instances, which bear upon the point. And in this case it would be as plainly the dictate of common sense as in any other. But we proceed:--

      "The only facts which can ever become useful, as grounds of physical inquiry, are those which happen uniformly and invariably under the same circumstances. This is evident: for if they have not this character they cannot be included in laws; they want that universality which fits them to enter as elementary particles into the constitution of those universal axioms which we aim at discovering. If one and the same result does not happen under a given combination of circumstances, apparently the same, one of two things must be supposed,--caprice, (i. e. the arbitrary intervention of mental agency,) or differences in the circumstances themselves, really existing, but unobserved by us. In either case, though we may record such facts as curiosities, or as [213] awaiting explanation when the difference of circumstances shall be understood, we can make no use of them in scientific inquiry. Hence, whenever we notice a remarkable effect of any kind, our first question ought to be, Can it be reproduced? What are the circumstances under which it has happened? And will it always happen again if those circumstances, so far as we have been able to collect them, coexist?"

      If, now, we return to the subject above chosen for illustration, we may collect, among other recorded instances of conversion, that of the thief on the cross. We now ask, What are the circumstances of this case? Are they peculiar, or do they possess "that universality which fits them to enter as elementary particles into the constitution of a universal axiom" or law? If we decide that they are peculiar, and such that, from the nature of the case, they could not by any possibility arise again, then we must be careful not to make those of the circumstances which are thus peculiar the elements of a general conclusion:

      "The circumstances, then," continues our author, "which accompany any observed fact are main features in its observation, at least until it is ascertained by sufficient experience what circumstances have nothing to do with it, and might, therefore, have been left unobserved without sacrificing the fact. In observing and recording a fact, therefore, altogether new, we ought not to omit any circumstance capable of being noted, lest some one of the omitted circumstances should be essentially connected with the fact, [214] and its omission should, therefore, reduce the implied statement of a law of nature to the mere record of an historical event."

      Such, then, are the materials of the inductive method. Not parts of facts or instances; not a clause of a verse, or a single sentence; not a single case, even when taken in all its amplitude; but a large collection of cases, all observed in the light of every circumstance that can contribute in any degree to explain them. This subject, which has received the earnest attention of every writer on induction, will come up again, under a different aspect, when we get to the subject of classification. It will be sufficient to observe in this place, that the circumstances which, in the collection of materials for a biblical induction, must in all cases be observed, are such as these: The person speaking or writing; the persons addressed--their prejudices, difficulties, previous attainments, and general character, whether Jews or Gentiles, believers or unbelievers; their relation to him who addresses them, with the main design of his address, and the whole scope of the argument in which the given passage occurs. Equally important is it to eliminate those circumstances which do not properly belong to a given ease, but which we are continually liable to attach to it,--as, for instance, the present state of knowledge, the opinions of modern times, the views and theories which have been based upon it, and all that mass of doctrinal or metaphysical speculation, which is now propounded in the language then used. [215]

      Having acted upon such principles, in the observation and collection of facts, we are prepared to take another step, and to proceed to the classification of the objects we have thus collected.¹ [216]

[TOOS 211-216]